By the early 2000s, a further phase was identifiable. Specifically, the reaction of the most important actors in the large-scale forest industry to the FSC was to create its own standard: the Chilean System of Forest Certification (CERTFOR). Since the FSC faced strong opposition from among the most important forest companies of the country, particularly from CMPC-Mininco and ARAUCO, the latter instead promoted the creation of its own sustainability scheme. As illustrated by one researcher:
“CERTFOR was mainly a response from the larger and more powerful industry groups such as CMPC-Mininco and ARAUCO because they deeply resisted the FSC and, through the support of Fundación Chile and with state funding they created the forestry scheme CERTFOR. In that sense,
CERTFOR was a strategic decision of these large industry groups. And they tried to validate this alternative through the media saying that they didn’t agree with that monopoly [the FSC] and that Chile should have its own forestry scheme because the FSC was a type of colonization and, this new scheme would attain the same outcome.” (interview with N-RM-06).
In the view of some highly regarded industry respondents208, the monopoly exerted by the FSC and its excessively exacting requirements, which it was felt may harm the industry’s interests, were consistently argued as important reasons to justify the creation of CERTFOR. Other common reasons argued by the industry appealed to the country’s sovereignty: some industry officers used to comment that the FSC just was another “gringos’ tale” to impose rules that had nothing to do with the Chilean reality209. There was also another reason: one industry respondent210 noted that the poor development of the national FSC scheme was an important factor to not adopt this scheme in the first half of the 2000s. In words of this respondent “we hadn’t the sufficient guarantees of governance with the FSC; the interested parties took too long in reaching consensus”. Indeed, the process of creating the Chilean FSC scheme took more than 5 years from its initiation at the end of 1998211 (hence, the first two companies that adopted the FSC were certified through an interim standard). In contrast, the process to create CERTFOR was much faster and relatively obstacle-free, as described below.
Overall, the above reasons provided by respondents as to why they opposed the FSC and sought an alternative approach, are consistent with other studies: many forest industry associations developed their own standards in response to the perceived threat to sovereignty and increased regulatory burden they believed the FSC would impose on them (Lister, 2011:47; Auld et al., 2008b; Cashore et al., 2006:14). In addition, Gulbrandsen (2010) argued that the existence of well-organized landowners’ associations would explain why some countries created and adopted their own competitor schemes to the FSC. The Chilean case, with a highly concentrated land ownership and vertically integrated firms, seems to confirm this hypothesis.
The creation of CERTFOR has not been the only self-regulation experiment that the large-scale forest industry has created. Prior to forest certification, the large-scale plantation forest industry had, in 1997, endorsed the creation of an industry code of conduct named “Code
of Forest Practices for Chile” (see Appendix 12). This was a joint effort among the industry, academia and public and international agencies (particularly, the ILO recommendations) in response to social pressures (from workers unions).212 Whilst its level of adoption within the
208 Interviews with PFB-MB-p01 and B-RM-01. 209 Interview with R-VIII-01.
210 Interview with PFB-MB-p01.
211 The national Chilean FSC initiative was finally recognised in 2005. Interview with PFB-MB-p01 and FSC-Chile
(2015a).
large forest industry has been a matter of debate among different actors213, it certainly contributed to encouraging more sustainable forestry practices across the entire forest industry and paved the way for the largest members of the forest industry – associated under CORMA – to adopt the ISO 14001 standard as of 1999214.
Turning to the development of CERTFOR, this scheme was initiated as a joint public/private partnership between Fundación Chile, INFOR and the large forest industry grouped under CORMA. The project was funded by CORFO (a state agency).215 Technically, the rule-making process of CERTFOR drew on the previous work performed by CONAF when they, along with a number of other interested parties, defined SFM indicators in the late 1990s216, as well as on the work of the “Permanent Committee for Forest Management”.217
Since 2002, the CERTFOR scheme has been administrated by CertforChile, a corporation that must update CERTFOR schemes periodically, and provide technical advice to certified firms as required218. The functions of accreditation and certification are carried out by different entities (see Figure 4.2).
213 Interviews with R-VIII-02, R-MB-01, B-RM-01 and PFB-MB-p01.
214 According to the data provided by CORMA, by 2012, more than 1.2 million hectares of plantation forests have
been certified in the ISO 14001 environmental standard (CORMA, 2015a).
215 Interviews with N-RM-06 and see also CertforChile (2015b). 216 Interview with N-RM-05.
217 Interview with R-VIII-01.
Figure 4.2 Flowchart showing how the CERTFOR scheme works. Source: Modified from CertforChile. 219
At its establishment in 2002, CertforChile declared itself to be a non-profit organization with an aim of obtaining international recognition for CERTFOR; this was granted in 2004 under the PEFC umbrella scheme. It also states that its rule-making process included “the different views of forest sustainability so as to guide the system’s principles”.220 However, this statement was questioned by some respondents from NGOs221 – particularly how the consultation process was performed. As described by this FSC social chamber representative:
“When they [The Certfor team] created the standard they consulted people with different views, even I was consulted and people who I know too. But it wasn’t really a consultation but an approaching to the people that they should consult with. Later, we appeared in a list of people who had been supposedly consulted but we weren’t, really. It never happened. They validated CERTFOR through the consultation process but it wasn’t a consultation at all…Actually, there was just a technical team validating such a standard. It wasn’t any democratic participation of social and environmental entities, Indigenous representatives, nothing at all.” (interview with N-RM-02).
My research suggests that the rule-making process of the CERTFOR scheme lacked the participation of actors other than the forest industry itself. An interview with one CertforChile officer222 confirmed this; he stated that “…we try to encourage NGOs to participate but they are
219 The solid arrows show the direct interaction between CertforChile and other entities, whereas the dashed arrows
the indirect interactions.
220 See “about CERTFOR” in CertforChile (2015b) 221 Interviews with N-RM-02 and N-RM-05. 222 Interview with S-RM-02.
not very willing to do so”. The natural consequence was that this process was perceived as illegitimate in the view of many respondents223, and subject to even further criticism because the standard’s governance included only the industry’s interests. There were some early attempts to modify the governance of CERTFOR, in such a way to make it more credible and legitimate, but these were largely fruitless. As described by one researcher who participated in its rule- making process:
“…There was an initial approach to the FSC to draw up a mixed standard, similar to what happened in the UK, but it wasn’t possible at all. The FSC imposed its rules and if they [CertforChile] didn’t have three chambers, that is, environmental, social and economic chambers with proper representatives they couldn’t ‘get on that bandwagon’. And if CERTFOR was mixed with the FSC, then the FSC scheme would prevail. Then, there were like two irreconcilable views: one view wanted this convergence, whereas others thought that since CERTFOR was funded by the state through CORFO they [CertforChile] thought that it was unacceptable to do that [a mixed standard] because they were already recognised by the PEFC. However, they had not included their stakeholders [in its governance]”. (interview with R-VIII-01).
It is likely that this initially weak consultation process undermined the possibility of stronger processes subsequently: many of the stakeholders whom I interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with CERTFOR, and a low willingness to participate in future rule-making processes. According to the above interviewee, CertforChile had – at least initially – an apparent unwillingness to make changes in its governance to enhance its reputation. However, this weakness at the time of writing may have been overcome to some extent, as some stakeholders224 recently expressed their willingness to participate in the rule-making process of the new version of the standard.
For many other respondents225, CertforChile had not adequately promoted some of CERTFOR main strengths, including its local orientation; its reputation as a standard that initiated important sustainability changes in the forestry industry (e.g. qualification system for forestry workers and community consultation); and its mix of performance and procedural based requirements.
Notwithstanding these negative views about its governance, CERTFOR has been largely successful in terms of the area covered by the scheme’s certificates: since its first pilot implementation between 2000 and 2002226, more than 1.9 million hectares had been certified in
223 Interviews with N-RM-02, N-RM-05, N-RM-06, PFB-VIII-n01, I-IX-02 and IW-MB-01. 224 Some union representatives.
225 Industry respondents from small, medium-sized and large forest enterprises. 226 Interview with S-RM-02.
January 2013, mainly by the large plantation forest industry227 (CertforChile, 2015a). However, there are no native forestry businesses certified under this standard yet.