How essential is language for thinking? This question was asked by Jäger (2004) in an article about the ‘Mediale Konstitutionsbedingungen des Mentalen’ (p. 15). He proposes that language is constitutive and essential for the development of mentality on different levels and that language can influence cognitive performances. The thesis that language influences the way a person behaves and thinks has been an important issue in linguistic tradition for several hundred years.
How far back this view can be traced is largely a function of how one understands the terms language and thought and how explicit a hypothesis one requires.
However, formulations begin to appear with the work of Herder and particularly in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836; for a review see Trabant 2000). In the twentieth century the idea is attributable to Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and especially to Benjamin Lee Whorf, who published a "new principle of relativity" in the paper "Science and Linguistics" (1940) (For an historical overview see Koerner, 2000). In several articles (in Carroll, 1956) about this issue, Whorf discussed the relationship between language, culture and thought. This resulted in a steady interest in linguistic relativity upheld throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and several researchers have tried to prove Whorf’s hypothesis.
There are several researchers, who make linguistic relativity claims. They vary in the attributed degree of the influence of language on thought. An attempt to make the 'Linguistic Relativity Principle' more accessible was Miller and McNeil's (1969) proposal of a weak and a strong version based on a careful review of the results in literature. They concluded that - according to the strong version of this hypothesis - thoughts and behavior are determined by language (linguistic determinism), i.e. speakers of different languages experience different worlds, because the structures of their languages provide them with disparate world views. Thus, language would directly dictate thinking. This strong version of 'Linguistic Relativity' was not accepted among a wide range of researchers. Many researchers argue that it is possible to translate information from one language into another. It is quite possible that people with two different languages understand each other with an interpreter, although sometimes to some extent meaning is ‘lost in translation’.
However, as previously mentioned in chapter II, section 1 (concepts and categorization) of this thesis, contemporary scientists who ascribe themselves to the cognitive linguistic group (D-Linguists) are quite content to accept a more moderate reading of the hypothesis. The weaker version of the theory is based on the premise that language merely influences thoughts.
Categories of one’s native language have a predisposing influence on the way in which one deals with the world. Obligatory parts in languages may differ, so that speakers express different fragments of whatever they have in mind. This implies that speakers focus on different aspects from their concepts about each scene or event, depending on what language they are speaking.
Whorf’s own position regarding the influence of language on thought is not as clear as some researchers imply (e.g. Pinker, 1994). He did not actually present a fully developed, explicit theory of how the language we speak influences the way we think. Rather, based on the discussion and analysis of selected interrelated examples, his writings are more the outlines of an implicit theory. In his publications, Whorf sometimes seems to argue for the strong version of the hypothesis and then he supports the weaker version. Many statements of Whorf suggest that he probably holds the position that language influences unconscious habitual thought, rather than limiting thought potential (see Lucy, 1992; Kay & Kempton, 1984; Werlen 2002). Whorf claims that the system of categories which each language provides is an individual one, so that its speakers have their own `fashion of speaking' (Whorf 1939 [in Carroll 1956], 158). Whorf pointed out that every speaker of a certain language thinks that the concepts defined by their specific language are naturally existing in the external world. Moreover, speakers generalize by assuming that objects, which are grouped together based on a certain criterion, have even more aspects in common.
Whorf claims that language does not determine a speaker’s thought, but rather the structure of the language implies certain associations which are not necessarily perceived and experienced before by the speaker or listener.
Whorf tried to make his 'Linguistic Relativity Principle' plausible with several examples of the Hopi language, but since its publication it has evoked intense controversy. So far, the scholars still do not agree about whether Whorf’s hypothesis should be disputed or defended. Many researchers welcome the fact that the issue of linguistic relativity is again a subject that matters, because a long period of research has been marked by total rejection of a possible linguistic relativity effect. George Lakoff describes it as follows: "For the past few decades, most
"responsible" scholars have steered clear of relativism. It has become a bète noire, identified with scholarly irresponsibility, fuzzy thinking, lack of rigor, and even immorality. Disavowals and disproofs are de rigueur - even I felt obliged to cite the standard disproof of "total relativism" in the previous chapter. In many circles, even the smell of relativism is tainted." (1987, 304). There
are several reasons for this. The first reason is mainly methodological. To test Whorf’s hypothesis, one needs to measure thought. In particular, it is necessary to assess non-linguistic cognitive processes independently of the linguistic features that are presumed to influence them. This is a quite difficult task because it is nearly impossible to suppress language in cognitive processes.
Another problem some researchers have encountered is the small volume of empirical research which supports Whorf’s claims. Schlesinger (1991) claims that "...the mere existence of such linguistic diversities is insufficient evidence for the parallelist claims of a correspondence between language on the one hand and cognition and culture, on the other, and for the determinist claim of the latter being determined by the former" (1991, 18). "Whorf occasionally supplies the translations from a foreign language into English, and leaves it to the good faith of the reader to accept the conclusion that here must have been a corresponding cognitive or cultural phenomenon" (1991, 27). Finally, an argument suggested by Bloom (1981) claims that Whorf's views, because they emphasize cognitive structures, did not fit well with the behavioristic tradition in psychology prevalent at the time that Whorf was writing. Moreover the linguistic relativity principle that Whorf emphasized was in direct contrast to the computationalistic approach represented by Chomsky, Fodor, later also by Jackendoff and Pinker of mental activity, which argues that language is innate and universal. The Chomskyan representational theories, which were dominant at that time, prevented any research on the principle of Linguistic Relativity.
Within cognitive psychology, there was a strong conviction that concepts come first and that language merely names them. In cognitive development, the Piagetian influence favored the same direction of influence, i.e. from thought to language. The position of cognitive psychologists in the last few decades has been that human conceptual structure is innate across cultures. This strong zeitgeist in Psychology and Linguistics as well as the lack of empirical evidence resulted in a period of extreme skepticism concerning the possibility of linguistic influences on thought (Clark & Clark, 1977; Devitt & Sterelny, 1987; Pinker, 1994).
However, currently most linguists maintain a moderate version of the ‚Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis’ holding that language influences higher-level categorization in non-trivial ways (Slobin, 1991; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Papafragou et al., 2008; Boroditsky, 2009; Evans
& Levinson, 2009; Malt & Wolff, 2010). Slobin (1991) for example proposed that language may influence thought during “thinking for speaking”, i.e. language-specific requirements affect the perception of objects or events because those that are relevant for linguistic encoding may become more salient in perceptual and conceptual categorization. Whether the effect is permanent or only a temporary cognitive process during a specific task is still the subject of controversial debate.