DISEÑO RED SNUBBER

To some Donbass Ukrainians, the post-war nationalities policy of the Soviet state in region appeared as a clear-cut policy of Russification. Ivan Dziuba and Oleksii Tykhyi, the oblast's most famous dissidents, risked their careers and lives in the name of an anti-Russification crusade. Tykhyi eventually died in a Soviet prison camp for his stubborn criticism of Russification in his native Donbass. Both Dziuba and Tykhyi claimed to be loyal disciples of Lenin, and regularly contrasted current practice with Leninist theory. On the whole, there were relatively few dissidents from the Donbass. Of 749 dissidents listed by Krawchenko, a mere 7 were from Donets'k oblast?^

Dziuba, who was bom and raised in the Donbass, was probably the most famous critic of the Soviet nationalities policy. According to the recollections of Anatolii Tymofeiovich Henenko, a former schoolmate of the future dissident, when the young Dziuba began his studies in

Donets'k, he was as a very rustic Ukrainian peasant boy. Although

Kenneth Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth. Svmbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policv. (The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), p. 69 ; Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness, p. 251.

clearly a very bright lad, he was mocked by his fellow, Russian-speaking students for his peasant ways 7^

Dziuba's Internationalism or Russification?^^, first published in 1968, was widely hailed as an important dissident work on the question of Russification in the Soviet Union. When he wrote this work Dziuba was still an ardent supporter of the principles of Marxism-Leninism; indeed his main argument is that the national policy of Stalin and his successors in Ukraine represented a "Great power chauvinist" deviation from the policy of Lenin, whom Dziuba paints as a hero and champion of Ukrainian culture.

According to Dziuba, there was a "very considerable stratum of the Russian petty bourgeoisie" which, rather than being a carrier of

communist internationalism, was instead the "spiritual heir of ten generations of colonisers." Rather than behaving as friendly guests in Ukraine, these Russians regard themselves as masters of the situation and look upon Ukrainian culture only with scorn and contempt. In sum, "[t]his stratum of the Russian petty bourgeoisie ... is a powerful, constantly active, politically reactionary, culturally and morally

degrading factor, which does much to poison the cause of friendship of nations in the USSR"^^ Furthermore, adds Dziuba, this stratum of the population was semi-officially considered to be a "true carrier of correct ideas" and a "reliable prop" for the regime, as a counterbalance to the local Ukrainian population.

Author's discussions with A.T. and N.D. Henenko, August 1996.

Ivan Dziuba, Internationalism or Russification?: A Studv in the Soviet Nationalities Problem (New York : Monad Press, 1974).

In effect Dziuba was noting — in suitably Leninist jargon — the existence of a local Russian elite which had no interest in

Ukrainianisation, never had, and never will have. Certainly, the post- Soviet history of the Donbass, like the region's history in the 1920s,

confirms that there is indeed a segment of the local elite that is inclined to resist Ukrainianisation as long as possible.

Dziuba argues that the changed nationality policy in the post-Stalin era confused Ukrainian workers, who were no longer sure whether

Ukrainian culture was to be preserved or discarded. Of particular interest is a letter, reprinted by Dziuba, written by two Ukrainian coal miners from the Donbass, and directed to the editors of Pravda. In the letter the miners began by pointing out that, according to Marxism-Leninism,

In the future there will be a single common language on earth and there will be no national divisions. So perhaps, the Ukrainian people will be the first to lose its language and other national characteristics... If the time for the final Russification of the Ukrainian people has come, we should actively work in that direction. If not, we should adopt decisive measures to support the development of the Ukrainian language. It seems to us that both courses will receive the support of the people.

Interestingly, the miners argue that someone who cannot speak Ukrainian should not have the right to call themselves Ukrainian, which attests to some acceptance of a purely linguistic basis for a Ukrainian identity. In addition, the miners found that "there were almost no contemporary (Ukrainian) national achievements to be proud of," which suggests a further psychological impetus to Russification. Roman Solchanyk aptly summarises the Soviet interpretation of history as the idea that "Ukraine

and Ukrainians emerged on the face of the earth for one reason and one reason only: to be "reunited" with Russia and R u s s i a n s . U k r a i n i a n leaders were, on the whole, great insofar as they contributed to this lofty goal.^^ In general, the miners were confused by the Soviet government's policy which, while not officially sanctioning the elimination of

Ukrainian culture or advocating Russification, seemed to be hastening the process nonetheless. It is worth noting that in October of 1992 Ivan Dziuba became Minister of Culture of Ukraine.

Oleksii Tykhyi, a country school teacher from the Donbass, was utterly preoccupied with what he perceived was a conscious plot to de­ nationalise Ukrainians in the Donbass. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in small towns such as Mala Illinivka (city of Artemivs’k) where only between 2-5 percent of the population were non-Ukrainian, the primary schools switched over to the Russian language, although neither the students nor the teachers could speak Russian. According to Tykhyi the problem was twofold: on the one hand, parents were attracted to the greater social prestige of the Russian language, and thus wanted their children to study in Russian, and, on the other hand, official pressure to promote "internationalism."^^

Roman Solchanyk, "Politics and the National Question in the Post- Shelest Period," in Krawchenko (ed.) Ukraine After Shelest, p. 17.

Kenneth Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 69.

Oleksyi Tykhyi, Rozdumv: zbimvk stattei. dokumentiv. spohadiv. (Toronto: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1982.), p. 16. For a transcript of Tykhyi's trial for anti-Soviet agitation, see Lesya Verba and Bohdan Yasen (eds). The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. 1976-1980. Smoloskyp Publishers, Toronto

In one of his typically emotional articles, entitled "Reflections on the Ukrainian language and culture in the Donets'k oblast, Tykhyi protests that:

Today the Ukrainian language in the Donets'k oblast is secondary, low, non-compulsory for instruction, doomed to disappear. Yet you still hear it on the radio, on the television, in movie magazines, and drinking songs. This generation studies Ukrainian in schools, knows it, but only does not speak it, for hardly anyone (perhaps one in a hundred) has not studied it and does not know it. But what about in twenty or thirty years? What will become of today's children, who from their prams hear only surzhik or Russian, and study Ukrainian as a foreign language? When it comes time to declare their

nationality at census time, will our children and

grandchildren sign themselves up thus: "Nationality — Soviet of Ukrainian origins. Language — DonbasskiiT^^

Tykhyi's projection was not entirely off the mark, for the Soviet nationalities policy, for better or for worse, did indeed encourage

identification as "Soviet, of Ukrainian origins." As noted, however, this process of forming the new Soviet person was powerfully aided by the demographic processes described above.