This section highlights the existence of three major groups of leaders or decision-makers in Timor-Leste. The first is the Indigenous leadership and decision-making system. Indigenous governance systems are stronger in rural areas, where leaders are primarily older men. The second group of decision-makers are the elite, represented by those politicians in Government and the bureaucracy, who are often overseas-educated and former diaspora. The third are international practitioners, represented primarily in international development and
peacebuilding organisations, advisers to Government, and in INGOs and the private sector.
Social order and Indigenous leadership in Timor-Leste has been systematised through relationships of allegiance and ritual exchange within and between networks of uma lulik, extended families or houses (Fox, 2000a, p.18; Tobias, 2014, p.15). These mostly hereditary leadership positions are at the heart of complex leadership hierarchies grounded in political and ritual power and people in these positions are connected to key uma lulik across different ethno- linguistic groups (McWilliam, 2005, p.34). Leadership and social status is based on hierarchies of precedence founded on relative seniority recursively applied and is usually patrilineal (McWilliam, 2007c, p.359). Pre-colonial groups were divided into: chiefs and nobles (Tetum:
dato); commoners; and slaves (Kammen, 2003, p.74).
Brown and Gusmão (2009), Cummins (2014), dos Santos and da Silva (2012), Hicks (2014), Hohe and Nixon (2003), and Trindade and Castro (2007) describe the three primary types of Indigenous leaders in Timor-Leste. The liurai (Tetum: local king, chief) is responsible for political authority, justice and resource management. The dato-lulik (Tetum: noble) has spiritual authority grounded in ancestral order and values (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.66; McWilliam,
2011). The lia-nain who is the judicial authority or arbitrator, has knowledge of ancestral rules, can determine compensation, land matters and interpret tarabandu for the community, and bind agreements by conducting juramentu (Marriot, 2010; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.21). The
liurai was customarily seen as inferior to the spiritual authorities, the dato-lulik and lia-nain, so dealt with all outsiders, such as the Portuguese and Indonesians, designing peace agreements and initiating juramentu or marriage processes.
Additional Indigenous leadership positions include the bee na’in (Tetum: owners of the water) that provide important conduits between the sacred and secular worlds to manage water use and infrastructure (Hicks, 1976, pp.21-24; Palmer, 2015; Trindade, 2015). There are also specialist knowledge holders including daia (Tetum: midwives), people who can assist women give birth) and matan-do’ok (Tetum: soothsayers, people who diagnose illness and use traditional plant medicines) (Castro, 2011).
Generally, older men hold these customary positions although women can be lia-nain, and within the few matriarchal uma lulik older women hold customary authority (Cummins & Leach 2012; Trindade & Castro 2007, p.33). Knowledge exchange is passed between generations through an apprentice system using training, inheritance, spiritual powers and other means. An East Timorese government adviser observed:
“So local concepts, local ideas and values have been kept by traditional elders. Which often, because they do not have university degrees, people often ignored them. But if you talk to them, they are absolutely the ones who keep traditional knowledge. And they have a very different concept about life, about creating relationships with people, about how to live peacefully, about how to live in harmony” (TG-1500-140910). Elite capture, corruption and abuse have resulted in contested relationships between elites and East Timorese citizens (Palmer, 2007). These hierarchical divisions occurred in pre-colonial times, which became distorted by the co-option of leaders through governance systems
introduced by the Portuguese and Indonesians that sought to incorporate Indigenous leadership into formal and informal political authority (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Traube (2011, p.217) describes elite co-option as “Timorese who had ‘put on trousers’ (Mambai: tam kalsa) and knew little about the people in whose name they claimed to speak”.
McWilliam (2005), Traube (1995) and Taylor (1991) argue that the Portuguese model paradoxically had the opposite effect to what was intended, resulting in the reinforcement of Indigenous systems. Traube (1995, p.47) explains that the Indonesian system regulated secular politics and reduced opportunities to enact ritual hierarchies. The Indonesian system of “erasing or denying” the structures and ritual practices of the uma lulik and “co-opting or excluding” East Timorese leaders also failed to eradicate these Indigenous systems (McWilliam, 2005,
p.34). Cummins (2014, pp.24,64) explains that some lia-nain were co-opted by the Portuguese and perpetrated violence against East Timorese. Therefore some East Timorese see the modern democratic system as a better model to achieve self-determination.
Timor-Leste has a long history of co-option and top-down, highly centralised decision-making associated with bureaucratic authoritarianism, including a pre-colonial history of hereditary Indigenous liurai rulers, Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation that promoted hierarchical, semi-presidential leaders (Kingsbury, 2007). Since 1999, leadership has been accorded primarily to those who fought in the resistance. Different historical experiences in communities affect the legitimacy and use of Indigenous leadership, for example, strong resistance leaders (who had no previous liurai lineage) may continue to have authority in the community; or if a liurai died without sharing their Indigenous knowledge, their community would usually use modern systems of governance (Brown, 2012, pp.64-65). Kinship is much less geographically focused due to forced resettlements during the Indonesian occupation, and now urban migration for education, employment and trade.
Identity pluralism and modern governance systems have allowed people to play leadership roles both within the sacred and secular spheres. Since independence, political leaders have not used
sasan lulik to rule, but relied on elections to legitimate their power. Effective leaders tend to have both customary leadership and elected representative power and this power can be transferred during rituals where the liurai formally grants authority to the Xefe de Suku
(Bovensiepen, 2014b; Brown, 2012, p.64; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). This ritual sharing of power is more prevelant in rural areas, as the legitimacy of liurai or uma lisan in urban or mixed communities tends to be diminished.
It is clear that some Indigenous leaders are co-opted, particularly those who collaborated with the Indonesians and had become wealthy, benefiting from lucrative jobs, status and power (Cristalis, 2009, p.33). These co-opted elites maintain their status quo hierarchies, including economic, social and political inequalities, through modern governance systems. For example, Belo (2014) explains that the proposed 2014 media regulation laws act to consolidate elite political power at the expense of citizen’s informed participation. Scambary (2009, p.2) cites the “irresponsible use of gangs” by elites for protection and provocation, the tolerance toward the Petitioners, and the pardoning of key participants in the 2006 violence as factors contributing to a culture of elitism and impunity.
The elite vision of independence, reflected in modern statebuilding, disables the ability ofEast Timorese citizens to frame their aspirations for independence through Indigenous knowledge systems (McClean, 2014, p.4). State power does not co-exist easily with Indigenous governance
systems, which created confusion and tension at a community level. Many East Timorese do not view the political elites as holding spiritual power, and many elites have indicated that they do not believe in lisan (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Brown (2009, pp.143-144) and Brown and Gusmão (2009, p.61) assert this disequilibrium of power exacerbated negative attitudes toward
Indigenous governance, polarising national politics and, “weakening the [local] capacity to resolve problems”. Trindade and Castro (2007, p.27) cite Alkatiri, then FRETILIN Secretary General, who expressed views that many elites hold:
“[T]o be East Timorese, we don’t need to go back to the uma lulik, we better defend our sovereignty and independence. [Whether] we like it or not, people of East Timor do not have uma lulik anymore, because the ancestors of East Timor are all wanderers”.