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decision on one hand and the uncertainty surrounding the development’s estimated cost on the other142.
5.3.2 The development process – Public participation opportunity
It has been observed that planning for Mass Rapid Transit Systems (MRTS) usually start when a city’s population exceeds 1 million so that it can be in service by the time the population reaches 2-3 million. Damascus and its surrounding region has a total population of 3.82 million (2004 est.) with 1.572 million of these within the Damascus administrative area (2004 est.) (CBoS, 2007a). This makes an MRTS crucial in order to support commuting within and around the city143 (Kadem, 2011).
The first study for a metro development in Damascus was in 1982 by a Russian party.
The study took 1.5 years to complete and was published at the end of 1984. It included estimates of the financial side (construction costs, funding options and investment returns) and the tender and construction details. However, the development did not make it past the study phase. This may be due to the effect of the dramatic changes that took place in Russia (the former Soviet Union) and the impact on Syrian/Russian relations144. Subsequent studies were held by different parties from Iran, Armenia and Malaysia, yet the Russian one was the most serious and comprehensive145. It suggested three metro lines connected by a fourth circular one with a total length of 46km and 42 stations to cover the city’s needs with a total construction cost of approximately 561.73 million EUR 146 (Kadem, 2011). None of these studies has been implemented, however, due to the Syrian planning authorities’ lack of capacity to fund and execute the development.
Due to a request from GoD, the Damascus metro was again put on the table in 2008 with a French proposal for the Green Line as part of a four-line network to cover the whole city (as shown in Figure 5-2). The total construction cost for the Green line as
142 These reasons were given by the director of UPD in GoD and were highlighted by Al-Hajj, the vice director of the same department.
143 This conclusion is based on the planning authorities’ views, not the public perception of the problem.
144 The dissolution of the Soviet Union reformed Syrian/Russian relations on all levels and this affected the financial agreements between the two countries.
145 This information is summarised by Kadem (2011) and supported by data collected from interviewees in GoD.
146 This amount was converted from the reported cost of 39 billion and 500 million SYP using a currency converter website (XE, 1995-2011).
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estimated by SYSTRA was approximately 1.2 billion EUR (around 60 million EUR per km) where 250 million EUR was to be funded by the French government via a loan to GoD and up to 400 million EUR was provided by EIB while the remaining 600 million EUR was to be funded by GoD (Kadem, 2011; Syria-Stocks, 2010; Syrian-Economic, 2010). The development is estimated to have a timeline of eight years to complete all five development phases shown in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2: The phases of the Green Line development process
Phase period Phase of study Main tasks included
2008- 2009 Feasibility study Topography, geology and soil, air quality, water resources, biodiversity, visual quality, archaeology and culture, noise and vibration.
Socio-economic evaluation (a participation statement is required).
Institutional and financial recommendations by the international consultants.
2009-2010 Basic design A further detailed study.
Finalising the funding plan.
Implementing the required institutional reinforcements.
2010-2011 Call for tender The selection of the future international consortium associated to local partners in charge of constructing the line.
2012 Detailed design The completion of the infrastructure designs before proceeding to construction works.
2012-2016 Construction The construction of the viaduct, the tunnel, the stations and the depot.
Manufacturing the rolling stock and delivering it in Damascus.
Testing the line.
Source: The author, using information available on the Green Line website
However, the French bid for the development is seen by the Syrian government to be expensive compared to the cost of similar developments within the region (e.g. in Turkey the cost for a similar development was around 16.8 million EUR per km; while in Cairo and Tehran it was around 23 million EUR per km) (Kadem, 2011). Therefore, the government is looking for alternative partners (Turkish or Iranian) in a way that local labour and materials can be employed and eventually the cost can be reduced by 50%.
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Another possibility suggested by the chair of the rail transport department in Damascus University, Dr. Omayra (2011), is to fund the development by using the build-operate-transfer (BOT) system (Kadem, 2011). In this, the development is given as a long term investment to private foreign or national investor(s), via a successful bid, at no or minor costs to the government under certain regulations set by the state (Badawi, 2003). After the private investment and operating period comes to an end, the ownership of the development is transferred to the state. However, no firm decision has been reached at the moment and the development has stalled at its second phase.
In relation to the concern of this research and the reason for choosing this development as a case study, the first phase of the development of the feasibility study (as shown in Table 5-2) has included a socio-economic evaluation and in this a public participation statement was required. This was a part of the development report documents required by the funding party and not a regular process implemented by GoD in such developments (according to the interview with the head of the UPD in GoD Ayaso, 2010). Therefore, GoD was obliged to implement some public participation mechanism as requested by the development study party.
The public participation process started in April 2008 and ended in February 2009 and was divided into three phases as shown in Table 5-3. Different participation tools of information packs, questionnaires (a copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 5-2), websites, public exhibition and meetings, NGO meetings and other public and private stakeholder meetings were used. The participation process that took place in this development is looked at closely in the following chapter.
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Table 5-3: Public participation phases in the development of the Green Line Notes 41.8% of the responses to the questionnaire were from the faculties Source: The author, using information published on the Green Line website
Public response 2612 participants 10,000 website visitors 2660 participants (400 online) 12,000 website visitors since establishment No report of this has been issued
Techniques 25,000 participation packs (questionnaires + brochures) Website 20,000 participation packs (questionnaires + brochures) Website Unidentified number of participation packs (questionnaires + brochures) Exhibition in Al-Hijaz Station at 12.00- 7.00 pm Public meeting on Feb 24th 2009 at 12.00 pm with representatives from: Traffic and transport engineering directorate The international consultants in charge of the study (SYSTRA/Khatib & Alami) Several meetings with: NGOs Environmental associations Traffic and urban planning engineers Metro users (public meeting) Heads of sub-municipalities Relevant authorities
Area(s) of investigation opinion on the project, its benefits and related concerns route options and construction styles more local issues and project impacts
Phase period Apr27th – Jun 12th 2008 (7 weeks) Aug 31st – Oct 9th 2008 (6 weeks) Jan 27th - Feb 24th 2009 (4 weeks)
Phase Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
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