Dominio grupal para el trabajo cooperativo.

I’m not saying the SAS were expendable but they were regarded as very robust sort of chaps who tended to operate in very small units - I mean the SAS patrols - and so it was felt that they could look after themselves. They tended to operate in a rather, I won’t say clandestine, but covert kind of way and so there was not the concern that the public would say ‘what are we doing - there are ten of our men getting into trouble in Borneo’ or something like that. We, I think, were able to take a broader view. It was a sort of an in-family thing that the SAS could look after themselves.1

It was the declared role of the SAS in Borneo to detect and report Indonesian military incursions; to win the support of the border tribes and then gain intelligence from them; to site and arrange construction of tactical Landing Zones (LZs) and tracks; to gain topographical information; to guide Commonwealth infantry reinforcements on cross- border operations and ‘harass the enemy when it fits in with the tactical plan.’2 Each of the four New Zealand detachments were generally responsible for all facets of their operations from the finding of tasks, their clearance through the British DOBOPS, preliminary liaison and reconnaissance, and mounting, briefing, controlling and subsequently debriefing the patrols themselves.

The general daily routine of a standard SAS patrol ensured all patrol members were up by first light and in a position to move off by 0730 hrs.3

1 _{Copy of Thornton interview by Christopher Pugsley, 30 October 1991, for the NZDF Malayan Oral}

History Project, held in the NZSAS Association Archive, Wellington.

Patrols were extraordinarily draining but the aim was to ensure no member was ever so physically ‘shattered’ that his senses became dulled and reactions slowed. It was recommended that ‘six-hours’ daily patrolling, excluding halts and breaks should be the standard measure. Speed of movement was reduced to an absolute minimum and, unless circumstances dictated otherwise, patrols halted at least once every half hour. This was also done to take into account the large weights patrol members carried. Both British and New Zealand SAS

2

D Squadron, United Kingdom 22 Special Air Service Regiment, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” NZSAS Association Archives, Wellington, p.3.

3 _{Patrol overnight locations were commonly referred to as ‘bashas.’ The morning routine also required that}

‘bashas’ would be put down and all kit packed and be ready to move before first light – 0530hrs. Any breakfast cooking would not start before 0600hrs. D Squadron, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.3 and p.19.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) added that normally no more than seven-days of rations be carried by a patrol; the remainder could be ‘hidden and picked up later.’4 With many patrols required to walk to their border insertion point, full rations were seldom taken. This resulted in most patrol members eating far less than necessary.5 Weight restrictions for helicopter travel – a 45 pound limit was imposed but excluded weapons – as well as general patrolling meant food was often sacrificed for ammunition, radios, medical supplies, search and rescue (SARBE) beacons and sleeping equipment.6 If a patrol was required to move with 14 days rations, for example, the British employed local porters. Porters could be hired at any time, but were only allowed to carry surplus rations – not personal kit – and never the patrol’s radio. The only British SAS argument against using porters, apart from issues of non-availability, was they increased the size of the patrol which made concealment much more difficult.7 Similarly, regardless of the pre- deployment practice and rehearsal of halt procedures and contact drills, there was no guarantee that the porters would follow such procedures.8 Neither the Australians nor the New Zealand SAS utilised porters in Borneo.

Most New Zealand SAS patrols lasted on average just over ten days – only nine out of 91 recorded operational patrols carried out by the New Zealanders in Borneo extended beyond 14 days. The longest, OPS/90/103, a four-man patrol commanded by Sergeant Danny Wilson and the last operational patrol carried out by Major Brian Worsnop’s first detachment, lasted 17 days.9

4 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.14.}

For the New Zealanders, any resupply requirements necessitated the patrol returning to the border area on foot and being replenished by helicopter, either air-landed on to a landing zone (LZ) or lowered by winch or rope. Not only were LZs in Borneo limited because of terrain, they were also high-value targets for the enemy. To minimize the risk to the patrol, aircraft and crew, LZs were usually some

5 _{De La Billiere, Looking For Trouble, p. 243.}

6 _{The New Zealand SAS detachments found out early that the British ration packs were too heavy to carry}

the full pack for periods in excess of seven days. The British packs contained ‘two dehydrated meat blocks’ that weighed 3 ½ pounds. Patrol members would break the ration packs down before deploying on

operations. Major Brian Worsnop, “Monthly Report: 4-31 March 65 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East), 12 April 1965,” and “Monthly Report: May 1965 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East), 15 June 1965,” both in NZSAS Association Archive, Wellington, p.1 and p.4 respectively, and Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation, p. 274.

7 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.15.} 8 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.15.} 9

Major Brian Worsnop, “OPS/90/103,” Army Non-File Material ANFM732, SAS Borneo Patrol Reports: 1 Detachment, NZSAS Squadron, NZDF Archive, Wellington.

distance from the area in which the patrol had been operating.10 The SOPs provided by the British illustrated their preference to conduct lengthy patrols, often lasting months. Australian SAS patrols in Borneo were also of a longer duration and to support these patrols, caches were utilised.11 The New Zealand SAS did not use caches.

Operational dress or uniform in Borneo was standard issue OGs – or Olive Greens – with sleeves down and jungle hats always worn. A coloured identification band was sewn into the inside of the hat and the hat was reversed whenever SAS patrols operated with, or near, other SAS patrols or Commonwealth forces within the same area.12 British SAS veterans commented that much of the army-issued equipment was ‘totally unsuitable or rotted and fell apart in jungle conditions,’ and new or modified equipment had to be made by local craftsmen and paid for by the soldiers.13 The British 1944 pattern waist belts were not strong enough to carry all of the necessary equipment – emergency rations (two day’s worth), a magazine pouch which could hold two 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) magazines,14 water bottles and a pouch that needed to be big enough to fit ‘hexamine [cooking] stove with fuel, spare matches, Paludrine [water purification tablets], wire-saw, insect repellent, rifle cleaning kit, binoculars and/or camera, shell dressings, morphine syrettes, parachute cord, knife, compass and SARBE radios.15 The waist belts either had to be substantially strengthened or replaced with an ‘acquired’ local pattern belt.

The first New Zealand detachment found that Bergen packs and ‘Trapper’ rucksacks brought from New Zealand were unsuitable as they were too large, too heavy (the Bergen was seven pounds empty) and too noisy (pack frames would ‘squeak’).16

10 _{The SOP dictated that the patrol should arrive at the LZ no earlier than the afternoon before resupply day.}

D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.14.

Soldiers experimented with smaller ‘Barangs,’ a local load-carrier made from rattan and United States Army nylon packs with frames. Worsnop also wrote back to 1 Ranger Squadron in New Zealand in early April 1965 that most of the clothing the detachment had brought from Papakura was unnecessary and recommended future reinforcements travel to Borneo

11 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.14.} 12 _{Whi Wanoa, interview conducted on 19 July 2008.}

13 _{Connor, Ghost Force,p. 126.} 14

Sixty rounds of SLR ammunition, carried in three magazines, was the minimum amount to be carried by a patrol member. The lighter Armalite rifle ammunition determined that 80 rounds – in four magazines – could be carried per soldier. D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.5.

15 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.4 and p.17.} 16

Worsnop, “Monthly Report: 4-31 March 65 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East), 12 April 1965,” p.6.

‘in civilian clothing.’17 They also used the British OG uniform rather than New Zealand jungle-green (JG) clothing.

The New Zealanders faced continuous shortages of operational equipment throughout their participation in the Borneo operations. Compasses were in short supply, not only did the issue of 35 Omega wrist watches purchased for the first detachment have to be doubled to allow Dearing’s second detachment to carry out pre-deployment training while Worsnop’s group continued operations, the watches themselves proved ‘neither robust nor waterproof,’ more SARBE beacons had to be ordered, and there were significant delays in receiving ordered Armalite (M-16) rifles.18

By the time the first New Zealand detachment arrived in Borneo, the preferred jungle weapon of most British SAS forces was the United States-manufactured Armalite rifle. Extremely light compared with the SLR, it also had the advantage of rapidity of fire over what many would regard the ‘first-choice weapon’ in the Malayan campaign; the sawn- off repeater shotgun. As the result of a New Zealand FARELF trial conducted in early 1965 it was assessed the Armalite was in terms of ‘carriage, handling, cleaning and accuracy at short range (between 40 and 100 yards)...a better weapon than the SLR and Sterling Sub Machine Gun (SMG) in jungle warfare.’ The first detachment received no instruction on the handling characteristics of the Armalite until July 1965 and for most part, New Zealand SAS soldiers utilised the SLRs in the early stages of ‘Confrontation.’19 Many scouts carried out a totally illegal modification of the SLR by filing down part of the firing mechanism of the weapon which allowed it to fire fully automatically.

17 _{Worsnop, “Monthly Report: 4-31 March 65 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East), 12 April}

1965,” p.6.

18 _{A further 8 SARBE Mark2A beacons were requested for the second detachment in mid-September 1965.}

NEWZARM, “Sarbe Beacons Mark 2A, 15 September 1965,” and “Equipment Requirements – 2 Det” (no date) both in New Zealand Army 34/9/4 Volume 1, Aid to Malaysia February 1965 – March 1965, NZDF Archive, Wellington.

19 _{Major Brian Worsnop, “Monthly Report: July 1965 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East) “G”}

Matters, 8 August 1965 and “Supply of Arms, 19 April 1965,” both in Army 34/9/4 Volume 1, and Connor,

Photograph 1: A New Zealand SAS patrol member observes a track in Borneo circa 1965.20

Worsnop reported to Wellington in May 1965 that the British Squadron was obtaining the Armalite as ‘the main patrol weapon’ and that trials - Worsnop did not specify whether

they were British or carried out by his detachment - had been successful. The lightness, robustness and simplicity of maintenance made it ‘an ideal weapon’ for patrol operations.21 Worsnop advised representations had been made for his detachment to be supplied with Armalite rifles, and 35 weapons finally arrived in June 1965.22 For many in Dearing’s second detachment, the Armalite also became the weapon of choice:

...well we were quite taken with those because we had the SLRs when we went there but we had Armalite – and they were pretty novel to us and were very powerful and did what we wanted them to.23

The New Zealanders in Borneo had to rely significantly on their British counterparts to supplement outstanding equipment. Thirty-three Armalite rifles and ten SR128 radios were loaned to the second detachment when it first arrived in Borneo in September 1965.24 Lightweight shelters were replaced by British ponchos and it was hoped that if any of the SR128 radios became unserviceable during the deployment, spares or replacements might be provided by the British or Australian Squadrons.

For a unit which could make itself available for deployment at short notice, and in fact had been deployed to Borneo because it could get there much faster than a battalion, it was inevitable that it would arrive in an operational area without some essential equipment. But the ‘limited’ response to requests for replacement equipment seemed to be mainly the fault of New Zealand SAS as a result of the way requests were phrased. There was no suggestion either 1 Ranger Squadron in New Zealand or the detachments in Borneo would demand the equipment; rather in identifying the shortages, it was suggested the equipment could be sourced from British 22 SAS stores in country.25

21 _{Worsnop also reported the weapon had ‘increased “hitting” power,’ although it has been argued by other}

detachment members, as well as those who subsequently operated in Vietnam, that the “hitting” power of the SLR could not be matched by any other rifle that the New Zealand SAS had at their disposal during the 1960s. Major Brian Worsnop, “Monthly Report: April 1965 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East) “G” Matters, 10 May 1965,” NZSAS Association Archive, Wellington, p.3.

It appears that New Zealand Army General Staff or New Zealand Army Malaya

22 _{Major Brian Worsnop, “Monthly Report: May 1965 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far East) “G”}

Matters, 15 June 1965,” NZSAS Association Archive, Wellington, p.2.

23 _{Gary Walker, interview conducted on 12 June 2008.}

24 _{Major Rod Dearing, “Monthly Report: 2-30 September 65 2 Det New Zealand Ranger Squadron (Far}

East), 12 October 1965,” NZSAS Association Archive, Wellington, p.3.

25

Once the British SAS Squadron left Borneo, some of these problems intensified. Major David Moloney wrote in early August 1966 that the committing of Detachment patrols on operations had been delayed because of a ‘lack of serviceable bergen’ packs. Moloney added that the shortage was ‘theatre-wide.’ Major David Moloney, “Monthly Report: 1-31 July 1966 Det 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron (FE) Government Matters, 1 August 1966,” in New Zealand Army A.15/15/1 Volumes I and II, Operation Reports SAS Far East (4Tp Vietnam), NZDF Archives, Wellington.

(NEWZARM) thus inferred such requests as problems that did not deserve much effort on their part to solve.

New Zealand SAS Patrol Procedures in Borneo

…we took our own [SOPs] initially and that they were modified as a result of the first two detachments and if there had been any British, and they may well have had a bit of an Australian input...but I doubt that. So they would have been, I think pretty much, our own.26

SAS patrolling methods, save for the size of the patrols, were virtually identical to those that had been proven effective in Malaya. When an SAS patrol discovered a track, it would assess the sign left by enemy soldiers and either establish an observation point (OP) or ambush (depending upon the mission parameters and the time available) or follow the track in the hope of discovering an enemy camp. To use the track itself was to invite an ambush, risk triggering a booby-trap, or coming into contact with the enemy. Instead, patrols would make a series of loops through the jungle, aiming to intersect the track every few hundred yards. This was known as cross-graining. As with the British SAS, the New Zealanders also utilised their significant experience in Malaya and applied these jungle warfare skills to the environment in Borneo. The security of an SAS patrol was based on ‘concealment of tracks and camps, silence, being unpredictable to the enemy and avoidance of tracks liable to ambush.’27

Basic patrol make-up was commonly a four-man arrangement. This was accepted as the minimum that could allow the extraction of a wounded patrol member.28 It was policy to allow Indonesian incursions, when discovered, to infiltrate across the border without being harassed or ‘molested.’29 The first British SAS Squadron in Borneo, A Squadron, had developed a drill called a ‘Step-Up.’ This provided for the quick deployment of larger infantry forces, usually by helicopter, to act as a ‘cut-off’ force for such incursions.30

26 _{David Ogilvy, interview conducted on 27 February 2008.}

27 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.5.}

28 _{Although several patrol operations were of larger size (either multiple patrols or Troop-strength}

operations) during the New Zealanders time in Borneo.

29 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.7.}

30 _{The ‘Step Up’ system was also utilised by the British SAS during their ‘hearts and minds’ operations}

with local Iban villagers; ‘In Brunei a platoon of Gurkhas was on stand-by, day and night...and we

deliberately exploited the magic of our radio sets to impress the Ibans. ‘Right,’ we would tell them. ‘All we have to do is send a message up into the sky, and help will come very quickly. Just watch.’ In twenty

As soon as an incursion was discovered by, or reported to, an SAS patrol, the patrol would radio the details back to the Squadron Headquarters. The patrol would then receive and guide the infantry support to likely ambush points. British SAS SOPs dictated that this was one of the few occasions when a four-man patrol might be split; two patrol members to guide the infantry, the other two to maintain observation of the Indonesians.31

Indonesian Forces

In briefing the New Zealanders on the opposition they were likely to encounter, the British SAS understood that the Indonesian forces comprised elements of their Regular Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) which included the Resemen Para Komando Angkaton Darat (RPKAD) or Indonesian Special Forces,32 Parachute and Raider Battalions, regular trained infantry and ‘Air force Quick Action Troops,’ Marine Commandos and Police Mobile Brigades (MOBRIG).33 The SAS knew the TNI troops wore a mixture of camouflage suits and ‘American webbing.’ TNI forces were also armed with a variety of weapons; Garand rifles, Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), Armalites and various Russian-made 7.62mm weapons - Siminov Carbines, Kalashnikov Submachine guns and Degtyarev Light Machine Guns (LMG). The TNI were also armed with 60mm and 81mm mortars and rocket launchers.34

The guerrilla forces that supported TNI operations in Borneo were commonly known as Indonesian Border Terrorists (IBT).35 These volunteers were supposedly recruited from Brunei and other areas in East Malaysia and trained in Indonesia. The IBT wore Olive Green (OG) uniforms and jungle hats. They had access to some American sourced webbing and weapons, and they were mainly armed with ‘No. 4 rifles and sten’ guns.36

minutes or so helicopters full of armed Gurkhas would be landing in the settlement, and everybody was tremendously heartened.’ De La Billiere, Looking For Trouble, p. 231.

The SAS were aware that TNI forces would often dress as IBT in conventional OG

31 _{D Squadron, 22 SAS, “Standing Orders for Borneo, 10 September 1964,” p.7.} 32

CINCFE. 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign, 27 January 1967,” DEFE 5/172, p. 8.

33 _{The MOBRIG forces were a para-military unit organised into battalions but used for internal security and}