Divorcio

Scholars have associated post-authoritarian party politics with the following: (1) how preceding dictators shape party politics, and how these party

configurations are inherited by subsequent democracies (Frantz and Geddes 2016; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), and (2) how the dictators dominate or develop distinct strategies for political transition (Grzymala-Busse 2006; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014).

In an empirical analysis of party system institutionalisation in Asian countries, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 584) confirm that party system institutionalisation is more likely when the ruling party was highly

institutionalised under the previous authoritarian regime. For example, the lowest level of electoral volatility was observed in post-1969 Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, where the organisational structure of the respective ruling parties—the Alliance Party, People’s Action Party, and

Kuomintang—was adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent. Instead of focusing on how the dictators institutionalise their parties, Frantz and Geddes (2016) analysed the effect of dictatorial strategies towards pre-existing parties on party system institutionalisation in Latin American democracies. They

argue that if a dictator determines to repress or ally with a traditional party, the party either goes underground or becomes the official ruling party and, thus, at least maintains its linkages to loyal voters until their return to democracy. Conversely, new parties that a dictator creates to divide the opposition will lead to the realignment of voter loyalty, adding instability to the future party system under democracy.

While these research studies highlight the significance of authoritarian party dynamics for post-autocratic party systems, the role of ruling parties is also important in the transition to democracy. Frantz and Geddes (2016: 9) argue that ‘when authoritarian governments do create new ruling

parties…they create incentives for those with a vocation for politics to expend their energy, either in the regime-sponsored party or in the tame opposition’. If a new ruling party totally controls the transitional politics, those planning on establishing other parties will be discouraged from doing so. This is because the ruling party will impose a higher barrier of entry into politics for other parties and, thus, decrease their probability of political survival. In sum, the stability of a party system in succeeding democracies depends not only on party politics of antecedent dictatorships but also on party competition in the transition phase.

Post-authoritarian party politics is closely related to how dictators and their ruling parties react to political transition. When communist leaders set up patronage networks to prevent intra-elite contestations and co-opt the

opposition, they would likely maintain their hegemonic status in democratic transitions and create institutions to their advantages. Consequently, party competition centres on personalistic power, which contributes to a fragmented

party system in post-communist regimes (Kitschelt 1995). By contrast, robust party competition is more likely when communist parties initially exit from the power centre during the transition period but resurge through the

transformation of organisations, ideologies, and policy outlines

(Grzymala-Busse 2006). In African democracies, where local elites are incorporated into a regime, the dictator has more bargaining power than the opposition during the transition period and, accordingly, imposes rules to limit electoral competition. Conversely, when local elites are substituted with newly created nomenklatura, they defect and choose to align with the opposition during the transition. Consequently, the opposition wins and pushes open participation (Riedl 2014).

While these seminal works highlight the importance of preceding

dictatorial rule in explaining party politics during the transition period, which, in turn, influences the party system of subsequent democracies, two points merit further discussion. First, no comparative study other than Grzymala-Busse’s (2007) has examined the interplay of ASPs and their opponents. When a dictator seeks to co-opt local elites, dominating transitional politics and limiting electoral competition, the high barrier to entry during the transition period causes the opposition to cooperate, which leads to higher party system institutionalisation (Riedl 2014). This argument, however, fails to explain why these ‘anti-incumbent alliances’ do not lose the incentive to remain united even after winning the battle. Further, the party system in a democratic country does not always become unstable if the ruler in preceding autocracies tends to create the new party (Frantz and Geddes 2016). This is because a dominant ASP may lead a divided opposition to realign, thus reducing the likelihood of

an unstable party system.

Second, these seminal works introduce the concept of the hegemonic status of a dictator during democratic transitions into the study of the

determinants of post-authoritarian party politics. The origin of their dominant status, however, remains unclear. Further, it is possible for ASPs to still play a significant role after democratisation, despite not controlling the transition process. It is the case when the authoritarian incumbents lose an election and allow the winner of the election to assume office and, thus, cannot design the rules of the new democratic game to their advantage. However, they can still return to power when possessing and inheriting substantial antecedent political strengths and resources. In Mexico, for instance, the old regime’s clientelistic structures and business community allies, and the government’s mediocre economic performance explain the Institutional Revolutionary

Party’s return to presidency in 2012 (Flores-Macías 2013: 135-137). Therefore, this study argues that valuable resources that old regime elites inherit

determine the performance of the ASPs, which affects the post-authoritarian party system.