Diseño de Experimentos-Diseños Estadísticos:

In terms of enmity, this border between order and disorder corresponds to the border between real enmity and absolute enmity. The distinction between real enmity and absolute enmity, in other words, pertains to a distinction between a form of enmity which is related to order and seeks to maintain order, and one which seeks to destroy order completely. Slomp, as such, has argued that while Schmitt distinguishes three types of enmity, concretely, the most significant distinction, for him, is that between limited and unlimited enmity (Slomp 2009, 93). Indeed, particularly when real enmity is considered a borderline concept, the significance of the distinction between concrete, genuine enmity and abstract, absolute enmity can hardly be overstated, as Schmitt very clearly seeks to distinguish the two. The partisan, as the bearer of real enmity grounded in an existential political commitment, is thus "the last sentinel of the earth, as a not yet destroyed element of world history," (Schmitt 2007d, 71) against the sweeping absolute

enmity derived from the sea.49 _{Schmitt very clearly construes the preservation of real} enmity as the last rampart of the political as a mode of existence that gains its significance from struggle and combat (Schmitt 2007c, 33; Schmitt 2007d, 85) rather than from destruction (Schmitt 2007c, 36).

The limited, defensive aim of real enmity is emphasised by Schmitt, in distinction to the offensive form of absolute enmity. The partisan, for instance, relies first and foremost on a telluric bond, which makes "the defensive, i.e., limited nature of hostility, spatially evident, and [guards] it against the absolute claim of an abstract justice." (Schmitt 2007d, 20). It is crucial, for the continuation of the political, that "the real enemy will not be declared to be an absolute enemy, also not the last enemy of mankind," (Schmitt 2007d, 92) as such a transition would lead to a collapse of concrete political order and its replacement with the "absolute claim of an abstract justice, which would not be ground in a recognition of human nature and the necessity of political order, but rather be divorced from concrete reality. As long as the borderline concept of real enmity is preserved and secured, the world will continue to be ordered: "Only the denial of real enmity paves the way for the destructive work of absolute enmity." (Schmitt 2007d, 95)50

Another point highlighted by Slomp is that the political is, for Schmitt, constituted of the distinction of friends and enemies (Schmitt 2007c, 26).51 _{Absolute enmity leads to} the elimination of the friend, as it means positioning oneself strictly in relation to an enemy to be eliminated. As such, one of the preconditions for absolute enmity is the

49 _{Both the opposition of land and sea and the figure of the partisan will be} discussed in Chapter 3.

50 _{As such, I agree entirely with Slomp that Schmitt does not glorify absolute} enmity, but rather seeks to oppose it in favour of some form of limited enmity –

conventional or real (Slomp 2009, 92)

disappearance of the friend – there is only the self and the enemy, with no mediating power or other groups (Slomp 2007, 202). Slomp in particular discusses the case of Raoul Salan, brought up by Schmitt in the Theory of the Partisan.52 _{For Slomp, in Salan we} find the story of a man who, according to Schmitt, lost his political identity," (Slomp 2007, 207) as he found himself surrounded by enemies: first the Algerian guerrilla, then France, then all of anti-colonialism. As Bernstein writes, "the bearers of absolute enmity perceive themselves as surrounded by Evil," (Bernstein 2013, 39) leaving no room for friends. Furthermore, as Slomp notes, it is inherent to the concept of the political that political identities are never fixed: "present allies can become our future enemies just as our present enemies can become our future friends." (Slomp 2007, 207) In the case of Salan, and indeed in the case of absolute enmity in general, any situation other than this unbridgeable hostility is unthinkable: the inhuman, radical evil, cannot be politically rehabilitated, but can only and must be annihilated.

Absolute enmity represents therefore a total rejection of the political and political ordering: "The war of absolute enmity knows no bracketing. The consistent fulfilment of absolute enmity provides its own meaning and justification." (Schmitt 2007d, 52) A commitment to absolute enmity reduces real and conventional enmity to mere "play," that fails to define itself in relation to the meaningful totality – the annihilation of the absolute enemy. (Schmitt 2007d, 52) As such, in Prozorov's words, absolute enmity becomes not political enmity, but enmity of the political – a hostility against the political order that allows such an absolute enmity to exist (Prozorov 2009, 243). The absolute enemy, as Onuf notes, is the utter and complete stranger, which represents an irreducible threat:

52 _{Raoul Salan was the commander of French forces in Algeria before leading the} putsch attempt against the French government in 1961.

"Strangers have no place in a world of brothers, of friends, rivals and enemies, of partners." (Onuf 2009, 9) In a Schmittian political world, therefore, absolute enmity represents nothing else than the spectre of unrestrained violence against order – of chaos.53

Finally, one question that remains unclear for Schmitt is the question of whether a political enemy is declared – that is, determined arbitrarily by a sovereign decision – or recognised – that is, merely acknowledged and accepted by the decision. Schmitt seems to waver between the two, never providing a clear answer to this question. In the Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt writes, very ambiguously that "Eine Kriegserklärung ist immer eine Feind-Erklärung" (Schmitt 1992b, 87), with "Feind-Erklärung" meaning both "declaration" and "clarification" of an existing enmity.54 _{The very story of Raoul Salan,} which Schmitt discusses in the Theory of the Partisan, further blurs the picture, as Salan declares two wars at once, thereby "[losing] his political identity." (Slomp 2007, 207) As Slomp notes, Salan failed to recognise his enemy properly, trying to position himself simultaneously against two negations, thereby losing his political bearings. Ultimately, therefore, it would appear that, as enmity represents the existential "negation" of the self, (Schmitt 2007c, 27) it "comes from the soul," (Slomp 2007, 206), and most importantly, it is constituted of a relationship between the self and the other, the enemy is

53 _{In ontological terms, the attempt to annihilate the other can be equated to a} desire to negate the ontological plurality of the world in order to instil an ontological uniformity ripe for hegemony. In this, see Schmitt's critique of liberalism (Schmitt 2007c, 69–79; Schmitt 2007b)

54 _{Interestingly, the two translations published by Telos Press' differ (both were} prepared by Gary Ulmen, but he disavowed the first when changes were made without his consent). The 2004 version reads "a declaration of war always implies the identification of an enemy" (Schmitt 2004b, 71), whereas the 2007 version reads "a declaration of war is always a declaration of an enemy." (Schmitt 2007d, 85). A. C. Goodson, meanwhile, circumvented the problem by writing of "a declaration of enmity," which is incorrect (the original has "Feind," not "Feindschaft") (Schmitt 2004a, 61).

simultaneously declared by and imposed upon the self. The enemy is declared to the extent that it is declared to be a legitimate enemy with political status: 'The enemy is on the same level as I." (Schmitt 2007d, 85) Fundamentally, however, the political enemy does not represent an ontological Other to be annihilated. Enmity, when ascribed to a determined foe to be eliminated (as in the case of absolute enmity)55 does not rely on the dialectic of recognition and declaration – it denies the fact that "the enemy is our own question as Gestalt." (Schmitt 2004a, 61)56 The following section will, by describing the

three types of enmity, emphasise this distinction between political and anti-political enmity.