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2.2.1. Fairness in Sport

The first argument against doping very simply states that doping is cheating.

There are those who will protest the use of performance enhancing drugs on the basis that they give an unfair advantage to the user in light of the rules governing a particular sport.⁷ The idea of consensual rule abiding casts athletes in the light of a previously

6 The President’s Council on Bioethics adopts the same categorisation though they do not offer the detailed theological account of the fourth argument as it is presented in the present work. See the President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003), 131-151.

7 It is important here to call attention to the uniqueness of each sport. Drugs used to gain an unfair advantage in one sport may not provide any benefit in another sport. Therefore, it is worth noting that universal prohibition against all substances which improve a specific performance might be difficult to justify on practical terms. For example, it seems superfluous to spend time and resources testing chess players for anabolic steroids because the competitive benefit of steroids is absent in the game of chess. On

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arranged contract. By participating in a sport an athlete submits himself or herself to the rules of that particular sport with the understanding that all other participants have agreed to the same regulations. This is what makes competition possible. An event governed by chaos will not determine who is the better athlete or the better team. All must compete under certain rules to exhibit their talents in a way that will result in displaying the best athlete or team in the competition. Any other way is simply meaningless. When an athlete competes contrary to the predetermined rules he or she is breaking the contract tacitly agreed to before entering competition.

Some make the claim that at this point the athlete has ceased participating in that specific sport or at least has severely handicapped the opponent by cheating. For example, if a rugby team decided they would no longer observe the rule against forward passes then that team is given a clear advantage over their opponent who respects the official rule which allows only for the backward pass. It reasonably could be said that the forward passing team is playing its own version of rugby (i.e. Rugbyⁿ) instead of the official game that observes traditional rules. It is doubtful whether any traditional team would knowingly compete against such a team. Even in the event that they did compete any outcome would be essentially meaningless.

This argument is part of a position known as formalism which states that a game is entirely defined by its rules.⁸ From this perspective, when an athlete fails to uphold the rules of the game he or she, strictly speaking, ceases to play the sport. This line of reasoning is often extended to doping. An athlete who dopes is competing directly in opposition to the rules and therefore not technically playing the game. Robert Simon describes it this way. ‘Cheaters violate the rules by failing to make moves within the sport and therefore fail to play it…. One can win the game only by playing it, and since cheaters do not play, cheaters can’t win.’⁹ The fairness argument insists that introducing doped athletes to the sport illegitimates fair play and makes the results of the entire activity meaningless since athletes are not playing the same game.

the other hand some substances such as alcohol and beta-blockers, which would impede performance in most sports, are prohibited from others such as archery for the competitive benefits derived from a slower heart rate and steadier hand. Prohibition applies where an explicit advantage is given to one individual or team over another by virtue of the agreed upon rules. WADA has divided the Prohibited List into three distinct sections. There are substances which are 1) prohibited at all times, 2) prohibited in competition, and 3) prohibited in particular sports. See, ‘The 2011 Prohibited List’,

http://www.wada- ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organisations/International-Standards/Prohibited-List/The-2011-Prohibited-List/ (accessed 1 June, 2011).

8 A more complete discussion of formalism and rules in sport can be found in 7.4. of this thesis.

9 Simon, Fair Play, 46.

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Another strain of the fairness argument points to the implicit respect due to other athletes. The doping athlete, it is argued, is declaring himself or herself exempt from the rules that other competitors must abide by. The mutual respect for all participants in a shared venture for a common goal is a point that should not be overlooked. Sigmund Loland addresses this well when he suggests that sport gains its meaning within a social context where ‘as with any set of shared social norms, it is a more or less clear expression of human interests and goals.’¹⁰ The ethos of a sport is determined by a set of norms shared by these participants to achieve the goals specific to that sport. Loland presents a clear articulation of a sport-specific contract theory in which all participants have a mutual understanding of the structural goals involved in the sport. In this sense it is necessary that sport be built on a foundation of fair play in which all participants share an equal opportunity for victory.

Another principle of fair play is not unlike the golden rule. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Illegally taking performance enhancing substances not only breaks the mutual contract but also shows tremendous disrespect to the other athletes. Treating persons as a means to one’s own selfish ambitions is unethical in all matters of life. Sport is no exception. Beyond the lack of respect for opponents breaking the rules to gain an illegitimate advantage shows a lack of moral virtue on behalf of the user. This behaviour is also contrary to the spirit of a level playing field.

2.2.2. A Critique of Fairness in Sport

For those who wish to ban performance drugs from sport it is clear that the use of biotechnology does little to promote the idea of fair play since doping violates the rules. That breaking the rules is morally reprehensible is hardly contested. Many who favour the use of performance enhancing substances in sport agree that breaking the rules is wrong. Michael Lavin, a supporter of enhancements, contends that, ‘when athletes avail themselves of means that rules prohibit, they do act unfairly…. But the present demand is for a compelling rationale for making the use of certain substances against the rules in the first place.’¹¹ No contracts would be broken if the contracts allowed for their use. This would also eliminate the problem of disrespect since doping would become a legitimate form of enhancement. Doping would then be as acceptable as current training methods which are more traditional.

10 Sigmund Loland, Fair Play in Sport: A Moral Norm System (New York: Routledge, 2002), 9.

11 Michael Lavin, ‘Sports and Drugs: Are the Current Bans Justified?’, in William Morgan (ed.), Ethics in Sport, 66.

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Significant carbohydrate intake by athletes is acceptable, even though it enhances their performance. Lavin and others are asking why the same type of consensus does not exist for performance enhancing drugs. If rules would allow for these more contemporary training methods there would be no reason to see doping as cheating. Lavin comments that most appeals to this justification for prohibiting doping are not really issues of fairness. Rather, ‘when people claim that using a particular drug is unfair, if they do not mean that its use is against the rules, they probably mean that it is either unnatural or secures players advantage at grave risk to themselves or, ultimately, coerces others into taking those same risks.’¹²

Lavin disperses the issue of fairness by redirecting it to one of the other major concerns we will address later in this chapter. But it is questionable whether or not we can so quickly marginalize fair play. The issue of fairness revolves around more than a set of rules. It is not sufficient to say that it would no longer be an issue of fairness if we made them legal since altering the rules would not guarantee fairness. Obviously, if they were legal it would no longer be considered cheating, but that does not mean athletic competition necessarily would be fair. Even most advocates do not endorse all forms of doping. It is difficult to conceive of a sport in which there are not at least some banned substances. Following the argument to its logical conclusion would result in allowing any type of biological agent for competitive purposes in the name of fairness. Such a policy no doubt would be unsafe and unwise.

One side of the argument says doping will make athletes more equal while the other side says that doping actually degrades the level playing field on which all athletes compete. But it is legitimate to ask both sides, to what extent is the playing field level already? Inequality among athletes is unavoidable. Some athletes naturally have more talent than others.

Doping advocates claim it is precisely the notion of fair play that makes the use of performance enhancing substances so appealing. Biotechnology does not undermine the spirit of fair play but rather enhances it.

Currently, people are at the mercy of the genetic lottery. Many aspiring athletes have a passion for their sport but their physical abilities limit their success. It is suggested that doping may allow those athletes to perform at the elite level by eliminating the performance gap between average and elite athletes. Tamburrini

12 Ibid., 266.

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contends doping will give everyone an equal opportunity to achieve success in professional sports. ‘Genetic technology makes it possible to reduce current gaps in skills and inherited traits between individuals.’¹³

Presumably, the best athletes will become not those who are most gifted but those who are most dedicated. Doping would level the playing field by ‘allowing the winners to become those who do the best rather than those who are the best.’¹⁴ I would point to two problematic areas in Tamburrini’s assertion that fairness is best served by allowing doping.

First, the natural unfairness is part of what makes sport so competitive and exciting. There is a modest sense of wonder at the performance of those who excel at physical activities.¹⁵ If everyone were able to achieve these feats it would remove much of the awesomeness of sport by tarnishing key characteristics of the game. A highly motivating factor in sports is the realization that one’s opponent is superior. Ambitious athletes who know they will be competing against more talented people than themselves are motivated to train harder thus improving the overall quality of the sport. One of the beautiful aspects of sport is the satisfaction that comes from defeating someone felt to be better than oneself. This means an inferior athlete performed better than a superior opponent on a particular occasion. There is a real sense of accomplishment in defying the odds and achieving victory over a bigger, stronger, and faster opponent. This could not be experienced if all competitors begin with the same ability. There would be no

‘Cinderella story’ to inspire and captivate the hearts of countless fans.

A second difficulty involves two mistaken assumptions about the effect doping might have on fairness in sport. (i) Doping advocates seem to assume that doping will create identically talented athletes. To believe doping will allow the average athlete to compete on par with elite level athletes fails to account for the possibility of elite athletes doping as well. Doping may raise the performance of average athletes but elite athletes will keep pace in the improvements brought about by their own doping. This negates the whole concept of creating an equal playing field.

But a further point can be made to show that doping fails to be the equalizer advocates claim it to be. (ii) It is unrealistic to think that the same quality of

13 C.M. Tamburrini, ‘After Doping, What? The Morality of the Genetic Engineering of Athletes’, in Andy Miah and Simon Eassom (eds.), Sport Technology: History, Philosophy and Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2002), 261.

14 The President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, 132 (emphasis in original).

15 See 6.2. and 6.3. of this thesis for a more detailed account of sporting achievement and beauty within the limitations of the human body.

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enhancements will be available to everyone. Undoubtedly, the most effective substances will be available to those in better financial situations. By the time the enhancements are inexpensive and accessible enough for everyone to buy them the cycle will perpetuate itself all over again with new, more powerful methods only within reach of the wealthy.

Furthermore, a purely equal playing field brought about by doping is highly improbable since the motivation to gain an edge over others would still exist. This would result in new forms of cheating merely shifting the focus from biotechnology to other methods of unfair competitive tactics.

What then are we to make of the issue of fairness in sport? It is clear that biotechnology is unlikely to create a state of athletic equality. It has also been suggested that the rules against enhancements beg the question of why such rules exist in the first place. The conclusion I wish to put forward is that the current debate over fairness points us to some important issues in sport. It helps clarify a point of agreement within the argument, namely that both sides are calling for fairness to be at the core of athletic activity. The disagreements are in the details of how that is best achieved. As a result, a detailed rationale of the fairness topic is a requirement of any ruling for or against enhancements in sport but is insufficient on its own to establish regulations.