DISCUSION Y COMENTARIOS

Introduction

This section examines the formal institutions that the Sunni political elite support in Iraq. Their preferences are examined in two dimensions; the executive-party dimension, and the federal unitary dimension. The views of the responses from key political elite will be discussed and the preferences of the larger number of respondents in the House of Representatives will be examined.

The findings show that the majority of the Sunni elite support consensual arrangements but on certain variables their support for specific institutions could rather disadvantage their position in relation to the Shia majority. It will be demonstrated that group size plays a role but there are other factors involved including the way that they perceive themselves as a group and the positions that they hold. All play an equally significant role in influencing their preferences for institutional arrangements.

Sunni’s Support for Majoritarian and Consensual Institutions

The Iraqi Vice President (2010-2014), Tariq al-Hashimi, supported a political system that could establish a government and an opposition. Similar to al Hakim, he believed that Iraq needs two opposing national political groupings. Al Hashimi is an Iraqi

nationalist and he believed in forming cross group coalitions. In the run up to the 2010 national elections, he joined forces with Shia Ayyad Allawi and formed the Iraqi National Movement, known as the Iraqiya list. His views are shaped by the way he understands Iraqi society, which he sees as in terms of sectarian cleavages, with two main sects, the Shia and the Sunni. He regards Kurds as Sunnis -although they are ethnically different from the Sunni Arabs.

His appeal to the political elite in other groups, however, is not sectarian and he believes the two sects in Iraq could learn to live together. In his view, Iraq’s nationalism, Iraqiness, is the solution. In his interview, he stated that if the Sunni Arabs, the Sunni Kurds, and the Shia nationalists were to join forces, they could form a national front. His responses to the questionnaire on the political institutions also reflected his views as outlined in the previous chapter. Concerning the concentration of the executive power, he favoured majoritarianism, with executive power concentrated in a single- party majority cabinet. He supported an executive-legislative balance of power; a multiparty system; and an electoral system with proportional representation. Regarding interest groups, he preferred a pluralist interest group system with free for all competition among groups.

On the federal unitary dimension, al-Hashimi preferred consensual characteristics on all five variables; federal and decentralised government; division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted Houses; and a rigid constitution that could only be changed by an extraordinary majority. He believed that there should be a review of the constitutionality of legislation by the supreme or the constitutional court: ‘if such bodies were not politicised by a certain sectarian group’, obviously referring to the Shia, and he supported an independent central bank.

Ayad al-Sammarai, the former speaker of the Iraqi parliament, preferred consensus based models for institutional arrangements. On the executive party dimension, he favoured the consensus elements of executive power sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, an executive-legislative balance of power, a multiparty system and proportional representation. For interest groups, he supports a pluralist interest system with free for all competition among groups, a majoritarian characteristic.

On the federal unitary dimension, al-Sammarai again preferred all the consensual elements of federal and decentralised governments, the division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted Houses, a rigid constitution that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities, and an independent central bank. For the legislation, he favoured a system in which the legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of its own legislation, a majoritarian approach.

The current Head of the House of Representatives, Salim Abdullah al-Jaburi, preferred consensual institutional arrangements on 8 variables. The only two majoritarian institutions that he chose were interest groups and the legislation. Mohammed al- Tamaimi, the Education Minister, similar to al-Samari and al-Hashimi, supported 8 consensual traits. The Trade Minister, Khairulla Hasan Babakr preferred three majoritarian traits; plural disproportional representation; the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature; and a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. The Culture Minister, Saadun al-Dulaimi, preferred three majoritarian institutions; concentration of power in a single-partly cabinet, a two party system, and unitary decentralised government.

A pattern could be discerned in the above responses. The Sunni political leaders have different or opposing views on the key variables, such as the concentration of executive power, the legislative and the legislation. The responses from a wider number of the Sunni political elite, members of the House of Representatives, are explored below.

The Executive Party dimension

On the executive party dimension, there is a 75 percent support for consensus among the Sunni members of the House of Representatives. On the specifics, there is a strong support, 68 percent, for consensual concentration of executive power sharing in a multi- party coalition. That indicates the approval of the majority of the Sunni parliament members for a government that is based on a broad coalition. The data also shows a very strong support, 96 percent, for an executive-legislative balance of power. This high percentage could be explained by concerns that the Sunni parliament members have with the executive power, for example, as the Prime Minister is Shia. Bearing in mind that the speaker of the Parliament is Sunni, it becomes clear that Sunni support for an

executive legislative balance of power is, in fact, a preference for a balance of power between the two sects in the apparatus of rule.

With regards to the two variables of party and electoral systems, the data shows a strong support for consensus. There is 82 percent support for a multi-party system and 89 percent support for proportional representation. The Sunni support for a multi-party system can be explained by their numerical strength in the parliament. After the 2010 elections, the Sunnis made up approximately one third, 28 percent, of the House. It is, therefore, no surprise that they strongly support a multi-party system, as a two party system gives them little chance to secure a place in government, as the majority Shia would always win and be the ruling party.

The Sunni Arab’s support for a consensual electoral system of proportional representation can be explained with their acceptance of the political reality in Iraq, representation in the apparatus of rule in proportion to numerical strength. The Kurds, although Sunnis, do not share a political platform with the Arab Sunnis. The Shia, although Arab, do not share a political platform with the Sunni Arabs. Therefore, it is a rational choice for Sunnis to support proportional representation. The last variable on the executive party dimension is the interest groups, with 60 percent support for the majoritarian trait of pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups.

The Federal-Unitary dimension

The data shows a 64 percent support for consensual institutions on five variables of the federal unitary dimension. Although the majority support consensus on the specific variables, the support for majoritarian traits is greater. The only two consensual traits that have a majority of support are government type and the central bank. There is 100 percent support for a federal and decentralised government.110 There is also a strong support, 94 percent, for the consensual basis of an independent central bank.

110 _{Please note that some of the Sunni political elite involved in this study support a unitary and} decentralised government, but they were not among the parliament members. They were members of the council of ministers.

All the Sunni parliament members who participated in this survey supported the idea of a federal state. While they may have differing views regarding the specific details of how Iraq’s federalism should be put into practice, fundamentally, almost all believe that in order for Sunnis to have political independence, a federal region similar to Iraqi Kurdistan is needed. They felt this was the only way that they could escape the hegemony of the Shia and protect themselves from being marginalised.

On three significant variables, the legislative, the constitution, and the legislation, the greater number of the Sunni supported majoritarianism. This is an interesting result because one might expect the minority Sunni Arabs to support consensus on those variables. There is a 54 percent support for the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature. This support could be in part explained by the belief of the Sunni political elite that they could join forces with the Sunni Kurds and Shia nationalists in the parliament.

There is a 54 percent preference for a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. This result can be explained by reference to the findings reported in Chapter 8. Article 142 promises an amendment to the constitution taking into account the views of the Sunni. Due to their boycott in 2005, the Sunni joined the constitution drafting late and established Article 142 as a guarantee for themselves. Without this article, the Sunnis would not have voted in favour of the constitution in the national referendum. This compromise is examined in depth in Chapter 8.

The legislation variable showed 68 percent support for a legislature that has the final word on the constitutionality of its own legislation. The Sunni view the legislative as theirs as part of the power-sharing agreement and so, for example, the Speaker of the Parliament falls within the remit of the Sunni. They believe that judicial power in Iraq has been politicised by the Shia, a view shared by Kurds, Sunni, and even some Shia that were interviewed. It can be argued that the Sunni elite do not support a judicial review or constitutional supreme courts because any judicial review would favour the Shia.

TABLE 6.2 SUNNI POLITICAL ELITE SUPPORT FOR MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUAL INSTITUTIONS

MAJ. CONS.

THE EXECUTIVE-PARTY DIMENSION

The Concentration of Power _{33% 67%} Executive-Legislative Relationship _{4% 96%}

Party system _{18% 82%}

Electoral System _{11% 89%}

Interest Groups _{61% 39%}

THE FEDERAL-UNITARY DIMENSION

Government type (Federal or Unitary) _{0% 100%}

The Legislative _{54% 46%} The Constitution _{54% 46%} The Legislation _{67% 33%} Central Bank _{4% 96%} N= 28 Conclusion

Overall, the Sunni political elite support a mixture of consensual and majoritarian approaches to the two different dimensions. On six variables, the majority supported consensual traits. These include; concentration of the executive power in a multi-party coalition, executive-legislative balance of power, a multi-party system, a proportional electoral system; a federal decentralised government and independent central bank. On four variables, the greater number supported majoritarian traits. These are; a unicameral legislature, a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. A legislature that has the final word on the constitutionality of its own legislation and interest groups that are free for all.

These findings partially confirm the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3; the smaller the group, the more likely it is that it will support consensus. On specific traits and institutions, however, the matter is more complex. The findings showed that group size has a significant role but it is not the only factor in determining preferences. On four variables, the majority of the Sunnis supported majoritarian traits, and those could be explained by the way in which the Sunni political elite view themselves, and other groups. Perhaps the most important factor, however, is the positions that the Sunni elite hold in the apparatus of rule. Based on the informal power sharing agreement, the post

of the Speaker of the House is reserved for the Sunni and this, as the findings demonstrated, has to a great extent influenced their preferences for the type of institutional arrangements in Iraq.