In October of 1991, representatives from 18 nations came together to broker a peace agreement between Vietnam and Cambodia (Nguyen-vo, 1992). For the following two years, the United Nations took direct control of Cambodia, as both Vietnam and Cambodia fought to be accepted into the international community. There was great international pressure to conform to the newer, open reality of a glasnost world
environment. After 1989, there would be an increasing effort on both the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments’ behalf to live up to international expectations in relation to their economic and political systems. After nearly thirty years of war, conflict, and isolation, the two countries were in desperate need of an economic revival to guarantee their survival.
The first step in that revival was supposed to be the implementation of a United Nations transitional government (UNTAC). The establishment of UNTAC had been the culmination of three years of negotiations on how to proceed in Cambodia after the Vietnamese withdrawal. The purpose of UNTAC was that it was to be an international control mechanism that would operate and control the Cambodian government and
institutions while preparations were made for general elections (IPS and UNITAR, 1995). It would take two years for the preparations to be completed.
In general, UNTAC was a very complex operation in a complex environment and this situation resulted in its slow progress. UNTAC involved the deployment of 15, 900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian police, and 1,020 civilian personnel from over 30 countries (IPS and UNITAR, 1995). UNTAC’s mandate involved, “major tasks in institution building and social reconstruction as integral parts of a peace-building ‘package’ designed to secure an end to armed conflict, and a transition to genuine
democracy” (1995, p. 4). It was a tall order and the time span to achieve the initial goals was very short. Needless to say there were some serious shortcomings in the mission. Specifically, the civil administration failed to gain control over the key areas of
government, including education. Therefore, once again, education became embroiled in the political, social, and economic turmoil encompassing Cambodia.
However despite overall shortcomings, some achievements were made under UNTAC. As per its official mandate, the attempted rebuilding and development of Cambodian social structure and institutions became the key focus for the temporary United Nations transitional government. Since the country’s economic and social structure had been a socialist model under Vietnamese control (at least until 1989), the focus was on establishing a capitalistic mind set as Cambodia prepared to enter the world market system. Thus, from the outset, the educational reforms in post-conflict Cambodia were intimately tied to changes in the economic and political structures of the country and the world beyond.
However, economic progress was slow and it was deemed by those in control that a properly run and structured education system was the way to improve economic
productivity. The financing for the rebuilding would have to come primarily from other nations and multinational financial organizations. Throughout the 1990s, these
institutions were becoming deeply ingrained with neo-liberal ideals and these would become an elemental condition of the loans to developing nations such as Cambodia.
When Cambodians elected a new government and restored the monarchy in 1993, it officially became an independent kingdom-nation once again. However, the influx of multinational and international agencies into the social, political, and economic structures of the country did not stop with the dismantling of UNTAC. What the Paris Peace
Accord of 1991 did do was to officially mandate international influence over Cambodian domestic affairs in the name of development. Ayres (2000) lists five main characteristics of the educational sector during UNTAC. These are: 1) the State of Cambodia still maintained official control over education; 2) there was an increased presence and profile of NGOs in the education sector; 3) education was in a terrible mess in the country; 4) educational development was haphazard with no clear plan or direction; 5) multinational organizations gained a say in the future direction of education in Cambodia through their funding. Through these processes, it is clear to see where the contradictions lay. The State of Cambodia, although officially still in charge of education, was becoming increasingly dependent on multinational financial organizations to reform and run their education system, and NGOs to staff the education sector. So many different groups were getting involved in education in Cambodia that there was little surprise that no clear direction was developed and the system remained obsolete and unmanageable.
This has then been the situation in Cambodia since the first democratically elected government came to power in 1993. This is the legacy of the policies under study in the following chapters. This background was intended to show how multinational and
international influence in the country has shaped the direction of domestic policy in Cambodia. Today, 16 years after the first election, Cambodia still struggles with its developing post-conflict status and the difficulty of balancing domestic needs with international demands. In the next chapter, I will examine theories about globalization and connect them to the situation in Cambodia.