CAPÍTULO VI. PROPUESTA
6.7 DISEÑO DEL FORMULARIO DE EVALUACIÓN DEL DESEMPEÑO
The estimates from each of the specifications above indicate that institution participation in guaranteed lending will raise cohort default rates by slightly less than one percentage point; a small amount relative to variation in default rates across institutions. This implies that the moral hazard created by the guarantee depresses effort to the extent that it outweighs any efficiency advantage. This suggests that existing studies may have underestimated the cost of guaranteed lending.
Additionally, the issue of direct versus guaranteed lending is not unique to student lending. The federal government subsidizes a number of loan markets including the market for mortgages, small business loans and farm loans. In ad- dition to these examples, the recent Target Asset Relief Program (2008), aimed at bringing stability to the financial services industry, and Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act (2008), which provided liquidity to the secondary market for student loans, are examples of emergency direct lending programs.
Given the scale of government intervention in credit markets, it is important to gain a better understand the differential effects of direct and guaranteed lending on repayment behavior.
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Dependent Variable: Cohort Default Rate Ordinary Least Squares
Institution Fixed Effect x x x
Year Fixed Effect x x x
Controls (see below) x x
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) -0.558*** -0.425** 0.674* 0.892* (-3.55) (-2.61) (2.14) (2.31) By School Type-
Public:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) 0.437 (1.30) Private:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) -0.768 (-1.22) Proprietary:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) 3.810* (2.32)
N 31022 31022 6730 6730
t statistics in parenthesis * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Estimate the Effect of FFELP of DefaultTable 4
Controls: Indicators (two-year, less than two-year, proprietary, public) tuition, graduation rate, enrollment, degree of geographic remoteness
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