The semantics of epistemic verbs like knowor be certainis comparably easy to capture as these verbs do not display an ambiguity between literal and deductive readings, but are intrinsically deductive. Once we direct our attention to communication verbs and emotives on the other hand, we do have to take care of the literal/deductive ambiguity. Essentially, it manifests itself in two respects: monotonicity behaviour and sensitivity to background knowledge. We will deal with these in turn.
In Chapter3, we saw that embedders on the[+lit]reading are characterised by a complete lack of monotonicity. Communication verbs on this reading describe an event in which a specific literal content gets communicated; emotive verbs on this reading describe a subject’s state of mind at a given point in time and express that the subject’s attention is centred on a specific piece of information at that point in time. In both cases, we find aliteral content of sorts associated with the event or the state that the embedding verb describes:literally communicated contentfor communication verbs and the subject’sattentive statefor emotive verbs. Also, in both cases, this literal content is more or less fixed. Consider the following example. Bob and Alice are arranging a dinner party, and Alice wants to invite Mary, John and Carol. Let pbe the proposition that Alice wants to invite Mary, John and Carol. What sheliterallytells Bob in (148) must then beexactly pand, in particular,notsome subset ofp. Although we have seen that[–lit]tellis upward-entailing with respect to its complement, this monotonicity is blocked under the[+lit]reading.
(148) When I entered the room, Alice was just telling Bob who she wants to invite. Similarly, what Bob’s attention is centred on in (149) is exactly p and not some superset of p. Although we have foundsurpriseto be “truth-functionally”13downward-entailing on the[–lit]reading, this monotonicity is blocked on the[+lit]reading.
(149) When Alice told him, Bob was very surprised by who she wants to invite.
Formally, the monotonicity will be blocked by imposing restrictions on the literal content associated with the embedding verb. For tell, this literal content will be identified with theliterally told message(what the speaker literally says) of type〈s,t〉:lit-tell(w)(q)(y)(x) expresses that in worldwspeakerxliterally told listenerythe propositionq.
Let Q be the denotation of the embedded question. Now, the restriction fortell is the following. While under the deductive reading the literal messageq may be any of the states from the answer set ofQ, under the literal reading it is not as free: there,qmust be one of themaximalstates from this answer set:
(150) Preliminary lexical entry for[–lit,+ver]tell: Tr(tell):=λQ〈s,T〉.λy.λx.λp. ∀w∈p:Q(w)is defined. ∀w∈p:∃q:(lit-tell(w)(q)(y)(x)∧q∈ Q(w)) 13 Cf. Section3.2.3.
(151) Lexical entry for[+lit,+ver]tell: Tr(tell):=λQ〈s,T〉.λy.λx.λp. ∀w∈p:Q(w)is defined. ∀w∈p:∃q:(lit-tell(w)(q)(y)(x)∧q∈ALT(Q(w)))
(152) Preliminary lexical entry for[–lit, –ver]tell: Tr(tell):=λQ〈s,T〉.λy.λx.λp. ∃w0∈p:Q(w0)is defined. ∃w00∀w∈p:∃q:(lit-tell(w)(q)(y)(x)∧q∈ Q(w00))
(153) Lexical entry for[+lit, –ver]tell: Tr(tell):=λQ〈s,T〉.λy.λx.λp. ∃w0∈p:Q(w0)is defined. ∃w00∀w∈p:∃q:(lit-tell(w)(q)(y)(x) ∧q∈ALT(Q(w00)))
Now on tosurprise—a verb, whose semantics has proven notoriously difficult to capture (e. g.Guerzoni,2007;Égré and Spector,2014). Accordingly, the following is to be taken as a sketch rather than a fully worked out proposal. What is certain, though, is that the lexical entries forsurprisewill look slightly different from those for upward-entailingknow,be cer- tainortell—given thatsurpriseis downward-entailing. We no longer specify that two pieces of informationmatch, but rather that they clash. To be exact, we demand that one of the subject’s “expectations” clashes with a minimally informative true answer to the embedded question. For us, expectations are essentially just beliefs at a previous point of time (which, at the present point of time, might already have been revised); but beyond this we will not attempt a formalisation of what expectations are.
Under the deductive reading,being surprisedcan then be captured by requiring that the set of all worlds compatible with the subject’s expectations is disjoint from a true basic answer q∈ALT(ANS(Q)(w)). For a literal reading, we add to this the condition thatqis also part ofx’s attentive state. The attentive state of xinwis formally captured by the termATTwx
of typeT. This complex type allows a subject’s attentive state to comprise more than just one proposition.14
(154) Lexical entry for[–lit]be surprised: Tr(be surprised):=λQ〈s,T〉.λx.λp. ∀w∈p:(Q(w)is defined∧Kxw∈ Q(w)). ∀w∈p:∃q∈ALT(Q(w)):q∩EXPwx =;
(155) Lexical entry for[+lit]be surprised: Tr(be surprised):=λQ〈s,T〉.λx.λp. ∀w∈p:(Q(w)is defined∧Kxw∈ Q(w)). ∀w∈p:∃q∈ALT(Q(w)):(q∩EXPwx =; ∧q∈ATTwx)
14 Furthermore, ifATTwx contains more than one maximal state, this could also be interpreted asxentertaining the issue expressed byATTwx. AsCiardelli and Roelofsen(2014b) show, this concept can be useful when definining what it means towonder-wh.
There are several remarks in order. For a start, note that the existential quantification over basic answers (∃q ∈ALT(Q(w))) is only relevant if there can be more than one element
in ALT(Q(w)). This will only be the case for [–cmp] answers: there always is at most one true minimally informative[+cmp]answer, while there can be several true minimally informative[–cmp]answers. For a mention-some understanding ofsurprise, it suffices ifx’s expectations clash with one of these answers.15
Further, as in the[+lit]entry fortell, we again impose restrictions on the literal content— here, onATTwx. We requireATTwx to coincide with a maximal stateq from the answer set
such thatqclashes withx’s expectations. As a result, if an answer to the embedded question clashes with your expectations, but you are not “thinking” about this answer, then you will not come out as surprised-wh. This restriction of ATTwx makes[+lit]surprisea non-
monotonic predicate.
Briefly recapitulating, our semantics can now capture the different monotonicity prop- erties that arise from the literal/deductive ambiguity. Essentially, the literal reading has be- come stricter, while the deductive reading has stayed the same. In what follows, we will (tentatively) explore another possible refinement of deductive readings.