Furthermore, Jordan & Taylor (2004) and Jordan (2008) fail to discuss web site defacements and other potentially individually undertaken hacktions within their typology. This gap is closed by Alexandra Samuel (2004a) with her doctoral thesis Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation.20 Samuel uses hacktivism to address three key questions: why do people choose to participate in collective political action; when do political actors pursue policy circumvention rather than policy change; and can the Internet foster new forms of political participation? She defines hacktivism as “the non-violent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends” (Samuel 2004a: iii), differentiated from hacking by its explicitly political nature, from online activism and cyberterrorism in that it is transgressive rather than conventional or violent (see Constanza-Chock 2001), and from traditional CD in that it is online (ibid.: 3-4). Samuel provides a clear and
20 Like Vegh, Samuel published a book chapter stemming from her thesis (2004). However, only the
empirically supported internal taxonomy of hacktivism, revealing much about the hacktivists themselves in the process. Furthermore, she begins to place hacktivism within a wider political context, extending upon the intentions of others before her.
FORMS ORIGINS ORIENTATION
POLITICAL CRACKING
Defacements Redirects Automated DDoS attacks
Sabotage Information theft Hacker-programmers Outlaw PERFORMATIVE HACKTIVISM Parodies
Sit-Ins Artist-activists Transgressive
POLITICAL
CODING Software development Hacker-programmers Transgressive
Table 7: Samuel's (2004a) taxonomic matrix of hacktivism
She proposes a taxonomy of hacktivism constructed by the intersection of various hacktivist origins (hacker-programmer or artist-activist) and orientations (transgressive or outlaw). It is built upon and supported by a number of interviews Samuel conducted with hacktivists or those connected to them. Some potential overlap is acknowledged, with the origins recognised as more stable than the orientations (ibid.). Hacktivism that is transgressive in orientation “challenges the legal and political order, but still exists in relation to it and even shares some norms… such as legitimacy and accountability”, whereas outlaw orientation “completely rejects the legal and political order” (ibid.: 37). Transgressive hacktivists tend to work in medium-size groups and collaborate multinationally, whereas outlaw hacktivists tend to work solo or in small groups and collaborate nationally, multinationally and internationally. National collaborations target governments, businesses or organisations within their own country; multinational collaborators band across borders to attack a common target at the subnational,
from one country targeting a government, business or organisation in another country, sometimes generating reciprocal hacktivism (ibid.: 50). Her taxonomy is best presented in the matrix illustrated in Table 7 (ibid.: 101). It should be noted that performative hacktivism and political coding are analogous to Jordan & Taylor’s (2004) MAH and DCH respectively.
4.4.4.1 Hacktivism as a form of identity construction
The question of why hacktivists participate in hacktivism is addressed through the responses given by hacktivists and those associated with them to a questionnaire distributed by Samuel. She argues that hacktivists tend to choose their methods of hacktivism before they choose their political agenda; therefore, Samuel reasons that specific political goals may not always be at the heart of political participation (ibid.: 105-6). She posits that their participation is founded on identity incentives, which “reflect individuals’ desire to confirm or enhance their sense of belonging to a group, where membership in that group enhances their self-image or self-esteem” (ibid.: 122). This hypothesis is tested and supported by attempting to predict which form of hacktivism individuals will pursue by their backgrounds. The findings are reflected in the origin component of Samuel’s taxonomic matrix.
Furthermore, hacktivists tend to collaborate rather than work alone when there is no real necessity to do so because of instrumental rather than interactive incentives. Hacktivist collaborations are less about social interaction, and more about increased productivity and the desire to affirm one’s own identity and self-esteem through affirming that one belongs to a group that shares the same identity and values. Thus, the kind of hacktivism one engages in and the group one collaborates with represent purposive statements about personal identity and values (ibid.: 134).
4.4.4.2 Political coding and policy circumvention
Samuel addresses her second question (asking when political actors pursue policy circumvention rather than policy change) through an assessment of two case studies of political coding, which is almost exclusively concerned with policy circumvention. Policy circumvention is defined as “a strategic political response to a specific policy, law, regulation, or court decision”, which aims to nullify the effects of that policy, law, regulation, or court decision. It creates excludable benefits for its individual practitioners, but also some non-excludable benefits such as issue awareness, declining enforceability of the given law, changes in norms concerning policy compliance, and possibly even policy change (ibid.: 156-8). It is important in that it “shunts the state to the status of a side-show whose co-operation is non-essential to obtaining desired political outcomes” (ibid.: 158).
Samuel’s case studies support her hypothesis that the emergence and success of any given instance of policy circumvention hinge upon the presence of political entrepreneurs, a low cost of failure ensuring high participation, and a governing state that faces political constraints on repressing the circumvention (ibid.: 164). Policy circumvention is likely to become more common in an increasingly informational society, with increasing political and economic repercussions, and Samuel advises that policies will have to become much more robust and enforceable if they are to hold up to the onslaught (ibid.: 197-98).
4.4.4.3 Hacktivism, free speech, and accountability
Samuel’s third question, regarding new forms of political participation on the Internet, addresses hacktivism’s challenges to traditional deliberative democratic requirements of free speech and accountability. Hacktions such as site defacements
actually rebukes to the concept? Performative hacktivists and political crackers work on the belief that access to free speech is not equal, and therefore take an ‘ends over means’ approach to having their say. This perspective also incorporates the need to have their speech heard, not just spoken, thus, the concept of free speech in the context of the Internet expands to encompass notions of audience access. Conversely, political coders are focused almost exclusively on maintaining an absolute standard of free speech, in line with the original hacker ethic that all information should be free (Levy 1984). This ideological opposition is a reframing of what was discussed in Jordan & Taylor (2004).
Accountability is also problematised by the different nymity practices of hacktivists. Anonymity has been variously theorised as having the potential to be good for deliberative discourse, as it can promote the free flow of ideas, protect unpopular idea from prosecution and privilege the speech act itself rather than the speaker. However, on the down side, it may have a deleterious effect in that it removes accountability, makes it impossible to judge the motivations of the speaker and may even promote uncivil behaviour. Anonymous hacktivism could thus be judged from either perspective. However, through the interviews conducted, Samuel establishes that hacktivists make nymity choices not as a matter of principle but as deliberative statements in themselves, which have the added bonus of further reinforcing their individual and group identity. Political crackers use robust pseudonymity both to avoid legal consequences and declare that they are accountable to no one; political coders use weak pseudonymity to construct a digital persona that is accountable to wider Internet community, but in digital rather than physical terms, and performative hacktivists do not use pseudonyms, thus embracing their accountability to the real world (ibid.: 220). Hacktivists therefore treat their nymity choices as “a political tool, with [different choices] conveying different kinds of claims about political strategy, risk, and above all, accountability” (ibid.; 222).