Utility communications with local officials were a major problem during the February 2003 ice storm in central and eastern Ken- tucky. The PSC received complaints that util- ity officials were unavailable to local elected officials and emergency response personnel, particularly during the initial hours of the storm. The PSC recommended that utilities take steps to improve such communications in the future.
Partly in order to assess whether the recom- mendation made following the 2003 storm had been implemented, the PSC surveyed local officials, as well as state legislators, in the areas affected by Hurricane Ike and the ice storm. Responses were received from 75
cities and 29 counties affected by the ice storm, as well as from four legislators and nine city council members in Louisville and Lexington. A total of 32 elected officials re- sponded to the inquiries regarding Hurricane Ike. Both the Kentucky Association of Coun- ties and the League of Cities assisted in the information gathering.
The responses suggest that utilities learned the lessons of the 2003 ice storm with respect to communications with local government. It appears that the recommendations made fol- lowing the 2003 ice storm were heeded. With one notable exception, there were no signifi- cant communication breakdowns between utilities and local officials, other than those that were the inevitable consequence of tele- communication system disruptions.
The one consequential communication break- down occurred between Jackson Purchase Energy Corp. and officials in McCracken County, which is home to 40 percent of the utility’s customers. In its response to the PSC, Jackson Purchase Energy said that it did not communicate with any government entity from the beginning of the ice storm on January 26th until January 29th.
Jackson Purchase Energy stated that its of- fice facilities had no power for approximately 18 hours after the ice storm and that it had no telephone service - land lines or cellular ser- vice - for three days. Jackson Purchase En- ergy said that for the first three days of the event, it had little or no contact with anyone outside the utility except for “occasional status updates” provided to local mayors and county judge-executives through unspecified means.
Restoration efforts in western Kentucky after the 2009 ice storm continued into mid-February
Contact with McCracken County emergency response officials did not occur until January 29th, when, as Jackson Purchase Energy stated in its response to the PSC, utility offi- cials acted after “hearing a plea on WPSD-TV (which we [Jackson Purchase Energy] were monitoring in our office) for someone from [Jackson Purchase Energy] to contact” the McCracken County EOC. Once communica- tions were established, emergency managers “offered us assistance in procuring needed equipment and providing traffic control.” Ultimately, McCracken County was able to provide Jackson Purchase Energy with sev- eral all-terrain vehicles. Additional assistance was provided by Marshall County after Jack- son Purchase Energy contacted that county’s EOC.
The utility’s delay in making contact with local emergency management officials undoubt- edly delayed Jackson Purchase Energy’s res- toration efforts, as it is clear from Jackson Purchase Energy’s response to the PSC staff’s questions that the emergency manage- ment center was able to provide the utility with equipment, manpower, and access to communications with the public after the util- ity contacted the local EOC.
The Commission believes that Jackson Pur- chase Energy’s experience in the 2009 ice storm reiterates the need for all utilities in Kentucky (jurisdictional and otherwise) to de- velop plans to communicate with local emer- gency managers in the event of a major dis- aster. Ideally, such plans would be the natural consequence of participation in annual emer- gency management planning drills. It is dur- ing such drills that contingency planning for the disruption of normal communications can be addressed.
Those communities that have disaster plans in place and conduct yearly exercises re- ported that both facilitated effective response to the ice storm. Several noted that local utili- ties do not participate in the exercises. How- ever, two communities stated that their disas-
ter preparedness exercises had included an ice storm simulation with utility participation. The city of Georgetown stated that it felt the disaster drill was very valuable in showing strengths and weaknesses of their response plan. The city of Willisburg reported that the availability of a community-wide power resto- ration priority list, developed in advance by emergency managers, facilitated disaster re- sponse.
The Commission recommends that disas- ter drills (both table-top and field exer- cises) conducted at the local, regional and state level include the appropriate jurisdic- tional and non-jurisdictional utilities and that utilities actively seek participation in such drills. An essential component of these drills should be the establishment of routine communication protocols between utilities and emergency managers and the development of contingency plans in the event that normal lines of communication are not available. Emergency contact in- formation should be exchanged and up- dated on a regular basis. Power restora- tion priorities should be identified, docu- mented in advance and made available to utilities.