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VULNERABILIDAD DE ATLETAS DE ÉLITE ANTE EL DOPAJE’ (EVAED)

1.1. El dopaje como problema social

This subsection deals with the research findings and analysis of data related to the above mentioned second research nil hypotheses

Table 4.30 illustrates that respondents who strongly disagreed on non-executive members of the board of directors have no correlation with the social living conditions of the customers of the MFIs represent 43(30.9%) while those who disagreed represent 56(40.3%). This shows that 99(71.2%) confirmed that the relationship between non executive members of the board of directors and the social living conditions of customers of MFIs does exist; this shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the social living conditions of the customers of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about no relationship represent 20(14.4%). This means that they didn’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non executive members of the board of directors and the social living conditions of customers of MFIs. The relationship is also confirmed by a low rate of the respondents who agreed about the non-relationship between the variables, the respondents represent 14(10.1%) of the total of respondents. It is also confirmed by those who strongly agreed on no relationship between the variables because they represent only 6(4.3%) of the total respondents. From Table 4.30, one may conclude that the majority of the respondents, representing 71.1%, confirmed that there is a correlation between the outside members of the board of directors and the social living conditions of the MFIs in Rwanda. This could be as a result of neutrality in decision making by outside members.They do not normally have a conflict of interest in companies and

normally endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.

Table 4.31: Frequency on outside/independent/nonexecutive members of the board and economic living conditions

Frequency Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Strongly agree 7 5.0 5.0 5.0

Agree 18 12.9 12.9 18.0

Neither agree nor disagree

13 9.4 9.4 27.3

Disagree 46 33.1 33.1 60.4

Strongly disagree 55 39.6 39.6 100.0

Total 139 100.0 100.0

Source: Primary data, September 2011

Table 4.31 demonstrates that respondents who strongly disagreed that no-executive members of the board of directors have no correlation with the economic living conditions of the customers of the MFIs represent 55(39.6%) while those who agreed represent 46(33.1%). This shows that 101(72.7%) confirmed that the relationship between non executive members of the board of directors and the economic living conditions of customers of MFIs does exist; this shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the economic living conditions of the customers of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about that relationship represent only 13(9.4%). This means that they

didn’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non executive members of the board of directors and the economic living conditions of customers of MFIs. The is also confirmed by the low rate of the respondents who agreed about the above mentioned relationship, the respondents represent 18(12.9%) of the total of respondents. It can be also confirmed by those who strongly agreed about the relationship because they represent only 7(5%) of the total respondents. From this Table, one may conclude that the majority of the respondents, representing 101(72.7%), confirmed that there is a strong correlation between the outside members of the board of directors and the economic living conditions of the MFIs in Rwanda. This could be as a result of neutralility in decision making by outside members. They do not normally have a conflict of interest in companies and normally endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.

Table 4.32: Frequency on outside/independent/nonexecutive members of the board and number of customers

Frequency Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Strongly agree 4 2.9 2.9 2.9

Agree 16 11.5 11.5 14.4 Neither agree nor disagree 13 9.4 9.4 23.7 Disagree 51 36.7 36.7 60.4 Strongly disagree 55 39.6 39.6 100.0 Total 139 100.0 100.0

Table 4.32 shows that respondents who strongly disagreed on non-executive members of the board of directors had no correlation with the increase of the customers of the MFIs represent 55(39.6%) while those who disagreed represented 51(36.7%). Surprisingly the same percentage as the relationship between the outsider members of the board and the economic living conditions of the customers of MFIs. This shows that 76.3% confirmed that the relationship between non-executive members of the board of directors and the increase of customers of MFIs does exist. This shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the increase of the customers of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about non-relationship represent only 13(9.4%). This means that they don’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non- executive members of the board of directors and the increase of customers of MFIs.

This relationship is also confirmed by the low rate of the respondents who agreed about non-relationship, the respondents represent 16(11.5%) of the total of respondents. It is also confirmed by those who strongly agreed about the non- relationship because they represent only 4(2.9%) of the total respondents. From this Table, the research concludes that the majority of the respondents, representing 106(76.3%), confirmed that there is a correlation between the outside members of the board of directors and the increase of the number of customers of the MFIs in Rwanda. This could be as a result of neutralility in decision making by outside members. They do not normally have a conflict of interest in companies and normally endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.

Table 4.33: Frequency on outside/independent/nonexecutive mebers of the board and number of loans

Frequency Percent

Valid

Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid Strongly agree 11 7.9 7.9 7.9

Agree 7 5.0 5.0 12.9 Neither agree nor disagree 15 10.8 10.8 23.7 Disagree 51 36.7 36.7 60.4 Strongly disagree 55 39.6 39.6 100.0 Total 139 100.0 100.0

Source: Primary data, September 2011

Table 4.33 expresses the number of repondents who strongly disagreed that non- executive members of the board of directors have no correlation with the increase of loans issued to customers by MFIs represents 55(39.6%) while those who disagreed represent 51(36.7%). This shows that 106(76.3%) confirmed that the relationship between non-executive members of the board of directors and the increase of the loans issued to customers of MFIs does exist; this shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the increase of loans issued to customers of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about that relationship represent 15(10.8%). This means that they don’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non-executive members of

the board of directors and the increase of loans issued to customers of MFIs. The non relationship is confirmed by a low rate of the respondents who agreed about the above mentioned relationship, they represent only 7(5%) of the total of respondents. It is also confirmed by those who strongly agreed about the no relationship because they represent 11(7.9%) of the total respondents. From this Table, one may conclude that the majority of the respondents, representing 106(76.3%), confirmed that there is a correlation between the outside members of the board of directors and the increase of loans issued to customers of the MFIs in Rwanda. This could be as a result of neutralility in decision making by outside members. They normally do not have any conflict of interest in companies and endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.

Table 4.34: Frequency on outside/independent/nonexecutive members of the board and debt recovery

Frequency Percent

Valid

Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid Strongly agree 6 4.3 4.3 4.3

Agree 14 10.1 10.1 14.4 Neither agree nor disagree 12 8.6 8.6 23.0 Disagree 44 31.7 31.7 54.7 Strongly disagree 63 45.3 45.3 100.0 Total 139 100.0 100.0

Table 4.34 shows that repondents who strongly disagreed that non-executive members of the board of directors have no correlation with the debt recovery represent 63(45.3%) while those who disagreed on no correlation represent 44(31.7%). This shows that 107(77%) confirmed that the relationship between non- executive members of the board of directors and the debt recovery of MFIs does exist. This shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the social living conditions of the customers of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about the non-relationship between outsider board members and the debt recovery represent 12(8.6%). This means that they don’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non- executive members of the board of directors and the debt recovery of MFIs.

The non-relationship is also confirmed by a low rate of the respondents who agreed about it, the respondents represent 14(10.1%) of the total of respondents. The non- relationship is also confirmed by those who strongly agreed about it because they represent only 6(4.3%) of the total respondents. From this Table, one may conclude that the majority of the respondents, representing 107(77%), confirmed that there is a correlation between the outside members of the board of directors and the debt recovery of the MFIs in Rwanda.This could be as a result of neutralility in decision making by outside members. They do not normally have any conflict of interest in companies and normally endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.

Table 4.35: Frequency on outside/independent/nonexecutive members of the board and profitability

Frequency Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Strongly agree 7 5.0 5.0 5.0

Agree 14 10.1 10.1 15.1

Neither agree nor disagree

14 10.1 10.1 25.2

Disagree 40 28.8 28.8 54.0

Strongly disagree 64 46.0 46.0 100.0

Total 139 100.0 100.0

Source: Primary data, September 2011

Table 4.35 demonstrates that respondents who strongly disagreed on non-executive members of the board of directors have no correlation with the profitability of the MFIs represent 64(46%) while those who disagreed represent 40(28.8%). This shows that 104(74.8%) confirmed that the relationship between non-executive members of the board of directors and the profitability of MFIs does exist. This shows to the researcher that independent members of the board of directors have a correlation with the profitability of MFIs. The respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed about that non-relationship represent 14(10.1%). This means that they don’t have any knowledge about the relationship between the non-executive members of the board of directors and the profitability of MFIs. The non- relationship is also confirmed by a low rate of the respondents who agreed about it who the respondents represent 14(10.1%) of the total of respondents. It is also

confirmed by those who strongly agreed about the relationship because they represent only 7(5%) of the total respondents. From this Table, one may conclude that the majority of the respondents, representing 104(74.8%), confirmed that there is a correlation between the outside members of the board of directors on the profitability of the MFIs in Rwanda. This could be as a result of neutralility in decision making by outside members. They do not normally have any conflict of interest in companies and normally endeavour to utilise their knowledge, skills, experience and contacts for the good of a company.