Within such anarchy and chaos, more and more people turned to those who urged armed resistance, which consisted of impetuous patriots, self-styled messiahs, even recruiters for ex-KMT warlords; moreover, considered armed insurgence as their only option (Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 115)
In May 1958, the first Shan rebel group called Noom Seik Harn (the Young Brave Warriors) originated from Muang Ton64 and was led by Saw Yan Da (alias Sao Noi), a
Shan (Tai Nüe) from Yunnan. At that moment, some university students joined him particularly when the Burmese army began its operation against the Shan nationalist movement. In 1959, the Tangyan battle stirred a revolt, which was launched by a well- known Wa police officer’s descent, with a band of Wa fighters as well as some university students, including members of Saophas families (Lintner, 1984: 413). Soon after that, some small bands sprang up, led by head villagers, ex-policemen, adventurers and even monks (Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 116). Later on, in 1964, the Shan State Army (SSA)was organised by merging Shan State Independence Army (SSIA), Shan National United Front (SNUF) and Kokang Revolutionary Army65 (Lintner, 1984:
64 Information from interviewee Saw Yan Da’s cousin.
416). Since then, the history of Shan resistance movement turned over a new page. However, complex war politics has always haunted the Shan resistance movement, mostly due to financial backing for their armed struggle against Burmese military regime. Therefore, I highlight how these Shan resistance groups negotiated, allied or split with different actors, including the KMT troops, Burmese military regime and the other communist party (CPB).
According to Chao Tzang Yawnghwe’s (1987) memoir, the 1962 coup not only devastated the reform progress, but also led the Shan State towards socio-political anarchy. Meanwhile, an economic vacuum was added due to the operation of Enterprise Nationalisation Law in 1963 and the Socialist Economy Protection Law in 196466 by the new regime; both made the situation worse and caused economic
breakdown in the country (122). Whether in Shan State or Burma, the economic downfall triggered a serious shortage of all kind of products and goods, which heightened cross-border trade controlled by the ex-KMT (124). In such a situation there were only two options for Shan rebel leaders: one to dislodge or impose control over these alien and exploitative elements, or to submit. Many preferred the latter, because they were in no position to fight against the ex-KMT merchant-warlords. However, in such an arrangement, Shan resistance groups could only obtain limited amounts of military supplies (e.g. weapons and ammunition) and some financial support from the ex-KMT to continue their struggle against the Burmese military regime. This situation trapped them as supplementary divisions or front organisations in the interest of ex- KMT groups and their counterparts. Therefore, during this socio-political and economic vacuum when Shan armies or Burmese military needed ammunition trade, whatever money or profit was made went into the pockets of warlords and merchants in Thailand, Laos, Burma and Hong Kong (126).
Opium Politics and Burmese Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) policy
After the KMT retreated to Shan State, along with civil war, the devastation of the fields
had ruined the traditional rice-based economy. Some farmers were forced to be porters for government troops, while some left their paddy fields to work on opium poppy fields which were the only feasible cash crop to grow. According to Lintner (1984), opium was legal but only allowed in some certain deep mountain areas in the east of the Salween River, in Kokang and Wa states before World War II. The Saophas could collect taxes on opium, but this was strictly regulated by local and British authorities under the 1923 Shan States Opium Act (410). During the British colonial period, poppy had been cultivated particularly by hill-tribes, but after the 1962 coup and KMT’s occupation, a growing number of poor Shan farmers also engaged in opium farming (417).
In order to obtain financial support for military purposes, opium became an important source of income for resistance groups. It had been already well established at the beginning of the resistance movement and brought in cash for the rebel bands (417). Their role was limited to tax poppy growers, buying agents and sometimes to escort caravans passing through their territory to the border for an agreed fee or by direct involvement in trade (Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 55; Lintner, 1984: 418). Therefore, money from opium trade facilitated their armed struggle against the Burmese troops and they could also use opium in exchange for guns, ammunitions, medicines and other necessities. The degree and form of involvement varied within groups (Lintner, 1984: 418)
Due to the expansion of communist military activities in Shan State, the Burmese Army suffered high casualties. In 1963 the Ne Win regime began to use a typical policy of “divide and rule” to acknowledge local warlord groups as the Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), “home guards” or “self-defence” forces, owing to their shortage of martial and financial resources to defeat the resistance groups and to control areas. Thus, the local militia groups were offered the right to use government controlled roads and towns in Shan State for opium smuggling and cross-border trade with Thailand and Laos, in exchange for combating the communists and other rebels. Any rebel group surrendering would be given KKY status (Seekins, 2006: 234; Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 23, 127; Lintner, 1984:421). Obviously, this policy gathered support of local communities in the Shan
State, and to counterbalance Shan rebels. In particular, opium could accrue huge profits as it was exchanged for bars of pure gold in the border town Tachilek, and the area gained the name ‘the Golden Triangle’.
At the border, the KKY bought consumer goods which they carried back as a return cargo. They would often bribe Burmese Army officers with some of these goods to facilitate trade. The relations built upon the opium trade were of total anarchy, with a number of armies ambushing and betraying each other (Lintner, 1984:421). Consequently, the two kings of the Golden Triangle, Lo Hsing-Han and Khun Sa67,
became well-known KKY commanders in the early 1960s, and by late 1960s, more than 50 KKY groups had been organised. The KKY policy brought a decisive change that led to an internal division in Shan State. However, this policy was abandoned by the Ne Win regime in 1973, who announced the actions of KKY forces illegal. In 1989, when the resistance armed groups signed ceasefire agreements with the SLORC, the approach resembled the KKY procedures as the ceasefire groups were engaged in trade or business. As a result, both policies boosted the drug trade and led to an expansion in the drug economy (Seekins, 2006:234).
The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) expansion and Shan State forces
Since end of 1968, the CPB, backed by the communist Chinese, began operation from its bases in China. By mid-1970s, it had become a new strong force adding to all the conflicts already in existence in Shan State (Jirattikorn, 2008:203).
As far as the SSA was concerned, it was in a tricky political situation whether to build an alliance with the CPB or not, in particular the aims and ideology of both groups were different. On one hand, the CPB was an opponent of the SSA at political and ideological level; on the other hand, the CPB could sit in the same boat with the SSA with regard to practical matters, because the CPB was a rival of the Burmese government and often
67 Khun Sa (Shan name) was a Chinese Shan, whose Chinese name was Chang, Chi-fu. The Loimaw KKY
combated Burmese military forces seriously due to Chinese communist’s support (Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 129). In particular, after a split within the SSA itself, the right- wing which was led by Sao Gon Jerng (alias Mo Heng, a co-founder of SSA) moved away (Jirattikorn, 2008:204) and crossed the Salween River with 1,200 followers to Thailand joining with the 3rd army of the ex-KMT to seek protection and establish its base close
to the Thai border in 1968 (Smith 1999: 334). In 1969, Sao Gon Jerng established the Shan United Revolution Army (SURA) at Piang Luang near the Thai border (Jirattikorn, 2008:203).
The SSA lost Gon Jerng, under pressure from the Burmese, unlike SURA in close association with the former KMT 3rd Army, or SUA which evolved from the KKY of
Loimaw (萊莫山). The left-wing of SSA did not control Thai-Shan border and the trade routes. This pioneer Shan resistance group did not have the resources to bring unification of all Shan armies. Therefore, they allied with the CPB to obtain unlimited Chinese weapons through the CPB and controlled most of northern Shan State (Cowell 2005: 8, cited in Jirattikorn, 2008:203-204; Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 1987: 123-124). In 1971, the SSA renamed the Shan State Progress Party and Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA). Until 1989 the SSA fought against the former Burmese military regime. However, following the collapse of their Chinese-backed ally - the CPB, the SSPP/SSA agreed to sign a ceasefire with the Burmese government in 1989.
Besides, in 1985, Sao Gon Jerng merged his SURA forces with Khun Sa’s SUA (the Shan United Army) and the joint force under the name Tailand Revolution Council /Tailand Revolutionary Army (TRC/TRA) was renamed Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 1987. After Sao Gon Jerng passed away, Khun Sa was the leader of the MTA. However, the situation suddenly changed after MTA surrendered to the Burmese military junta in 1996; the Burmese military, Tatmadaw, started to control the area and human rights violations became widespread. In late 1999, those ex-MTA soldiers who refused to surrender renewed the SSA-S (Shan State Army- South). They followed the leader, Yawd Serk, and settled around the border; since then the border camps have become a refuge and shelter for displaced Shan who escaped from their homelands.