Introduction
This chapter will explain how the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and Hashimite dealings with the Arab nationalist societies of Syria contributed to the emergence of the Hashimite family, particularly Abdallah, as a new force in the political life of the Fertile Crescent. Once again we shall explain how Hashimite political ambitions were shaped by British declarations to Husayn and Abdallah. The previous two chapters noted that, until 1915, Hashimite political ambitions had been unaffected by the Arab political societies in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. This chapter, which covers the period from July 1915 until the start of the Arab revolt in June 1916, will examine the beginning of the Hashimite relationship with those societies, and how that relationship shaped Abdallah's political ambitions.
This chapter will highlight how Abdallah actively promoted a new role for his family in Arab politics as paramount leaders of the Arab nation. His actions in that regard will be explained in terms of his contribution to the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and his crucial role in encouraging his father and brothers to break with the Ottomans, seek alliance with Great Britain and assume the leadership of the Arabs.
Two assumptions underlie this chapter and chapter four. The first is that Abdallah's role in Arab politics developed in the context of his family's evolving political ambitions. The second is that the emergence of Abdallah's political ambitions in the Fertile Crescent cannot be understood without reference to Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn- KcMahon correspondence and his family's relationship with the Arab nationalists of Syria and Iraq who encouraged them to lead the Arab national movement. Ve shall see how that interpretation enabled Abdallah to claim that his family's ambition to create an Arab empire in the Fertile Crescent and Arabia had the support of both Great Britain and the Arab majority in the Arabian peninsula and the Fertile Crescent.
Chapters three and four of this thesis are not the first study of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and other British attempts until the
end of World War I to explain Great Britain's Arab policy to the Hashimites, These controversial questions have been studied in numerous works based on British and Arab primary sources. The most important of these studies are: Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, The McMahon Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations (Cambridge, 1976)
and 'Cairo Khartoum on the Arab Question, 1915-1918' in The Chatham
House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (New York, 1970) pp. 13-
32 and 395-99; two books by A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria
including Lebanon and Palestine (London, 1969) and Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921 (London, 1971); Isaiah Friedman,
'The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine',
Journal of Contemporary History, volume 5, number 2, 1970, pp. 83-122
and Arnold Toynbee's reponse to Friedman in 'The McMahan-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a Reply', Journal of Contemporary History, volume 5, number 4, 1970, pp. 185-201 (Toynbee's article was followed by a brief response by Friedman), An amplified version of Friedman's article in The Journal of Contemporary History is found in Isaiah Friedman, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918. British-Jewish-Arab- Relations (New York, 1973). The only detailed study in Arabic is found in Sulayman Musa, Al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya. Sirat al-Marhala al-Ula Lil- Rahada al-cArabiyya al-Haditha, 1908-1924 (Beirut, 1986) An important commentary on much of this research is found in chapter four of C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanlsm to Arabism. Essays on the Origins of Arab
Rationalism (Urbana, 1973).
Although all of these studies have considered Hashimite motivations and policy, their primary aim has been to unravel the complexities of British policy. Each of the scholars mentioned above has closely examined the compatibility of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence with the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration. All of them have studied the importance of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence for the future of Palestine. These scholars have invested considerable effort in trying to clarify the meaning of Sir Henry McMahan's letter to Husayn of 24 October 1915. The problem of British good faith and honour in negotiating with Husayn has also been a major concern,
Elie Kedourie has written that 'In order fully to understand the meaning of these documents [the Husayn-McMahon correspondence] which are at once deliberately vague and unwittingly obscure, and to account for the remarkably divergent interpretations to which they have given rise, we must see them as belonging to two different histories: that of Anglo-Sharifian negotiations during 1914-16, and that of the Palestine dispute which began with the British conquest of Palestine and the Balfour Declaration.'1 This chapter and the next will show that the Husayn-McMahon correspondence also belongs to a third history: the making of Abdallah's political ambitions in the Fertile Crescent.
This study of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, and later attempts by British officials to explain British policy to the Hashimites, differs in several respects from earlier studies of these subjects. None of the previous studies has attempted in an overt way to assess the impact of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and later British declarations on the shaping of Abdallah's political ambitions. None has examined the link between Abdallah's political evolution and his father's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. Chapters three and four of this thesis will demonstrate that the begining of Abdallah's involvement in the politics of the Fertile Crescent can only be understood in light of that interpretation.
Although this thesis differs in several respects from earlier studies of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, it has been influenced by the work of others. This is particularly true in the case of Elie Kedourie's, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, which is the most systematic and thoroughly researched study of the Husayn-McMahon correpsondence. The. Husayn-McMahon Correspondence
Contact between the Hashimites and the British in Cairo was resumed on 14 July 1915 when Abdallah sent Ronald Storrs the first letter of what has come to be known as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence.2 Husayn presented himself in this letter as the spokesman of the 'Arab nation' and offered several conditions for an Anglo-Arab alliance. All of Husayn's conditions clearly implied that he should become Caliph and head of an Arab state in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent.3 The first condition called upon
England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37* of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn cUmar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.
The second condition called upon ’England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.' In return for this, Husayn would 'acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprise are otherwise equal.' Husayn called for a mutual defence alliance between Great Britain and the Arabs. England was asked 'to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Convention for confirming such abolition.' The letter ended with an ultimatum that was intended to impress the British with the strength and determination of the Arab nation Husayn supposedly led: the British had thirty days to answer this letter, otherwise 'the whole of the Arab nation' would 'reserve to themselves complete freedom of action.'
How are we to account for the bold demands of this letter? Chapter two noted three influences on Hashimite ambitions between August 1914 and July 1915: Kitchener's note of 31 October 1914 that was rewritten and amplified by Storrs, British declarations distributed in the Hijaz between December 1914 and May 1915 and Kirghani's letter of 15 May 1915. It will be recalled that Abdallah responded cautiously to Kitchener's letter of 1 November 1914 and not at all to Mirghani or the declarations scattered in the Hijaz. Several explainations can be given for why Husayn abandoned his earlier caution in order to advance such grandiose territorial claims,
Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915, which was written in Abdallah's handwriting, reflected the grand scope of Abdallah's ambition and his penchant for hustling foreign powers with threats of a crisis that could only be resolved by meeting his demands,4 As Husayn's private secretary, Abdallah was intimately involved in the drafting of Husayn's letters to McMahon.® The gi'andiose language of Kitchener's letters and
the British declarations distributed in the Hijaz gave Abdallah an opening to make such sweeping demands.
Abdallah was the most anxious of his family for a British- supported revolt against the Turks. In July 1915 G. S. Symes learned from a Hijazi notable visiting Khartoum that Abdallah's ambition was to overthrow Turkish rule in the Hijaz with British help, 'as a preliminary to his larger schemes', and to secure the Caliphate. Husayn was in general agreement with Abdallah, but was reluctant to rebel or to assume the Caliphate.® In December 1916 Faysal told T. E, Lawrence that the idea of a British-supported revolt against the Turks originated with Abdallah. Faysal, who believed that the Turks were too strong to be overthrown, advised Husayn to reject Abdallah's proposals.7
The Arab nationalist societies in the Ottoman Empire were a second possible source of Husayn's territorial demands, Hashimite interest in the Arab political societies began in early 1915 when a representative of Jamciyat al-cArab!yya al-Fatat in Damascus asked Husayn to lead an
Arab insurrection in the Ottoman army in Syria. Al-Fatat was founded in 1909 as a reaction to Young Turkish hostility towards the Arabs and had its central branch in Damascus and other branches in Beirut and Aleppo, Most of its members were Syrian civilians. The Syrian scholar, cAli Sultan, has written that al-Fatat had sixty members before World War I. Eliezer Tauber has placed its membership at thirty-six only. During the first year of the war, al-Fatat became the first Arab political society -to call for Arab secession from the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of
an Arab empire under Hashimite leadership and an Arab Caliphate.3
Jamclyat al-cAJhd (The Covenant Society) was a secret political
society founded in Istanbul in October 1913 by cAzTz cAlI al-MisrT, Major Salim al-Jaza'irT of Damascus and Lieutenant Nurl al-SacTd of Baghdad. Despite the membership of a few civilians, al-cAhd consisted almost entirely of Arab, mostly Iraqi, officers in the Ottoman army. In late 1914 and early 1915, Iraqi officers established branches of al-cAhd in Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. The original political program of
al-cAhd called for the creation of a Turco-Arab federation with its
capital in Istanbul based on the model of the Austro-Hungarian empire.
The Caliphate would remain in Ottoman hands.3 According to Eliezer Tauber, al-cAhd had fifty-three active members on the eve of the war, forty-two of whom were officers.10
In January 1915, the Damascus branches of al-Fatat and al-cAhd approached the Hashimites through FawzI al-Bakrl, who had been assigned by the Ottoman government to Husayn's service as a bodyguard, (It will be recalled that the al-BakrT family had been friends of the Hashimites since the pilgrimage of 1909.) Bakri delivered a message to Husayn, which asked him to lead a revolt for Arab independence, and to receive a delegation in Mecca that would discuss future cooperation between the Hashimites and the nationalist conspirators in Damascus.
Al-Fatat and al~*Ahd in Damascus conspired to start a revolt among Arab troops in Syria that would coincide with a British landing at Alexandretta. Vasin al-Hashiml and cAlI Rida al-Rikabl were the two
m
leaders of this conspiracy. (Hashlmi of Baghdad was the chief of staff of the twelfth army corps and the former leader of al-'Ahd in Baghdad; Rikabi, who had recently been retired from the Ottoman army, was the mayor of Damascus.) After Hashimi had united al-Fatat and al-cAhd in late 1914 or early 1915, both societies agreed to cooperate in instigating a Hashimite-led revolt in Syria. Soon thereafter, al-Fatat
and al-cAhd merged in Aleppo.11
In early February 1915, a retainer of Emir cAli accidentally discovered a secret correspondence between VahTb Bey and Istanbul, which discussed plans to depose Husayn and end the traditional autonomy of the Hijaz. Husayn responded to this alarming discovery by sending Faysal to Istanbul to discuss these letters with the Grand Vizier, and, if possible, to restore amicable relations between Mecca and the central government. Faysal also had instructions to contact the Arab nationalists in Syria.12
Beginning in late March 1915, Faysal spent four weeks in Damascus as a guest in the home of cAta' al-Bakri, where he met secretly with representatives of al-Fatat and al-cMd. HashimT told Faysal that the Ottoman army in Syria was overwhelmingly Arab and that three of its divisions were ready to revolt. However, until conditions favoured a
drive for Arab secession, the Damascus conspirators wanted to strengthen their ties with Husayn and, if necessary, to seek British assistance. Faysal declined an offer to lead the Arab movement saying that he had been sent to Syria only to study local political conditions. He agreed, however, to join al-Fatat as a gesture of solidarity with the Damascus
nationalists. After meeting Faysal, al-Fatat and al-cAhd sent emissaries to meet Husayn in Mecca. Yusuf Haydar and Shaikh Kamil al-Qassab of
al-Fatat reviewed the situation in Syria with Husayn; Haidar was said to
have inducted Husayn's eldest son, cAli, into al-Fa£at. First Lieutenant ‘Abd al-Hamid of al-cAJbd presented Husayn with a list of Arab officers who had sworn allegiance to him,1’3
During a three-week visit to Istanbul, Faysal complained to the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, Talcat and Enver about Vahib Bey, the hostility of the CUP in the Hijaz towards his family and about Jamal Pasha, commander of the Ottoman fourth army in Syria who had recently ordered the arrest of several Arab nationalists. Faysal explained that his father would support the Ottoman jihad and send troops to participate in a second Suez Canal campaign only if Istanbul recognized the traditional autonomy of the Hijaz and the hereditary right of his family to rule the Emirate of Mecca. Faysal was told that all of his demands would be met if Husayn supported the Ottoman jihad. As a gesture of goodwill, Istanbul transferred Vahib from the Hijaz and replaced him with General Ghalib Pasha, who had orders to appease Husayn. Faysal agreed to send Hijazi volunteers to Syria and to cooperate with Jamal Pasha, who would command a second attack on the Suez Canal,
When Faysal returned to Damascus the nationalist conspirators appealed to him again to lead an Arab revolt in Syria, They claimed that their conspiracy now had the support of the Ruwalla tribes and several leading shaikhs of the Syrian Druze. Faysal agreed to ask Husayn to present the nationalists' conditions for an Anglo-Arab alliance to the British authorities in Cairo. The Damascus conspirators, who had heard from Faysal about Abdallah's contacts with Kitchener, aimed to exploit Hashimite influence in Cairo in order to gain British
support for an uprising in Syria. Faysal returned to Mecca on 20 June 1915/14
In 1938 George Antonius published what he claimed was an English translation of the nationalists' conditions for an agreement with Great Britain. The terms of the Damascus Protocol, as Antonius called that document, are almost identical to the territorial demands outlined in Husayn's letter to McMahan of 14 July 1915. Although Antonius's account of the Damascus Protocol is highly romanticized and exaggerated for dramatic effect, its essentials can be confirmed from other sources, When Mrs. Stewart Erskine, an Englishwoman with an interest in Arab affairs, interviewed Faysal in the early 1930s, she was told in rather less dramatic language about the 'Manifesto' addressed to Husayn by the Damascus nationalists which formed the basis of Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915 to McMahon.1 e
The Hashimite family held a conference in Ta'lf immediately after Faysal*s return. The purpose of this conference was to decide how the Hashimites should respond to Faysal's talks in Damascus and Istanbul. They decided that Husayn would resume contact with the British in Cairo in order to negotiate the terms of an Anglo-Hashimite alliance and a Hashimite-led Arab uprising. It was decided that Faysal would return to Damascus to meet again with the nationalist conspirators, Abdallah's task would be to raise troops from the tribes around Ta'if; cAlT would do the same with the tribes near Medina,1 *
By July 1915 territorial schemes like that in Husayn's letter to McMahon had become well known to the British and the Hashimites, The British had already heard similar proposals from Rashid Rida, cAzIz cAlT al-Misri, Sayyid ‘All al-Mirghani, cIzzat Pasha al-cAbid, Najib cAz"uri and an unnamed 'Young Arab' known to Symes in Khartoum. Storrs noted 'a curiously exact resemblance' between Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915 and Rida's frequently expressed views concerning Arab frontiers.17 It will be recalled that Rida propagandized in Arabia in 1912 and that, in early 1914, Abdallah may have joined his Society of the Arab Union. Rida's contacts with al-Fata't suggest another way in which his ideas may have circulated between Egypt, Syria and the Hijaz. After the outbreak of the
war, al-Fatat sent Kamil al-Qassab to Cairo to confer with the Syrian exiles. It is possible that when they met in Mecca in the spring of 1915, Qassab and Husayn discussed Rida's contacts with al-Fatat.'**
Ve can reasonsably conclude that territorial schemes like that of Rashid Rida were known in the Hijaz. However, only the prospect of British support for Husayn in a new role as leader of the Arabs, Caliph and founder of an Arab empire, and the expectation of a massive Arab uprising in the Ottoman army in Syria, spurred Husayn and Abdallah to address McMahan as they did in their letter of 14 July 1915. The presentation of such demands certainly suited Abdallah's inclination for grand gestures and provocative demarches designed to stampede the British into conceding his demands. The Damascus conspirators had successfully convinced the Hashimites that they represented a powerful conspiracy of Arab elements in the Ottoman army. The confluence of these factors during the first half of 1915 led Husayn to abandon much of his earlier caution about seeking an alliance with Great Britain and leading an anti-Ottoman uprising.
McMahon's letter to Husayn of 30 August 1915 reconfirmed the terms