SAJONAS v. CA (July 1996)
While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. While it is true that under the Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
Sentence three, paragraph two of §70 of P.D. 1529 provides: "The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: "After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest."
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
LEASE
CHUA v. CA (February 1995 )
There being no ambiguity in the lease contract, there is no basis to allow oral testimony to prove that petitioner was given verbal assurance of a renewal of the lease.
NASSER v. CA (June 1995)
The trial court had authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract.
DE VERA v. CA (G.R. No. 110297, August 7, 1996)
The issue in this case is whether the oral contract of lease was on a month-to-month basis which is terminated at the end of every month. We hold that it is. We have already ruled that a
lease on a month-to-month basis is, under Art. 1687, a lease with a definite period, upon the expiration of which upon demand made by the lessor on the lessee to vacate, the ejectment of the lessee may be ordered.
Thus, what has been suspended by the Rent Control Law is Art. 1673, not Art. 1687.
The efect of the suspension on Art. 1687 is only that the lessor cannot eject the tenant by reason alone of the expiration of the period of lease as provided in Art. 1687. Otherwise, Art.
1687 itself has not been suspended. Hencem, it can be used to determine the period of a lease agreement. As petitioner was notified of the expiration of the lease efective December 30, 1990, her right to stay in the premises came to an end.
SANDEL v. CA (G.R. No. 117250, September 1996 )
Private respondent's reliance on De Rivera v. Halili and Dy Sun v. Brillante is misplaced, for these were decided before the effectivity of B.P. 129. The former held that the assertion of the parties of their respective right to own the properties in controversy converted the litigation into an inquiry into the nullity of the presented documents,or from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus beyond the Justice of the Peace's jurisdiction. This rule has since been modified.
§33, BP 129 provides: Even if the defendant sets up the matter of ownership, such is of no moment, because, the MTC is competent to determine ownership, for the purpose of determining possession de facto, though without prejudice to a plenary action to determine ownership.
A reading of the complaint shows that the action is for unlawful detainer, since what is sought is the recovery of possession of the leased premises, following the lapse of the term of the lease agreement. After the lapse of the lease contract, the lessee has no more right to remain in possession of the properties. It becomes his obligation to turn over the same to the lessor. (Arts. 1669 & 1673, NCC)
INTER-ASIA SERVICES CORP. v. CA (G.R. No. 106427, October 1996)
To renew means the old contract is extinguished, thus a new one must be executed, and vice-versa; and in this case, there was only an extension]
Thus, petitioner failed to establish its right to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. In fact, the act being enjoined [ejectment] was not a unilateral act on the part of private respondent as the lower court concluded but a logical consequence of the expiration of the lease contract, an act mutually agreed upon by the parties.
In Fernandez v. CA (166 SCRA 577 [1988]), this Court held that an alleged verbal assurance of renewal of a lease is inadmissible to qualify the terms of the written lease agreement under the parole evidence rule and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
SAN ANDRES v. CA (G.R. No. 94516, December 6, 1996)
The question is whether this constitutes a demand to vacate as required by Rule 70, §2, sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MeTC. We rule in the negative. First, the lease between petitioner and private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Go Co, was not terminated by the dath of Go Co. The fact is that the parties here so regarded the contract and therefor continued the lease even aftter Go Co's death in 1974. It was only in 1987, 13 years later, when petitioner demanded execution of a new contract on ground that the lease had been terminated by Go Co's death.
The demand must be either to pay the rents or comply with the terms of the contract.
But petitioner's letter makes neither demand. Instead, the letter demands execution of a new lease on the mistaken theory that the lease had been terminated by Go Co's death; further, the lease with Go Co provided for transfer of ownership of the buildings built upon the land upon expiration of the lease in 2003.
The question is whether the prohibition against the sublease of the land extends to the building. Because the lessee, Go Co, ran out of funds to finish the construction of the building, he was forced to borrow money from Land Center, to pay for which he allowed the latter the free use of the building. Land Center, in turn, subsequently leased the building for a 5-year term to Kookaburra Industrial.
However, for the purpose of enforcing the "no-sublease" provision of the lease contract here, it is clear not only from the text of the agreement which unequivocally speaks of the sublease of "the land leased herein," but also from its context that it does not apply to the lease of the building which the lessee had constructed on the land leased. (citing Arts. 1370, 1373 &
1374) This is because the term of the lease is for 30 years. The purpose of the lease is for the lessee to have a place on which to construct a building or a factory. The building could be a tenement house or a factory, either of which could be for commercial purposes. A stipulation that upon the expiration of the lease the building constructed by the lessee will become the property of the land owner is usual with respect to commercial buildings, the lessee calculating that the building will bring him income sufficient to cover his investment for a fair return. It is thus unlikely that, in entering into the 30-year lease here, the parties contemplated imposing restrictions on private respondents' rights of ownership of the building, by prohibiting even the lease of the building constructed by the lessee. The most natural and logical construction of the
"no sublease" provision is that it refers only to the land leased but not to the building or factory which the lessee was authorized to construct on the land.
HEIRS OF SUICO v. CA (G.R. No. 120615, January 21, 1997)
It has been held that the power of a court to extend the term of the lease under the second sentence of Art. 1687 is potestative, or more precisely, discretionary. The court is not bound to extend it, and its exercise depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case.
Private respondents and their parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 years when the ejectment case was filed. Further, despite the relatively large premises, private respondents were paying a meager sum as rental. Thus, the arrangement obviously worked in favor of private respondents, who received greater benefits while petitioners were unable to have full use and enjoyment of a substantial portion of their property. The need to balance these interests did not sanction an extension of the term.
The value of the house is inconsequential since it was build in 1950, and private respondents can remove it if petitioners opt not to retain it by paying 1/2 of its value, pursuant to Art. 1678, which provides that the lessors would become the owner of the house constructed by reimbursing the lessees in said amount. Petitioners-lessors are thus given the option to pay indemnity, while private respondents-lessees do not have a right to demand that they be paid. If the former refuses to reimburse, the latter's remedy is to remove the house, even though petitioners' lot may suffer damage thereby, as long as the damage caused is not more than reasonably necessary.
BANGAYAN v. CA, (August 1997)
Art. 1311, NCC, provides that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except where the rights and obligations arising from contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Here, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the lease contract provided that the right of first option was not transmissible, which are consistent with Art. 1649, NCC that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. We have held that the lessor's consent is necessary as the assignment of the lease would involve the transfer not only of rights, but also of obligations. It constitutes novation by a substitution of the person of one of the parties.
It cannot be denied that Teofista's right of first option to buy the leased property in case of its sale is but part of the bigger right to lease said property. The option was given to Teofista
as she was the lessee. It was a component of the consideration of the lease. The option was by no means an independent right which Teofista could exercise. It ought to follow that if Teofista was barred by contract from assigning her right to lease the lot, she was similarly barred from assigning her right of first option to Angelita.
SADHWANI v. CA (October 1997)
Whether under their contracts with Orient, petitioners had a right of first refusal (RFR) in case the property was sold. To begin, it is fundamental that a contract binds only the parties to it (Art.
1311, NCC). The RFR was embodied in the lease contract between Sawit and Orient, to which petitioners were not a party to.
The rule is different, however, regarding assignments of lease. Art. 1649 provides that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Indeed, the consent of the lessor is necessary because the assignment of lease would involve the transfer not only of rights, but also of obligations. Such assignment would constitute novation by substitution of one of the parties, i.e., the lessee.
CHUA v. CA, IBARRA (January 21, 1999)
Court have no power to extend lease with a term.-As there was no longer any lease to speak of which could be extended, the MTC was in effect making a contract for the parties which it obviously did not have the power to do. The potestative authority of the courts to fix a longer term for a lease under Art. 1687 of the CC applies only to cases where there is no period fixed by the parties.
Improvements made by lessees on the leased premises are not valid reasons for their retention thereof; otherwise, a lessee would “improve” his landlord out of his property. – The fact that petitioners allegedly made repairs on the premises in question is not a reason for them to retain the possession of the premises. There is no provision of law which grants the lessees a right of retention over the leased premises on that ground. Art. 448 of the CC, in relation to Art.
546, which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursements us made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. In a number of cases, the Court has held that this right does not apply to a mere lessee, otherwise, it would always be in his power to “improve” his landlord our of the latter’s property. Art. 1678 merely grants to such a lessee making in good faith useful improvements the right to be reimbursed ½ of the value of the improvements upon the termination of the lease, or, in the alternative, to remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement.
LHUILLIER, vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 128058. December 19, 2000)
A covenant to renew a lease, which makes no provision on its terms, implies an extension or renewal subject to the same terms in the original lease contract. Since the parties did not make a new one, the terms and conditions of the original except the provision on the rate and period of lease are deemed extended. Corollarily, Art. 1678 of the Civil Code did not apply. 9 The parties agreed that all improvements introduced by the lessee would accrue to the benefit of the owner at the end of the lease, without reimbursement. 10 This stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, binds the parties and is the law between them.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS 2001
REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG (G.R. No. 109975, February 2001)
Civil Law/Persons/ Psychological incapacity/Molina Guidelines: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, is void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. And whether or not psychological incapacity calling for annulment exists depends crucially on the facts of the case.
The Court reaffirms Republic v. CA & Molina, where it laid the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage, when the parties exchanged their "I do's." Its manifestation need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code 20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code 21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by the courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
CARIÑO v. CARIÑO (G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001)
Civil Law/Persons/Contracting Second Marriage/Property Regime: (1) Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring
Civil Law/Persons/Contracting Second Marriage/Property Regime: (1) Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring