Diseño de Perforación y voladura

Court a formal proposal for settlement of the case but said proposal, however, was ignored by defendant.

The RTC ruled in favor of Technogas ordering Uy to sell to Technogas the portion of land enroached by the building. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC ruling that petitioner is a builder in bad faith because he is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.

ISSUE: Is bad faith imputable to a registered owner of a land when a part of his

building enroached upon a neighbor’s land, simply because he is supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his land as described in his certificate of title

RULING:

NO. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, “no one can determine

the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.” Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent's land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Further, "(w)here one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.

As to the question whether the same benefit can be invoked by petitioner is not the builder of the offending structures bus possess them as buyer, the court answered in the affirmative. There is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired the property from Pariz Industries. In any case, contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the property. Consequently, petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 79688, 1 February 1996 [MANRIQUE]

FACTS:

Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to Kee’s taking actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee’s wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed. On January 30, 1981, Jardinico’s lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate, Jardinico filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.

ISSUE: Was the respondent a builder in good faith? RULING:

YES. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building

on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the respondent (Kee). At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.

GEMINIANO, ET. AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 120303, 24 July 1996

[MATEO] FACTS:

Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano, petitioners’ mother, owns a with an area of 314 square meters. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold in November 1978 to the private respondents for the sum of P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of seven years commencing on 15 November 1978. The private respondents then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease in November 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and Ester Dionisio. RTC ruled that since the private respondents were assured by the petitioners that the lot they leased would eventually be sold to them, they could be considered builders in good faith, and as such, were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements with the right of retention until reimbursement had been made.

ISSUE: Are the private respondents builders in good faith? RULING:

NO. Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation

of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. This Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. And even if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or builders in good faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven. The first thing that the private respondents should have done was to reduce the alleged promise into writing, because under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Not having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise to sell may be enforced, the private respondents cannot

bank on that promise and profess any claim nor color of title over the lot in question.

AGUSTIN v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT