4. CAPÍTULO IV ANÁLISIS Y DISCUSIÓN DE RESULTADOS
4.2 Discusión de los resultados encontrados con los antecedentes teóricos
Given the current stalemate and the SCNC’s continuous adherence to its motto of ‘the force of argument and not the argument of force’, it would appear that future negotiations between the Anglophone and Francophone elites, like the 1961 constitutional talks in Foumban, are the most likely way of solving the Anglophone problem. Increasing numbers of the Anglophone and Francophone elite are beginning to support a negotiated solution.
A major opportunity to lay the long-standing Anglophone problem to rest was missed during the constitutional reform debate in the 1991-96 period when the Anglophone elite proposed a return to the federal state and even drew up a federal draft constitution. At the end of this process, which was fully controlled by the government, the 1996 constitution introduced a new classification of Cameroonians: those who belong to autochthonous minorities and those who do not. No attempt was made to define this bizarre concept but the Anglophone minority problem was carefully fudged. This attempt by the regime to re- conceptualise ‘belonging’ was obviously aimed at safeguarding its survival. Finding it hard to win free and fair elections in the new multi-party system and to meet the Anglophone challenge to the unitary state, it felt obliged to encourage the resurgence of local identities which were likely to support its continued stay in power and to stretch the conventional ideas of minorities to such ambiguous proportions that historical minorities like the Anglophones were denied minority status in the 1996 constitution (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000).
It has become increasingly evident that Biya forms the major obstacle to the multiple calls for negotiations between the Anglophone and Francophone elite. As recently as December 2001, he declared in his New Year message that it would be a betrayal of the founding fathers of nation-building to make any concessions to forces seeking secession or the fragmentation of Cameroon. He
appears not yet to realise that his present strategies of appointing a few Anglo- phones in strategic positions previously reserved for Francophones and brutalising the Anglophone movement are more likely to radicalise Anglophone demands than offer a lasting solution to the problem. The emergence of the SCYL with its advocacy of armed struggle, the election of a new and apparently bolder SCNC leadership, and the heated discussions of the Anglophones in the diaspora on the Internet furnish proof for possible radicalisation. At present, the gap between the Biya camp and the Anglophone leadership is so wide that there are no political or religious leaders in the country who command enough trust among both sides to be able to serve as credible intermediaries or facilitators of any discussion on the sensitive Anglophone problem. That is why the Anglo- phone leadership strongly believes that no meaningful dialogue is possible without the involvement of the United Nations, the supervisory organ of the former Cameroon trust territories. During his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between the Anglophone and Francophone leaders. To forestall any further bloodshed and an escalation of the conflict between the Anglophone movements and the Francophone-dominated state, he should bring more pressure to bear upon Biya to accept dialogue and help organise constitutional talks under the auspices of the United Nations.
Unlike the constitutional talks in Foumban in 1961, it would be advisable that, prior to the negotiations, the Anglophone and Francophone populations were to be actively involved in the constitutional process about the future form of state and eventually consulted in a referendum. We have stressed in this book that Anglophones and Francophones are by no means monolithic blocs. Both are divided along various lines, including ethno-regional ones (for example, the South West-North West divide in Anglophone Cameroon and the Bamileke- Beti divide in Francophone Cameroon), political ones (supporters and opponents of the regime), and constitutional ones (different opinions about the future form of state).
During the actual negotiations, the various options for a future form of state are to be discussed freely and frankly. The major options appear to be the following:
· The formation of two independent states. The Anglophone call for an inde- pendent state has a long tradition. It was the most popular option in the Southern Cameroons in the years preceding reunification but the local population was eventually not given the chance by the United Nations to vote for it during the 1961 plebiscite. The Anglophone movements renewed this call during political liberalisation in the early 1990s. Contrary to the pre- reunification period, the renewed pursuit of an independent state was
initially a minority option with most Anglophone movements striving for a return to a federal state. It was only after Biya’s persistent refusal to discuss the federal option that the leadership of the Anglophone movements started championing a non-violent separation between Anglophone and Franco- phone Cameroon into two sovereign states along the lines of what happened between the Czechs and Slovaks in 1992. Such a peaceful separation would be accompanied by an equitable sharing of assets and liabilities, and perhaps supported by the establishment of other cross-border confidence-building institutions. Most leaders of the Anglophone movements now argue that this solution possibly holds the best chance for peace in the long run because any attempts to engage belatedly in democratic and institutional reforms just to placate the Anglophones and preserve international appearances may only prolong the agony of the Anglophones and postpone the day of reckoning. An increasing number of scholars like Ghai (1998) and Sandbrook (2000) also regard secession as the best solution in cases where there are no prospects for any peaceful coexistence of territorial units within dysfunc- tional and deeply divided nation-states. Eritrea’s peaceful separation from Ethiopia in 1994 following a referendum the previous year reassured those who feared that secession in any African country would open a Pandora’s box of violence and fragmentation.
The question, however, arises of whether there is sufficient support for the Anglophone movements’ call for the creation of an independent Southern Cameroons state. They themselves claim widespread support in the Anglophone region, often referring to the 1996 signature referendum. Since there are several indications that the results of this referendum were clearly biased, a new referendum held under UN supervision would form a more reliable source of information about the Anglophone population’s aspira- tions. Our own research instead provides evidence that the majority of the Anglophone elite tends to favour a federation, albeit differing on the number of states. Even some SCNC leaders, like the late John Ngu Foncha and the late Solomon Tandeng Muna (the Anglophone architects of reunification), appear never to have abandoned their federalist ideal although they contin- ued to support the SCNC line in public for strategic reasons.
It is, however, unlikely that the Anglophone movements’ call for an independent Southern Cameroons state will receive any support from the Francophone elite and the international community. The majority of the Francophone elite is clearly in favour of a decentralised unitary state and is determined to keep control of Anglophone Cameroon’s rich natural resources, in particular oil. International organisations continue to respect the territorial integrity of member states and to disapprove of any move towards a further Balkanisation of Africa. That is why, during his recent
visit to Cameroon, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made the Anglo- phone movements understand, in no uncertain terms, that dialogue and reconciliation rather than separation were instrumental in solving the Anglophone problem.
The question of the fiscal prospects of an independent Southern Camer- oons state deserves more attention to justify the SCNC’s pursuit of independence. The same question was posed in the period preceding reunifi- cation and the then existing British doubts about the economic viability of a tiny independent Southern Cameroons state turned out to be one of the main reasons for the UN’s refusal to consider this option. The area has in the meantime become the country’s breadbasket and the source of its consider- able oil wealth and a detailed study of the post-colonial Southern Cameroo- nian economy is needed to re-assess the economic viability of an independ- ent Southern Cameroons state.
· A return to the federal state. Since the formal dismantlement of the sham federation in 1972, federalism has been rejected by the regime as alien and synonymous with fragmentation and secession. However, more than forty years of centralisation has not brought about the declared goals of national unity and integration, or economic progress. Why not start an experiment in true federalism, requiring among other things, the transfer of power to a lower level of jurisdiction with clear geographical boundaries, a legal status, specified functions, fixed financial resources and autonomous personnel. Of course, federalism per se offers no magic and ultimate solution to the Anglophone problem but properly conceived and implemented it might enhance the chances of regulating deep divisions within society and prevent them spilling over into inter-communal violence. The past fifty years have witnessed a federalist revolution. According to one estimate, nearly 40 per cent of the world’s population now live within polities that are partly federal, and another third in polities that apply federal arrangements in some way (Fombad 2001). The seeming viability and durability of the Nigerian federal experiment in the face of severe odds has turned the country into an important reference point of constitutional efforts to engineer unity and peace in Cameroon and other deeply divided societies on the African continent (cf. Suberu 1999). At the same time, however, the continuing Nigerian problem of developing criteria for the sharing of federal revenues requires us to devote ample attention to the economic implications of federalism (Olukoshi & Agbu 1996). The 1961 federal constitution did not provide for any autonomous financial resources for the federated state of West Cameroon and this quickly became a source of fierce conflict between the West Cameroonian authorities and the federal government. The high
costs of federalism later allegedly became a pretext for the central govern- ment in Cameroon to abolish the federation and to oppose the re-introduc- tion of a federal state.
Secessionist tendencies may disappear in Anglophone Cameroon if the present situation is turned in the direction of federalism and Anglophones are constitutionally guaranteed equal status and the preservation of their language and cultural identity. Federalism is widely supported in Anglo- phone Cameroon but Anglophones clearly differ on the number of states there should be. The Anglophone movements used to propose a return to the two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) federation but in sharp contrast to the pre-1972 federal arrangement, they have devised a federal draft constitution that provides for true autonomy for the federated states and even for the provinces within the federated states. The South West elite in particular are proponents of the ten-state option that calls for radical decentralisation of power based on the current ten provincial administrative units. For them, multi-party electoral competition and advocacy of a return to a two-state federal arrangement amplify fears of the domination of ‘their’ political space by North Westerners (Eyoh 1998a). The major opposition party in the country, the North West-based SDF, proposes a four-state federation so as not to alienate its majority Francophone membership. Anglophone pursuit of a federal state is also backed by certain ethno-regional groups and opposi- tion parties in Francophone Cameroon, albeit differing, like Anglophones, on the number of states.
· Regional decentralisation. Decentralisation within the unitary state is an option that has been supported by the vast majority of the Francophone elite and a small minority of the Anglophone elite from the very start of the constitutional reform process in 1991. At present, many appear to be disappointed by the decentralisation clauses laid down in the 1996 constitu- tion and their actual implementation. While the constitution provides for the possibility of some deconcentration of powers through the creation of regional and local authorities, these provisions are stated in such dubious, obscure and circumlocutory language that it is doubtful if there were ever any serious intentions of implementing them (Fombad 2001). None of these so-called new institutions, like regional councils, have been established. Moreover, recent official statements by senior government officials, including the president, have called for the postponement of their implementation.
Some Francophone scholars, such as Olinga (1994) and Donfack (1998), are now proposing the introduction of regional states with larger powers than the regime has been willing to grant, occupying a middle position on
the constitutional spectrum between decentralisation and federalism. The formation of such states that in their view form an adequate answer to the widespread desire for autonomy in both the Anglophone and Francophone parts of the country could be based on the ten existing provinces or on new constitutionally recognised regions. The latter makes it possible to recognise one Anglophone region. The creation of an Anglophone region could be even more acceptable to the Anglophone movement if given a special status on the grounds that the Anglophone population perceives itself as a distinct community defined by differences in official language and inherited colonial traditions of education, law, and public administration. Similar experiments have been tried in countries such as Canada where Quebec enjoys a special status, and in Spain.
Ultimately such constitutional talks can only succeed if the regime is prepared to abandon its Gallic centralist conception of the state and the participants are allowed to think constructively and imaginatively about the most suitable solution to the Anglophone problem. This also requires Anglo- phones knowing where their best interests lie and having leaders capable of articulating their community’s concerns and aspirations.