ENFOQUE TEÓRICO
2- División del trabajo, género y clase obrera
In this section, I outline the framework used to identify how actors who become party to a conflict, use indiscriminate violence as a strategy and examine various studies that support this framework. Valentino et al. (2004) contend that the state may engage in mass killing in conflicts, where the population supports a guerrilla movement, as a means of reducing their strength. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) further suggest that violence against civilians diminishes the population density in an area, both through killing and successive migration, which in turn makes it harder for rebels to hide among the civilian populations. If Azam and Hoeffler (2002) are correct in their analysis that fighting zones will always see the killing and migration of civilians, then how does this account for situations where civilians are not killed or the population density in an area does not reduce, or civilians do not migrate? As demonstrated earlier, the SP held control over several civilian liberated zones, but civilians did not rush to migrate, notwithstanding the extraordinary levels of violence. During the Nepalese and Peruvian conflicts, civilians did not migrate in their tens of thousands, neither did the density of these populations drastically reduce because the strategy used by both the CPN-Maoist in Nepal and the SP in Peru. While Azam and Hoeffler (2002) view violence as a way of preventing embeddedness from occurring, this argument does not account for circumstances under which rebels are embedded amongst civilians but cause confusion for security forces; resulting in high levels of violence against civilians with no civilian migration. This occurred during the Vietnam conflict (Kalyvas, 2009), where strategies like hide and seek were used to overcome US forces.
Valentino et al. (2004) understand the use of violence as a strategy to prevent civilians from supporting the rebels. They argue that indiscriminate violence will be an
instrument of last resort since actors may see no other alternative. While I do suspect, my findings will be similar, I verge away from how this moment of last resort
transpires. Where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), is on their conceptualization and timing of this moment of last resort. How can I know when an actor in a battle arrives at this moment or ceiling of last resort? Does an actor's moment of last resort depend on whether the actor is well trained or not? Does the type of battle mean some actors are more susceptible to moments of last resort over others? Or does it revolve around the dynamics of the conflict? If I add another layer of dynamics to the equation, like the strategic position an actor assumes, how will this interact with the actor’s moment of last resort? For example, the timing of an actor passing through a zone (on short deployment) and their use of indiscriminate violence as a last resort will be different to an actor living with civilians who uses indiscriminate violence as a last resort. Both actors’ interaction with “a moment of last resort” will depend on their interactions with the conflict, their strategy and the position these actors assume, which impacts on their rival’s overall position. Each position an actor takes offers this actor with a different level of interaction with opposing actors, civilians and dynamics of the conflict.
Valentino et al., (2004), perspective suggests that actors operate within motionless, unlimited time and alteration free zones, which do not influence the use of violence. If this were to hold, then we could expect arbitrary use of violence which would be mimicked throughout all conflicts. Also, where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), is in the concept that actor’s dynamics and their use of violence is influenced by an actor’s strategic position and how these positions interact with other actors. These
mechanisms are what I believe triggers the use of indiscriminate violence which I explore later in the chapter.
While Azam and Hoeffler (2002) acknowledge that rebels can hide amongst civilians, the authors assume that actors are fixed in certain areas. Azam and Hoeffler do not recognise that even when a population moves because of the violence, the rebels can follow and re-embed themselves amongst migrating civilians. Evidence of this was found after the Rwandan genocide, when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) allowed Rwandan forces to enter DRC territory to participate in joint military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).8,9
The joint military operations and the violence used by the Rwandan forces against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), shows how the actors change different strategic positions and how Rwandan forces responded by assuming different strategic positions (one that involved being deployed) to deal with the FDLR. It suggests that while actors can use violence to move civilians on as a tool, it does not deter actors from embedding themselves amongst civilians at different points in time. However, a larger question is how in the case of Rwanda, positions of the FDLR and the Rwandan forces interacted.
Raleigh (Raleigh, 2013, p. 462), in her examination of the Africa continent, conversely concludes that civilians are targeted because they are accessible, and rebels kill more civilians often to create new frontlines for the conflict.10 Eck,
Kristine, and Hultman, (2007) and Hultman (2007) contend that by targeting civilians,
8 https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/13/you-will-be-punished/attacks-civilians-eastern-congo (accessed on 20
December 2014)
9 The FDLR is a rebel group composed of Rwandan Hutus, many of whom were survivors of the genocide, who
fled to refugee camps and concealed themselves among refugees in 1994.
https://web.stanford.edu/~sstedman/2001.readings/Zaire.htm (accessed on 20 December 2014)
insurgents are trying to distract the government and change its current policy to suit their own agenda. Hultman (2007) concludes that the high levels of violence
witnessed in conflicts are perpetrated predominately by rebels during their resistance to the state. According to Hultman, violence is used to show the population that the government is unable to protect them, uphold the law, and provide the necessary security. This, Hultman (2007) argues, makes the government appear incompetent and incapable of functioning as a coherent state that can provide stability for all its
civilians. Hultman and Lilja (2011) add another piece to this model asserting that ethnic, demographic structures influence the way rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war, before they establish territorial control (Hultman and Lilja, 2011, p. 172). Ethnic groups tend to cluster geographically, particularly in Africa where African minorities often inhabit contiguous territories (Scarritt & McMillan, 1995). This geographical concentration facilitates recruitment to armed groups (Gates, 2002; Melander, 2009; Weidmann, 2009) and helps rebels carry out their struggle more effectively (Toft, 2003).
This suggests co-ethnic targets can be divided into two main categories: civilians and rivals. Rebels target civilian zones to ensure their cooperation in the war against the government forces, and rebels target rivals to eliminate competition and establish dominance over their ethnic community. Hultman and Lilja (2011) conclude that the killing of civilians is causally linked to a rebel group’s overall act of trying to damage the government, displaying its incompetency and lack of legitimacy to protect
civilians. These studies argue that mass violence is employed to show “the power to hurt,” and when rebels resort to violence against civilians it is often because all other means of damaging the government have been exhausted (Hultman, 2009, p. 822).
Thus, by targeting civilians, rebels compensate for their inability to cause damage to the government on the frontline.
Hultman and Fjelde, (2014) add that ethnicity affects conflict patterns of civilian cruelty, but it is more likely in ethnically homogenous areas. Both governments and rebels target more civilians in zones where the opponent’s co-ethnic groups live, compared to zones where their own co-ethnic groups reside. Hultman and Fjelde, (2014) also found that states are more likely to target civilians in areas inhabited by the rebels or areas close to the rebel bases.
However, Hultman’s (2007) explanation does not clarify why the SP continued to use significant amounts of indiscriminate violence levels throughout the conflict, despite having control over most liberated zones.11 Violence towards civilians in controlled
SP liberated zones continued to increase over the years, despite the significant amounts of control that the SP had over liberated zones under their control. In fact, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s own findings indicated that the levels of violence against civilians in SP areas increased during operations that were carried out by the state.12 Similarly, the early years of the Nepalese conflict, witnessed state
police using violence towards civilian despite having information on the civilian populations.13 Despite the similar tactics used by both rebels, in both conflicts, the
outcome of violence by rebel actors is inverted. Hultman and Lilja’s (2011),
contribution allows researchers to observe whether the use of indiscriminate violence might be ethnically aligned but does this suggest that if an actor is not ethnically aligned to civilians from the start, that the actor will not be aligned to this group once control is established. Do actors have agency to change ethnic sides? In South
11 The Truth Commission found the SP were indicated with having significant levels of indiscriminate violence
then the state.
12 https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01(accessed on 20 July 2018) 13 https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Nepal-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf
Sudan’s current conflict, ethnic groups have been known to change sides during the conflict. This includes the Shilluk ethnic group defecting from the Dinka ethnic group and joining their historic rivals the Nuer ethnic group, linked to the former Vice President.14 During both the Nepalese and the Peruvian conflicts, recruits were taken
from ethnic differences hegemonic areas, but those running the SP and Maoist CPN- M were not from the same caste. In Nepal, upper castes Maoists were joined in solidarity to lower caste ethnic groups. This suggests that ethnicity may not be as strong an influencing mechanism as previously thought outside of the African context.
The literature reviewed in this section helps to understand how actors can not only use violence as a strategy but can selectively distribute violence towards civilians. This understanding enables me to explore other causal activities that could potentially explain why violence is used and, in turn, why certain acts of violence continue to be used during a conflict. However, the theory that the targeting of civilians is a strategy is puzzling, especially as it appears to be a counterproductive measure. Such measures could potentially create distance between the actors and the surrounding populations, reducing their legitimacy and alienating the very people they claim to represent and be fighting for. The theory does well to assist research to understand why there is a need for actors and civilians to co-exist and survive during a conflict (Nagel et al. (2008) and Dixon (2009). While this body of research gives indications about the behaviour of actors while living amongst civilians, it does not fully explore how different strategic positions may impact and influence actors to use violence. How does the opposing actor’s position and strategy impinge on an actor’s ability to use or not to use violence against civilians? If violence is used as a strategy, at what point
does this strategy become unproductive? How do we explain violence when this does not appear apparent through ethnic clusters in some conflicts? While the models put forward do well to explore the use of indiscriminate violence, questions remain as to how different strategic positions influence the use of violence, if at all it does. In the next section, I examine the framework that explores how indiscriminate violence is used to gain control.