Distancia de un punto a una recta en el plano. Supongamos que tenemos un punto

FACTS:

The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration four (4) parcels of land, which they claimed to be the owners in fee simple. The Director of Lands filed an opposition. The trial court rendered a decision ordering registration of three lands and declined to adjudicate on the fourth land. The applicants appealed. The Solicitor General filed in CA a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 4. CA rendered judgment decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4. After the said order, the Solicitor General filed a petition for review of the decree of registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the respondents, then applicants, by intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the herein respondents and the land inspector. The Court of Appeals rendered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the Philippines appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition without affording the opportunity to the petitioner(Republic) to adduce evidence in its claim of actual and extrinsic fraud on the part of the applicants.

RULING:

The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed by the respondents, then applicant, and was filed within a year from the entry of the decree. Without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents the Court below denied the petition. This is an error. There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land Registration Act. Petition Granted. The order appealed from is set aside.

CASE NO.: L- 64159, 138 SCRA 489 CHAPTER: REMEDIES, p.318-319 PONENTE: Relova

FACTS:

Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land which she had purchased from the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in June 1954 and returned in May 1966. Fe Duran (Circe’s mother) forged the signature of her daughter in a deed of sale purporting to sell her properties to her. Fe obtained titles in her name, and thereafter mortgaged the properties to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. Upon her failure to redeem the mortgage, the mortgagees foreclosed and purchased the properties at the sheriff’s auction sale. CFI dismissed the case. CA modified the decision, declaring respondents lawful owners of the lots and ordering the Duran to deliver the lots to the Tiangcos. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

WON a forged deed of title may be a root of a valid title? RULING:

Petition denied; decision of IAC affirmed

• The mortgage was valid with respect to the mortgagees because at the time of its constitution, title to the properties was already in the name of the party who had executed the mortgage (mother).

• The mortgagee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate of title, and did not have to inquire further. If the rule otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of Torrens Certificate of Title would be futile and nugatory.

• This case involves a situation where title to the property had already been registered in favor of a person other than the true owner before being conveyed or mortgaged to the party claiming the rights of an innocent transferee.

• A fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title of the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated in the forger.

CASE NO.: L- 32723, 80 SCRA 89 CHAPTER: REMEDIES, p. 312 PONENTE: Guerrero

FACTS:

Sometime prior to January 19, 19434, a parcel of land was being possessed by Jose Maramba in that month and year a certain Sabina Capua and companions grabbed possession of the property and since then possessed. Sometime afterwards, Maramba filed a civil case for reivindicacion but notwithstanding the case Capua remained. While the civil case was pending, Capua sold the property to Gualberto Calulot and there was no evidence that the latter was informed or came to know of the pending litigation between Capua and Maramba. The CFI declared Maramba as absolute owner of the property. The decision was not executed within the reglementary period of 5 years from the time it had become final. Several years later Calulot sold the same property to spouses Capua and Sinforosa Padilla. Maramba having died, his heirs and successor-in-interest sometime afterwards to Juan Dacasin and his wife; Felipe Capua went to the Court and secured a writ if possession. From then actual possession came to a seesaw. After trial judgment was rendered in favor of petitioners Juan Dacasin, et al. on appeal, CA reversed the judgment. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON Dacasin has the title over the property? RULING:

Petition granted; decision of CA reversed and decision of CFI affirmed

• As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of same property, law and justice command that he who has registered his deed must prevail over his adversary who has not done so.

• The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.

• None of the deed of sale evidencing the ownership in the registry of property, hence they cannot prevail over the rights of the petitioner who holds in his favor the instrument of sale duly registered.

Date: March 11 1994

File GR nos. 76265 and 83280 Ponente: Justice Melo

FACTS:

This case involves the resolution of the court on the motion for reconsideration instituted by the petitioners in the de la Cruz vs CA, 187 SCRA 165. In this case the SC ruled that petitioners cannot raise anew the question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over lot 671 which has been determined by the CA and affirmed by the supreme court . The court’s ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago.

At the core of the controversy is the case of Agustina de la Cruz et al vs. Lucia de la Cruz, Iglesia ni Kristo and Honorable CA (130 SCRA 666 [1984] ) which has settled once and for all the question of ownership of Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City. A portion of these two consolidated petitions in the case at bar. ISSUE:

whether or not the de la decision of the SC in the de la Cruz case constitutes a bar to the petition under the doctrine of Res Judicata

HELD:

Once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less, set aside the same; otherwise, endless litigation will result.

Thus said the court “our decision in these two consolidated petitions is an application of this well-established rule . . . To grant a reconsideration of this decision would also reconsider, reverse, and set aside our 1984 decision which has long becaome final. For while the 1984 decision declared the reconstituted title RT-58 of Lucia de la Cruz valid and legal, petitioners would want us to reach 10 years back and declare the same title null and void; while the 1984 decision declared the Iglesia ni Kristo a purchaser in good faith and for value, petitioners would want us to do a complete turn around and find the INC a purchaser in bad faith”

The court does not agree with petitioners in saying that the de la Cruz ruling is not applicable and hence should not have been applied. The doctrine of Res Judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of Judgment.

The second concept states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot again litigated in the future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.

In order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.

Thus: the issue of validity of the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz over lot 671; the issue of whether or not the INC was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, and the issue of the validity of the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz were Actually, Directly, And Expressly RAISED, CONTROVERTED, LITIGATED and RESOLVED in the 1984 decision. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, these issues may no longer be relitigated in these present petitions.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, plaintiff-appellant VS. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND JOSE B. SANTOS, defendants-

appellees Date: October 26, 1976

File: GR no L-27595 73 SCRA 507 Ponente: Justice Antonio

FACTS:

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Municipality is the lawful and absolute owner of a fish pond situated at San Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan. Hence, the sale effected between the Bureau of Lands and Jose Santos is a nullity.

The Director of Lands answered to the effect that the plaintiff’s allegation of ownership over the parcel of land (fishpond) in question is owned by the Republic of the Philippines and had been administered by the bureau of Fisheries which had leased said land to Jose Santos

As affirmative defense Santos alleged that the plaintiff had already filed a case for annulment of the same title, which case was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE:

WON the order of Bulacan CFI on May 28, 1964, dismissing the “petition for Cancellation of Title, the OCT of title no p-746 against appellees Jose B. Santos constitute a bar to the present action.

HELD.

No it does not. The principle of bar by prior judgment or Res Judicata is based upon the fundamental principle that a matter once adjudicated shall not again be drawn in issue while the former adjudication remains in force. The elements of Res Judicata are: (a.) it must be a final judgment or order; (b.) the court that rendered the judgment or order must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c.) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d.) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of cause of action.

If the judgment is not on the merits, it cannot be considered as a conclusive adjudication of the controversy. Consequently, a judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction or because of the pendency of another action between the same parties and for the same cause cannot operate as Res Judicata on the merits. In the case at bar, it is evident that the order of dismissal was not on the merits but on the ground that the petitioner therein pursued the wrong remedy.

Also, notwithstanding that the action for reconveyance was brought within 1 year from the date of the issuance of the patent, during which time a petition for review, as contemplated in section 38 of the Land Registration Act, could have been brought, said action could nevertheless prosper. The petition for reopening of the decree which may be filed within 1 year from the issuance of the said decree is not the exclusive remedy of, and does not bar any other remedy to which the aggrieved party may be entitled.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (director of lands), petitioner vs. CA and TEDITA INFANTE-TAYAG

Date: July 31, 1984 File: GR no L-61462 Ponente: Justice Aquino FACTS:

This is an application for registration of land with an area of more than 11 hectares located in Barrio Tambo, Buhi, Camarines Sur

The private respondent testified that the land was first possessed by her father, Froilan Infante, who died in 1937. the 11 hectare land was adjudicated to Soledad Infante_Yago who exchanged it in 1975 for another parcel of land with an area of 23 hectares belonging to her sister, Mrs. Tayag, the applicant

Mrs Tayag filed the instant application in 1976. She possessed the land in question for barely a year. She knows that the land is a coconut land but she does not know the number of the coconut trees planted therein nor the person who planted the same. She does not know too the actual area of the land.

The only other witness, Abraham Morandarte (56 in 1977), testified that he came to know the land in 1935 because his father was the overseer of Froilan.

The trial court and the CA granted the application. Hence the Director of lands appealed. ISSUE:

WON the failure to attach by the petitioner of the tracing cloth plan is fatal to their claim WON the applicant has been in OCENCO of the land in question

HELD

The Solicitor General argued that the application should be denied because of the applicant’s failure to present the original tracing cloth plan cannot be sustained. It is indubitably indicated that the “cloth plan” was attached to the application. It was detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission. It could not be marked as an exhibit.

As to the second issue the court finds that the applicant, who does not know the boundary owners and the are of the land,, and Morandarte, her overseer since 1973, are not sufficient to prove the alleged 30 year possession in the concept of an owner by the applicant, her sister, mother and father. The taxes for 31 years, from 1946 to 1976, were paid only in 1976, a few moths prior to the filling of the application. The applicant therefore failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her alleged title. The said land must be presumed to be still part of the public domain.

SPS DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES, petitioners VS GUILLERMO REED, respondent

Date: December 9, 2005 Ponente: CJ Panganiban FACTS

Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came home only for short vacations purchased from the Government Service Insurance System [GSIS] a 166 square meter property located at MRR Road, Mangahan, Pasig. Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. On July 9, 1986, TCT No. 58195 covering said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed. Guillermo Reed had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property who In December, 1991, were summoned to the barangay in connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who claimed to be the owner of the lot where their house stands. Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the complaint filed against them. Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay, where they met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the subject property. Guillermo denied having sold his property.

Guillermo Reed made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig. Guillermo discovered that his title over the subject property had been cancelled. He discovered that a 1. Special Power of Attorney, dated July 8, 1986, allegedly executed by him authorizing his wife, Lolita Reed, to sell the subject property or a portion thereof; also there was an Absolute Deed of Sale of a Portion of Residential Land, executed by Lolita Reed, as vendor and attorney-in-fact of Guillermo Reed, in favor of Natividad R. Villanera, married to Ardaniel Villanera, covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property; and a Deed of Sale of a Portion of a Residential Land, dated January 10, 1989, executed by Lolita Reed, for herself and as attorney-in-fact, in favor of Eduardo Quiteves covering 86 square meter portion of subject property;

On March 8, 1994, Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against Lolita Reed, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed.

ISSUE : Whether the case for reconveyance filed by respondent against petitioners sans the trial court’s acquisition of

jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed, an indispensable party, can prosper

HELD

A document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.

All the foregoing circumstances successfully challenge the integrity, genuineness, and veracity of the questioned document. Petitioners, therefore, cannot take refuge in the presumption of regularity of public documents, a presumption that has been clearly rebutted in this case.

The final question to be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.

When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. It is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to