We start the analysis with the United Kingdom. As it provides an interesting starting point for the research. Its position in the Refugee Crisis is different from the other four Nation States in this research project, mainly because the United Kingdom is not part of the European Mainland. As explained in the method chapter, it prefers to have the lowest number of immigrants possible, and this is reflected in their immigration laws. In relation to this, they are not part of Schengen, which implies that the United Kingdom does not allow EU inhabitants to travel across their borders unchecked. This makes their position within the framework of the Refugee Crisis interesting and unique when compared to that of the Nation States of mainland Europe which will analysed in section 5.2.
‘Another big judgment calls to make is when a refugee crisis confronts our world. Like most people, I found it impossible to get the image of that poor Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi out of my mind. We know in our hearts our responsibilities to help those fleeing for their lives. But we
know, too, that we must keep our heads. Let’s start with a simple fact. Twelve million people
have been made homeless by the conflict in Syria. And so far only 4 per cent of them have come to Europe. If we opened the door to every refugee, our country would be overwhelmed. The best thing Britain can do is help neighbouring countries, the Syrian people and the refugees in the camps´ (Cameron, 2015).6
This first quote from David Cameron on the Refugee crisis harbours one imperative.7 This imperative is a speech act that does not securitize a direct existential threat. David Cameron opts to politicize the stream of migrants fleeing to Europe. By emphasising that Britain would be ‘overwhelmed’ if they would open the door. This is followed by a solution: Helping in the conflict region, by aiding the neighbouring countries of Syria. Based on conventional securitization theory we could now conclude that David Cameron uses a speech act to bring forward his agenda in a very careful manner. Emphasising the position that the United Kingdom is in.
The additional contextual factors provided by the extended version of securitization theory provide additional information. First, at this point in time Cameron addresses the ongoing crisis as a Refugee Crisis and not a Migration Crisis. This together with his focus on
6 See appendices for the full (in detail analysed) versions of the speech fragments discussed here. 7 Displayed in bold.
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distribution of refugees shows a thematic focus on ‘politics of unease’ as displayed in the framework of facilitating variables8. Here the discourse of his policy community, the Conservative Party, becomes visible. ‘Politics of unease’ do not antagonize perceived threats, instead the aim is to connect different policy areas, by means of discourse, ideally connecting them to feelings of unease regarding safety and security. The goal of Cameron becomes clear. A second quote from the same speech shows this perfectly:
‘We must play our part too. And we can, because of that commitment we made this summer:
yes, we will spend two per cent of our GDP on defence – this year, next year, throughout this
decade. In the coming years, we’ll be launching the biggest aircraft carriers in our history… …a new class of Hunter Killer submarines… …new Joint Strike Fighter jets; improved Apache helicopters; a new fleet of drones… …and because our independent nuclear deterrent is our ultimate insurance policy – this Government will order four new trident submarines’ (Cameron, 2015).
Continuing in this speech, Cameron puts emphasis on what the United-Kingdom does to help refugees and what his country does to end the Civil War in Syria. Thematically the focus shifts to nationalism and internal defence. He directly links the Refugee Crisis to matters of internal security and nationalistic ideals. His aim to strengthen the feelings on unease in his audience. By creating a discourse surrounding nationalism, emphasising the problems of hosting to many refugees, and linking this to internal security issues. Than you are creating a discourse of unease based on multiple facilitating variables, strengthening the securitizing argument.
When state related dangers are presented through facilitating variables, these would normally fall under ‘Politics of Exception’. However, based on this quote we can draw the following conclusion: when no direct existential threat is presented, or when liberty and security are not directly addressed or problematized, then it strengthens discourses of unease. This is a point in which the first edition of the extended version of securitization theory is not clear enough and needs more development in the future.
Nevertheless, based on these first two quotes by David Cameron the added value of the extended version of securitization theory can be seen as well. Discourse linking nationalism, security, and the potential influx of refugees show the specific goals of David Cameron and
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his policy community, in combination with the discourse they try to make the hegemonic discourse of their country.