Diseño de la red de agua para las duchas de seguridad

Hazony (2011: 115) explains that the starting point for Berkovits’s approach to Zionism is an understanding of morality rooted in deed and consequence. While, conceding that Berkovits does not ever provide a systematic account of ethics separate from Halakha, nevertheless Hazony (2011: 63) asserts that the bulk of his writings “are infused with a distinctive set of assumptions that amount to a systematic rejection of the Kantian style in ethics.” Specifically it is the role of Kant’s cognitive imperative, which evaluates morality in terms of intention that

Berkovits argues against. In reality, this approach is seen as underpinning the vast majority of Jewish ethical writing in the 19th and 20th centuries. Yet, in formulating his own moral vision Berkovits draws attention away from attempts at identifying a system of absolute intentions to guide all actions. Rather, Hazony explains that “what is important is not intentions, or even “actions” as such, as much as the consequences of action.” Thus, for Berkovits the values elucidated in the prophetic and rabbinic tradition serve as a framework for a desired state of life achieved through human action. Expounding on these ideas in his 1959 work God, Man

and History, Berkovits (2004: 138) explains:

Judaism is not an “idealistic” or “spiritual” religion, but a human one. It is a religion for the whole of man. It aims at relating life in its entirety to God. It is not, therefore, so much a religion of creed as it is the religion of the deed on earth. The intellect or the soul may be satisfied with the creed; the whole man, however, may serve God only through the deed.... However, in order to be, the deed must be effective; and it must be so in the place where it belongs—in the external world, in history (Berkovits, 2004: 137-138).

An important result of this consequence-based ethics is a move beyond personal action to that of the collective as a realised moral order is dependant upon more than the sum of individual decisions. Rather the focus is upon the ethical ramifications of societal conduct. This perspective represents a further break with the Kantian tradition, which frames morality around the autonomous choices of the individual.

In truth, Berkovits notes the significance of individual actions in achieving a realised order of moral worth. However it is maintained that this is not enough to establish a moral society. Instead, attention is drawn to the fact that even the Jewish ideal of the tzadik, the wholly righteous individual, is forced to act within the parameters of his society:

A man may be a perfect tzadik with nothing but good deeds to his credit, yet he cannot but share in the fate of the nation to which he belongs. And if the nation as such lives foolishly and is unable to manage its affairs competently and well, all will suffer within the nation, even the innocent; as all will benefit—even those whom you may think that they do not deserve it—from a just and honorable administration of the group or the state (Berkovits, 1945: 142, quoted in Hazony, 2011: 106-107).

Thus, for Berkovits Judaism in its truest form is a matter of collective action and not individual creed. In Berkovits’s (2004: 137) words “For the deed to be effective, it must not remain the act of an individual, but must become that of a community.”

The conclusion reached by Berkovits is that humanity’s moral advancement is not dependant upon a new ethical doctrine, but instead by the exemplary actions of a society committed to the realisation of an ethical order. It is in this light that he conceptualises the notion of the Children of Israel as God’s “treasured people…a kingdom of priests and a holy nation”(Exodus, 19:5-6).32 For him, the central task of the people is to create an archetypal moral society to be replicated by others. Specifically, concentrating on the notion of “holiness” (Kedusha) in his work Man and God: Studies in Biblical Theology (1969: 245-246) Berkovitz utilises the full gamut of its usage in the Hebrew Bible to understand its meaning. For Rudolf Otto holiness is synonymous with the impenetrable distance of God from man-the Mysterium

Tremendum as explained in his 1917 work The Idea of the Holy. In contrast, Berkovits locates

holiness in ordinary life, as the “dedication” of the mundane human experience to divine connection (Berkovits, 1969: 245-246). The task of living as a holy nation is thus one that requires full dedication of a people’s pursuit to moral concerns. It follows that the realm of the spiritual cannot be limited to the study hall and synagogue. As Hazony (2011: 119-120) explains “holiness is not achieved, in Berkovits’ view, by ignoring profanity and celebrating its absence, but by focusing all the areas of public and private life on that which is ‘right and good in the eyes of the Eternal.’” What is more, it is asserted that:

If an exilic Jewish community is without control over such far- reaching, genuinely existential concerns as defense and economics, it has assuredly been rendered flatter, less representative of the human condition, and therefore less capable of fulfilling the central aims of a holy nation. It is, literally, less holy (Hazony, 2011: 119).

This project is one that is beyond the grasp of the individual, family or even community, instead its realisation is dependant upon active involvement in all aspects of corporate life. However, such a pursuit relies upon the existence of an independent people, responsible for its own destiny. For Berkovits, the distinction between community and nation is precisely what the Zionist movement provides –"sovereignty.