Diseño hidráulico del sector

The Netherlands is a prosperous country with a stable social structure, a reliable banking system (subject to strict government supervision) and only a small number of days lost to strikes every year. It is a setting in which a huge range of firms operate on a businesslike footing, i.e. they are used to meeting their obligations. Electricity companies are no exception to this. Consequently, a firm operating an NPP has a good idea of its future financial liabilities, in both the short and the long term. In this sort of environment, there are good opportunities for creating a profitable energy industry that can also meet the relevant requirements regarding financial stability. The liberalisation of the electricity market did not have any direct material effect on this situation. In the long term, however, some consequential events may have an adverse impact and therefore regulatory attention is continuously required.

In the light of the country’s social structure, operating organisations are expected to be financially sound businesses with sufficient financial resources at their disposal to enable them to take all relevant measures, including those relating to safety. For this reason, no special action has been taken to guarantee the liquidity of the businesses in question, with the exception of the licensing restriction referred to above.

Due to the effects of the liberalisation of the European energy market, it may be advisable to consider the general introduction of legal requirements relating to company financing and organisation. Market liberalisation may lead to the departure of the old, very stable commercial and financial environment and behaviour, perhaps with a negative influence on long-term safety practices and culture.

History and legislative aspects of the liberalisation of electricity production in the Netherlands

Until a few years ago, the Dutch Electricity Generating Board (SEP), a consortium of the Dutch utilities, among others, took care of all international contracts in the electricity sector. The SEP also owned the Dodewaard NPP. In order to achieve a liberalised electricity market, the cooperation agreement between the utilities and the Electricity Act of 1998 had to be dissolved. However, until that time many of the costs were incurred in nonconformity with the market (e.g., capital investments which were not profitable in the short run, such as the construction of a demonstration coal- gasification plant or the district-heating projects). These costs, often incurred as a consequence of government encouragement, could be borne by the electricity sector as a whole (i.e., the SEP). After the European decision to liberalise the electricity generating market, it was necessary to find a way to resolve the financial consequences. First of all, the utilities tried to create a big new Dutch utility by merging the existing utilities. When this failed, a legal solution was necessary in order to achieve a proper liquidation of financial commitments and contracts, and a solution to the problem of the costs that had been incurred by the SEP in nonconformity with the market. On 21 December 2000, the Transition Act Electricity Production Sector was published. This Act regulates the liquidation of the SEP.

In principle, each of the separate utilities is to be responsible for a set proportion of the total costs associated with past commitments and contracts. The government is to cover the costs made in nonconformity with the market via a surcharge on charges for the transport of electricity.

The national grid is to remain independent of the other parties in the electricity market, such as electricity producers, suppliers or brokers. They are not allowed to possess more than 10% of the shares.

The Act’s explanatory memorandum reports the advice of a Special Advisory Committee on these matters. With regard to the nuclear power plants, this is as follows:

The Committee recommends that the ownership of the Dodewaard plant should be transferred from the SEP to COVRA (Central Organisation for Interim Storage of Radioactive Waste). This will also apply to the Borssele plant after its closure. Given the political nature of decision- making on the closure and decommissioning of NPPs, it is strongly advised that the government should be the sole shareholder in the COVRA organisation.

The government intends to follow this advice. Negotiations are, therefore, currently in hand regarding the transfer of the Dodewaard plant to the COVRA organisation. An important issue in these negotiations is the funding of decommissioning. Since 2003, shares in COVRA have been transferred from the owners of the utilities and ECN to the government.

Legislative aspects

The Nuclear Energy Act contains a number of articles, which deal with criteria, interests and conditions under which a license can be awarded. The explanatory memorandum on Article 70, which states that a license is to be awarded to a corporate body, refers to guarantees of necessary expertise and trustworthiness in relation to safety. At the present time, trustworthiness in relation to safety can be associated with financial solvability.

The license does not automatically pass to the license holder’s successor in title. Article 70 of the Nuclear Energy Act stipulates that any transfer of ownership must take place with the consent of the ministers who issued the license. This allows the authorities to assess whether a new license holder can offer the same standard of expertise, safety, security etc. as the previous one. Indeed, the authorities will refuse to issue a license to a proposed new license holder where a change in ownership alters certain circumstances that are of vital importance from a licensing point of view.

Rules and regulations on adequate financial resources

Although NVR 2.2.9 (Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation) contains no direct requirement to possess adequate financial resources to ensure the safe operation of an NPP, it does require this indirectly. For instance, it stipulates that the management of an NPP must act promptly to provide adequate facilities and services during operation and in response to emergencies. The personnel involved in reviewing activities are to have sufficient independence from cost and scheduling considerations. This applies to reviews of all safety-related activities. Paragraphs 6.1.1 and 6.1.3 of this NVR read respectively:

Certain services and facilities complementary to the direct operating functions shall be provided for effective implementation of the management programmes and for ensuring safe operation of a nuclear power plant. These are called supporting functions. The services are the expertise and assistance made available to the plant management to support the operation of the nuclear power plant. The facilities are the equipment and systems required by the

services….

… the operating organisation shall make arrangements to provide the following services and facilities:

1. Training services 2. Operation services

3. Quality assurance services

4. Radiation protection and emergency preparedness 5. Maintenance and surveillance services.

The requirement to provide these services and facilities implies the requirement to provide the necessary financial resources for them.

Rules and regulations on financing decommissioning

Article 1801 of NVR 1.2 states:

The operating organisation is responsible for providing measures for the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant in a safe manner after it has been taken out of operation, and its responsibility can only be terminated with the approval of the regulatory body.

This requirement can be translated into a stipulation that the licensee should have sufficient (financial) resources to ensure proper decommissioning. The Nuclear Installations, Fissionable Materials and Ores Decree (Bkse) specifies that the licensee’s application for a decommissioning license must be accompanied by an indication of the costs of decommissioning and how it proposes to meet them. In the course of operating the NPPs, the licensees of the Borssele and Dodewaard plants have built up (or are in the process of building up) the necessary funding to meet the cost of eventual decommissioning (see annex 2 for a description of the decommissioning plan and associated costs for the Dodewaard plant). It has to be remembered that in the past (prior to deregulation) energy policies and associated finances were regulated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and all utilities (private or otherwise) had public shareholders.

Although, JRC no longer will be the licensee for the HFR in the future, it will remain its owner. Consequently, it has officially stated in its contract with NRG (the new licensee) that the European Communities will bear the entire cost of decommissioning the plant.

Nevertheless, the conditions of the new licence state that the licensee is to provide financial guarantees with regard to decommissioning. A written guarantee from the owner (i.e. the European Commission) will be sufficient to fulfil this requirement.

11.2 Sufficiency of qualified staff