DISEÑO DE ESTRUCTURAS DE DRENAJE TRANSVERSAL: ALCANTARILLAS

At the national level, British Muslims are dissatisfied with a perceived lack of protection of their religious rights and with xenophobic legislation, as well as with British foreign policy. At the local level, however, Muslims are achieving significant

representation.

Jytte Klausen,132 _{as part of her study of Muslims in Europe, compared the number}

of Muslim politicians that have been elected to local and national government positions in six different European countries. In Britain, she found that there are a large number of Muslim politicians represented in local governments, while at the national level Muslim representation lags.133 _{The reasons for this are several. Mass Muslim migrations into}

Britain have been going on for several decades, which has allowed political representation to slowly evolve. This has not been the case in other European countries.134 _{There are two other factors peculiar to Britain that boost Muslim}

participation in local government. First, “local party committees are largely free to decide who gets to stand for elections,” and second, “the combination of decentralized local government and a high degree of residential segregation … facilitates immigrant representation.”135 _{Overall, “demography and the boundaries of municipal government}

conspire … to foster inclusion” in Britain’s local level politics.136

Nationally, Muslims are not as well represented. Currently there are eleven Muslims in the British Parliament.137 _{This is less than one percent of the seats for a}

group that comprises approximately three percent of the population. Thus, the ability of Muslim representatives to influence national policies is minimal.

Muslims have three major concerns about national, as opposed to local, politics. Results from Britain’s Home Office 2001 Citizenship Survey show that Muslims were the most concerned of any faith group that the government is doing “too little” to protect

132 _{Dr. Klausen is Professor of Comparative Politics at Brandeis University.} 133 _{Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 7.}

134 _{Ibid., 23.} 135 _{Ibid., 23-4.} 136 _{Ibid., 24.} 137 _{Ibid., 22.}

the rights of people belonging to various religions in Britain. While the majority of Muslims felt that the government was providing the “right amount” of protection, 34 percent of Muslims felt that the government was doing too little. For the general population, only 27 percent said the government was doing little.138 _{This is not a big}

difference, but it is notable that of all faith groups, Muslims were the most disaffected in this area.

The Muslim community perceives political promises to crackdown on radical Muslims as xenophobia. Many Muslims perceive legislation from the Terrorism Act of 2000 to the Terrorism Act 2006 as an attack on their religion, rather than as legislation necessary to protect the community. Klausen asked British Muslim civic and political leaders this question: Is “right-wing antiforeigner rhetoric not important, somewhat important, or very important” in explaining who is responsible for problems like

discrimination against Muslims in Britain? Seventy-three percent chose “very important” and not one person chose “not important” as an answer.139 _{Klausen asked these same}

leaders if they were “generally satisfied with the way Muslims are treated” in Britain. The majority said they were only somewhat happy. The immediate complaints raised were the “perceived impact” of xenophobic anti-terrorism legislation, but also

unhappiness “about the Iraq war.”140

The most significant feeling of political impotence for British Muslims is their inability to effect changes in British foreign policy, primarily relating to Iraq, but also to Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, and other Muslim lands. Gilles Kepel explained how political impotence can lead to terrorism. He used the May 2003 Casablanca

bombings in his example, but the motives uncovered thus far for both the Casablanca and the 7/7 terrorist attacks were similar. Kepel said, “The Casablanca attacks resulted from a mix of Al Qaeda’s ideology with the social frustrations of dispossessed young men who decided, under the influence of radical salafist imams, to translate their political

138 _{Maria O’Beirne, Religion in England and Wales: Findings from the 2001 Home Office Citizenship}

Survey (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, March 2004), 24-5. 139 _{Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 59.}

impotence into terrorism.”141 _{Kepel and other scholars consider terrorism to be a tool}

used to influence politics when politics by other means is perceived to be a futile endeavor.

Moderate Muslim leaders in the U.K. share Kepel’s point of view. Just after the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, Dilowar Khan,142 _{director of the East London Mosque,}

stated what he thought was likely to be the motivation of the 7/7 terrorists. He believed it was “hopelessness,” by which he meant “opposition to the policies of powerful nations. … Until Iraq, the British government was also looked up to and admired in some ways. … Now the situation may be changing.”143 _{To Khan “there is considerable ill-will}

toward America among Muslims because of its policies toward the Muslim world.” Because Britain is America’s closest alley in the war on terror, Britain shares the ill-will. Chapter four addresses the implications of British foreign policy in more detail.

In sum, dissatisfaction with protection of religious rights, perceived xenophobic legislation, and the inability to change British foreign policy contributed to the alienation of British Muslims.