Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March
Whether the foreigner can recover his property after
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller It held that Helmut Muller
GR No. 195670/ December 03, 2012
In pari delicto
"MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another)
29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal praying for the distribution of 6 Lots.
In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefitsince respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.
RTC dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership.
CA promulgated a
Decisionaffirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC . The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
dissolution of marriage cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
2. Dino vs Dino GR No. 178044/ January 19, 2011
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. On 14 January 1998, they were married each other. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity..
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
The RTC ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
.
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void
ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co- ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co- ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. xxx.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage
3. Camacho-