DOCUMENTACIÓN NORMATIVA DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE REFERENCIA

Various theoretical perspectives have been developed in an attempt to understand the engagement of NGOs with the state in the endeavour to influence the policy and governance direction. In my

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case I have relied on Antonio Gramsci, in understanding the role of NGOs, as a framework of my reflection and analysis. Some of the ideas of Gramsci on civil society have been highlighted briefly in the proceeding sections in this chapter . But in this subsection, I focus more on Gramsci’s thinking on especially how it fits in a study like this one with its context in Tanzania.

In the early stages of this thesis, before opting for Gramsci’s thinking, I had thought of three other frameworks which I thought would be well suited to my study. However, as I continued reading and doing some reflections, I had to abandon one after the other. Initially, I thought about Social Capital which Putnam (1993) has written extensively about. After my initial research, I was not convinced with the idea of reflecting on NGOs’ activities in Tanzania as social capital endeavour.

Through personal experience and reading I was not able to get enough evidence to link NGOs with social capital in the Tanzanian environment. This led me to conclude that this framework would not be able to inform this project critically enough. Hence, I turned to social movement theory. Initially, I was captivated by this framework. But again, it did not take me long before I came to the conclusion that this framework is not sufficiently situated in studying NGOs in the Tanzanian context. Social movements are well developed in Europe and America. When one attempts to reflect on the work of NGOs in Tanzania, through the eyes of social movements, it fails to see how this fits in the framework of social movement. One of the major shortcomings they notice is the fact that NGOs are not rooted in peoples’ struggles (Shivji, 2003). And this makes one want to see that somehow NGOs are sabotaging the efforts to build social movement forces. After abandoning social movement theory, I opted for Alex de Tocqueville and his thinking on the role of association in monitoring and checking state power. I thought because many advocacy NGOs aim at checking on state power, then this is an appropriate framework to

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use in reflecting on the role of NGO’s activism and advocacy. This new found love did not last long. I had to abandon de Tocqueville because his central argument is how associations help to foster democracy through holding governments to account. I was not comfortable with his thinking because the mushrooming of NGOs in the country is mostly due to availability of donor funds. Finally, I settled for Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts. Although, I had to try different perspectives before settling down, this has helped me a lot in sharpening my understanding of civil society and NGOs from different perspectives.

Gramcsi (1971), in his notes he wrote when was in prison in Italy focuses on hegemony. Gramcsi defines hegemony as a form of control exercised primarily through a society superstructure. The use of hegemony by Gramsci has been interpreted as an effort to correct Karl Marx, by eliminating economic bias from social and historical analysis, hence he makes the Marxism more complete (Femia, 1987). Gramsci, as pointed out by Bobbio in Orvis (2001, p.15), ‘saw civil society as a non-state sphere of outright domination (hegemony) controlled, directly or indirectly, by the bourgeoisie’. By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations’ society’ Burke (1999, 2005). While Hadenius and Uggla (1996) see civil society as neither performing a democratic nor creating egalitarian democracy. Chachage (2004) explains how Gramsci defines and understands civil society in very simple and straight forward words when he quotes Gramsci who says; “civil society is the realm where the ‘hegemony or political power of one social group over the entire nation is excised through subtle, intangible and invisible forms’. There is a dichotomy between political and civil society”. Femia (1987, p. 27) asserts that

“the state, when it wants to initiate an unpopular action or policy, creates in advance a suitable or

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appropriate, public opinion, that is, it organizes and centralizes certain element of civil society”.

The crucial point to his mind is that governments can rule and regulate. Governments can mobilize mass media and other ideological instruments to further its ideology, polices or programs. This is possible because various elites in governments, media or NGOs share similar world views and life style. When the (UN) through its different programs like United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP); and International Financial Institutions (IFS) like World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) tell governments of developing countries to work in partnership with NGOs, that is enough to make one to see clearly what Gramcsi meant. Chachage (2004) explains how these institutions in the 1980s and 1990s rediscovered NGOs and through them it is easy to push for a globalization project which is based on neo-liberal agenda, hence it is easy to maintain the status quo and it helps them to exploit with less resistance. The dominant actors have in effect manipulated and dictated policies to redefine and shape the outcome/agenda to suit their respective interests.

Gramcsi sees hegemony as involving both the consensual diffusion of a particular cultural and moral view through society and its interconnection with coercive functions: or when there is a corresponding equilibrium between ethico-political ideas and prevailing socio-economic conditions fortified by coercion (Gramcsi, 1995). The emphasis on continual construction, maintenance, and defence of hegemony in the face of constant resistance and pressure is reflected in Gramcsi’s strategic theory and potential for counter hegemony. Gramcsi analysis aims to show how the society can resist cultural domination by ruling class. He contends that society should not relay on one strategy, rather he proposes multiphase approaches. He asserts the oppressed wage war of manoeuvres to challenge total domination. Here “war of manoeuvre” refers to an

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rising out of popular initiative-to directly challenge the dominant social forces. The war of manoeuvre or frontal attack, targeted directly at attaining state power might prove ineffective and transitory in certain countries (Morton, 2007). Gramsci (1971) opposes the war of manoeuvre, instead a more protected form of trench warfare could be conducted, known as the war of position. This involves struggle on the cultural front in civil society-to overcome the ‘powerful system’- in an attempt to penetrate and subvert the mechanisms of ideological diffusion (Gramcsi, 1971). War of position (also called a passive revolution) focuses on consolidating, fortifying, and perhaps gradually reforming a given social order. Additionally, a counter hegemony could entail an ‘underground war’ involving the clandestine gathering of arms assault troops (Gramcsi, 1971).

However, in terms of the war-of-position strategy, one has to bear in mind that a ‘counter’

hegemonic movement may lack an internal logic or social basis. This means that the formation of collective will might be thwarted and resistance dispersed into infinity of individual wills’

scattered into separate and conflicting paths (Gramsci, 1971).

The struggle to establish counter hegemony could therefore be particularly weakened by absorbing or co-opting the active elements of opposition involved in projecting a war of position.

Gramcsi (1971) gives examples of how this game was played by Italian politicians in 19th Century. Such attempts to remove substantive differences and establish a convergence between contending social-class forces sometimes are encapsulated within the processes of transformation and changes. The war of position demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence more interventionist government, which will take the offensive more openly against the impossibility internal disintegration-with control of every kind, political, administrative , etc., reinforcement of

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hegemonic positions of the dominant group etc. The war of manoeuvre subsists so long at is it a question of winning positions hegemony cannot be mobilised. But when, for one reason or another these positions have lost their value and only the decisive positions are at stake, then one passes over to siege warfare; this is concentrated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities of patience and inventiveness. Karl Marks (1855) as cited by Gramcsi (1971, p. 239) sums up this scenario:

A resistance too long prolonged in a besieged camp is demoralising in itself. It implies suffering, fatigue, loss of rest, illness and the continual presence not of acute danger which tempers but of the chronic danger which destroys.

In order for the state to continue with domination of every sector of society, it raises a great deal of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level or type which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development and hence to the interest of the ruling class.

Williams (1977.113) sees among other things that hegemony tries to neutralize opposition. “The decisive hegemonic function is to control transformation or even incorporate alternative opposition”.

Fowler (1994) as cited in Clay (1996) sees one of the intentions of NGOs is to reform the way that society works or alter the way its costs and benefits are distributed. The size of NGOs in a state is determined by the dominant ideology in the society guided by the regime in power and the expressed policy preferences, legislation, public versus private investment voices and other means. When citizens engage in different associational life it helps to promote the creation and preservation of civic virtue which entails elements of war of position (Wolfe, 1997).

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In recent years there has been an increase of scholarly writings stressing the need for states to expand the ways in which citizens can have more say on governance. The argument put forward is that in the era of globalization this is the best choice for the states if they want to increase their legitimacy. Globalisation creates a strong impetus and logic to the downward devolution of power. The most notable and celebrated work is ‘The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy’ by Giddens (1998) who in the last decades of the 20^th century saw the trend of governments towards entering into partnership with civil society to foster community renewal and development. Initially he uses Britain as his case study, and later in his following two books he expands his focus and also documents reactions of other scholars who commented on his thesis (Giddens, 2000; Giddens et al, 2001). The advance of globalization makes a community focus on both the necessary and possible, because of the downward pressure it exerts. In that way governments should expand the role of the public sphere by being more transparent and open.

Unlike in the past, governments and citizens increasingly now live in a single information environment and existing ways of doing things comes under inquiry.

For instance, Giddens (2000) criticizes United Kingdom (UK) executives for holding too much power, while forms of accountability are weak. Governments could re-establish more contacts with citizens, and citizens with governments. He goes further by proposing that government could go as far as inviting people to input into policy formulation because this has been the practice in Scandinavian countries like Sweden. Governments should not be expected to react and listen to civil society when things have gone wrong, rather, in the era of globalisation governments can rely and draw upon the resources of the civil society for what is needed for effective governance

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(Giddens, 2000). Although Giddens was addressing issues in the UK; many countries worldwide responded by following and implementing his ideas (Giddens et al, 2001).

One view of NGOs is that based on a democratic imperative view that once formal democracy is established (and this occurred in many Africa countries in 1980s and early 1990s), NGOs continue their role of making material and social demands. Groups no longer seek formal power within government by opposing those who hold power. Instead, they seek to change the agenda by proposing sustainable solutions to social problems (Merere, 2004). Civil society activists do not want to see democracy limited to electoral politics imposed by foreign superpowers, rather they want to see people participating in everyday decision processes (Nash, 2006).

In the case of many developing countries, unlike in the West, where NGOs were people initiatives to pressurise governments, NGOs were the initiative of donors as Shivji (2003, p. 2) explains:

NGOs, as they developed in the West, were essentially pressure groups to keep those in power, the state and the government, on their toes. In our case, as the donors became disenchanted with states, they took a fancy to NGOs, thus undermining the state and its institutions while, at the same time, placating their own constituencies back at home who demanded civil society involvement. Participation and consultation are supposedly part of the so-called “good governance” insisted upon by donors. They provide the imperial countries with the means to legitimize the neo-liberal policies of hegemonic Western powers and the IFIs (International Financial Institutions) in our countries.

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Chachage (2002, p.15) gives a comprehensive analysis as to why the World Bank and IMF have stood firmly to promote civil society and NGO participation in the governance in Africa. He says:

...thus struggle for broad democracy were derailed by the late 1980s, even the civil society relationship discourse was radically transformed to the one that supported liberalisation and operation of market forces in response to what was termed ‘informal’ or ‘second’ economy.

The World Bank and IMF promoted this conception backed by scholarly words of both Western and African origin. The belief that civil society organisations (re-conceptualised as Non-Governmental Organisations-NGOs) in Africa have an important role to play.

Seckinelgin (2001) reveals how at the United Nations level, the international Chamber of Commerce and the UN Secretary General label groups of activists who demonstrate against globalisation as enemies of the poor. He questions and calls for security of the rules which establish their rights if they refuse to behave like other groups who have been working with business. These groups are trade unions, consumer organisations and other representative groups.

He praises those groups that are responsible, credible and reliable.

One of the reason which made me to opt for hegemony advanced by Gramsci as my framework is because I want to see to what extent it is applicable in the Tanzanian context and environment. In recent years, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors have been arguing and pushing for governments in the developing world to give more room to civil society organisations and NGOs. They claim that NGOs constantly monitor government. Also they see this as a way of

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making sure people are meaningfully participating in deciding on their governance. Another reason which pushed me towards the Gramsci way is because the growth and development of NGOs in Africa and the developing countries of Asia, Latin America and even Eastern Europe is mainly associated with democratisation and the free market economy. For the past 20 years or so, there has been a voice from donors and other international development actors who have been tying aid with democratisation development and one way they use is it to force governments to create an enabling environment for civil society and NGOs to flourish.