DVR vs NVR

Insofar as the implementation of the rationing of general goods and daily necessities largely remained an urban initiative, one may wonder how the rural society of Manchukuo operated during these times of economic crises, and in what ways peasants were affected by the shortages. To begin with, the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 instantly triggered a dramatic increase in the production and exportation of agricultural products, which in turn put significant pressure on the production capacity of the already worn out Manchukuoan peasants. However, considering that at the same time, the Manchukuo government was focusing primarily on heavy industry, the total amounts invested in the regime’s agricultural sector witnessed an inevitable decrease of nearly nine percent under the amended Five-Year Development Plan.¹²⁸ Under such circumstances, peasants across the countryside were given no choice but to produce more with fewer resources, which expectedly caused their profits and personal income to worsen every year. Hence, in an attempt to ensure sufficient agricultural yield in the following years, the authorities gradually introduced a series of agricultural policies leading up to the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy (Liang gu chu he) in 1940.

Serving as a complement to the introduction of the rationing system in urban regions, private intermediary agencies such as wholesale grain stores in the countryside were abolished altogether, and peasants throughout the regime were required to sell their grain at designated governmental trading posts under the supervision of their respective grain depot unions.¹²⁹ Certainly, the Manchukuo government sought complete control over the allocation and distribution processes as a way to contain inflation and guarantee the circulation of grain within the regime. However, as time went by, the shortage crisis in the regime showed no

128 Ibid., p. 548.

129 Ibid., p. 343.

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signs of relief, and grain procurement targets were often unrealistic and systematically overestimated, leaving the peasants having to bear the cost.

It is worth specifying that the vast majority of the rural population in Manchukuo consisted primarily of land cultivators rather than landowners. Surely, during the founding of the regime, the Japanese preserved the existing societal structure in the countryside as a compromise to appease the big landowners, allowing them to retain their properties in return for their acceptance and support towards the new administration.¹³⁰ Therefore, land cultivators were under the increasing pressure to meet demanding grain quotas on top of having to pay land rent and compound interest to their landowners. This meant that however much was left for them to keep would be unlikely to last long enough to survive until the next harvest season. To elaborate, after 1940, the annual production of grain in the regime averaged approximately 18 million tons, 12 million of which would be needed to circulate within the countryside to maintain the minimum standard of living.¹³¹ However, the grain procurement targets each year stood at roughly seven million tons,¹³² meaning that it was virtually impossible for cultivators to achieve, if no one were to be left starving to death.

From the rural population’s perspective, the practice of the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy was hardly distinguishable from acts of daylight robbery and extortion. This is not only because of the fact that peasants were demanded to turn in more grain than they were willing to, but also because of how little the grain depot unions were paying for the amount of grain that they expropriated. In line with the efforts to maintain low selling prices in the cities, the acquisition of grain

130 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth, 120.

131Dongbei wuzi tiaojie weiyuanhui, Nongchan shengchan pian (Agricultural production edition), Dongbei jingji xiao congshu (Beijing: Jinghua yinshuju, 1948), p. 17.

132 Ibid.

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was also regulated at low prices, for which farmers were compensated as little as 2.5 yuan for 50 kilograms of corn. Compared to the previous years during which the market selling price was on average 12 yuan for 50 kilograms of corn, farmers had no choice but to count their inevitable losses.¹³³ Aware of the peasants’ frustrations and lack of enthusiasm in contributing to the implemented system, grain procurement enforcers began using public humiliations and violence against the peasants as methods of persuasion.¹³⁴ For instance, the police commissioner of Chaoyang County organized an admonitory meeting gathering land cultivators from the neighbouring villages, during which each household received specific grain imposition tasks following the harvest period.

Summoned early in the morning, peasants who arrived late were subjected to harsh punishments, and in addition to receiving beatings and slaps on the face, latecomers were to kneel through the entire meeting.¹³⁵ Given the unrealistic obligations to turn in grain, some protested by stating the obvious facts related to the already tough situation: “My family could not even harvest 5,000 kilograms of grain this year, how can you assign us to hand in 2,500 kilograms of grain? We cannot afford this, if you do not believe me then you are welcome to search in my home.” However, despite being aware of the harsh circumstances of rural life, the local authorities responded to the peasant’s remarks by carrying out severe thrashings, accusing him of having a “negative attitude” towards the procurement

133 Yu Xingju, “Cong ‘Liangshi Tongzhi’ dao ‘Qiangzhi Gouxiao’ (From Grain control to compulsory regulations),” in Hunjiang Wenshi Ziliao (Hunjiang Historical Data), ed., Zhengxie hunjiang shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuan hui, 211.

134 Qu Bingshan, “Riben Ruhe Lueduo Dongbei Renmin de Liangshi (How the Japanese plundered grain from the people),” in Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian (A selection of Historical Data Manuscripts), ed., Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuan hui wenshi ziliao weiyuan hui, 170.

135 Fu Chengxun, Fu Chengqing and Han Guoxiang, “Riwei Shiqi Chaoyangxian Renmin Jiao Chuheliang Yu Juanshui zhiku (The Bitter experiences of the Compulsory Purchase and Sales of Grain and Taxes of the Chaoyang People),” in Chaoyang Wenshi Ziliao (Chaoyang Historical Data), eds. Liaoningsheng Chaoyang shi zheng xie, dongmei gongsi beipiao kuangwu ju (Chaoyang: Internal Release, 1989), p. 38.

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of grain, and also of course, for talking back.¹³⁶ However, this does not mean that the authorities systematically dismissed all the objections voiced by the peasants with regards to the procurement targets. Nevertheless, in a context where severe scarcities affected the regime, it was also in the peasants’ interests to emphasize the peculiarities of local difficulties as a tactic to protect themselves from the burdens of grain requisition. Unfortunately, the local officials could easily see through such strategies since they had been holding similar discourses and arguments when reporting to the central government.

On top of the pressures produced by the ongoing war, one could understand why the grain procurement targets set by the central authorities were largely perceived to be impractical on the regional level. In fact, quotas were calculated based on estimations from previous harvests, without taking into account the seasonal specificities potentially damaging the upcoming yield. However, since the provincial administrators were familiar with the local circumstances affecting their respective regions, the central authorities’ assignment to have them collect such large quantities of grain following each harvest was perceived as an improbable directive to accomplish successfully. This meant that for once, both the peasants and the local officials commonly agreed that the central government’s grain targets were unrealistically high. As such, it inevitably brings out the issue of what were the

“realistic” targets, as well as how they could be determined.

To be sure, regional officials tried their hardest to test out the waters, often by using the miserable status quo and the regional hardships as leverage in their attempts to “barter” with the central authorities. In March 1943, during a Governor Conference organized by the Ministry of Agriculture to announce the annual grain quota, Chancellor Huang Fujun, who attended the meeting, recalled:

136 Ibid.

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“… During the meeting, when I announced the year’s target of grain assignments, a few governors instantly stood up and expressed their opposition to the number I had just announced and proceeded to detail all the various hardships in the rural areas in their respective provinces before they requested a reduction of the total amount. In order to quell their discontent, I made a brief speech to encourage them, albeit I could tell that they were not satisfied with my answer.

As the governors continued to press on the issue, [Minister of Agriculture] Inahara, who was sitting next to me, suddenly stood up and instructed them in a stern tone about the importance of assisting the Imperial Army in the Holy War, reminding them that Manchukuoans had a duty to contribute to the cause. By the end of his speech, Inahara euphemistically assured the governors that the central government had made sufficient preparations, and that the stated goal was achievable if everybody worked hard, also implying that for their own good, governors should not deliberately make things more difficult”.¹³⁷

Indeed, apart from emphasizing the Manchukuoans’ responsibility to devote themselves to the war, it can be said that Inahara’s confidence reflects the extent to which the Manchukuo government had thought about the implementation of the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy. Whilst recognizing the fact that high grain quotas would inflict tremendous strain upon the peasants, the central authorities also clearly knew that its rural population could never be in a position to actively resist against it either. Surely, under the system of monopolized distribution, if anyone refused to hand in the designated amount of grain, the authorities could also refuse to provide them with the seeds necessary to cultivate the lands in the future.

Because of the distribution system imposed on them, peasants were on the disadvantageous end of the “blackmail”. As such, complete resistance against the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy would equate to having no crops and no source of income at all, something that the peasants could certainly not afford.

137 Huang Fujun, “Riben dui Dongbei Renmin de Liangshi Lueduo (The Exploitation of Grain and Food by the Japanese),” in Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian (A selection of Historical Data Manuscripts), ed., Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuan hui wenshi ziliao weiyuan hui, 150.

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This was especially evident when Huang visited Sanjiang province, as a follow-up to the earlier conference. The meeting was intended to instil motivation and confidence within the peasants which was thought was needed to stimulate agricultural production. Organized by provincial governor Sun Bofang, 30 peasants were gathered from the villages near Huachuan and Boli Counties to express their thoughts towards grain production. In the end, the motivational encounter lasted three hours, gradually turning into a way for the regional authorities to collect messages and complaints from the peasants to be relayed to the Chancellor. “After the implementation of the compulsory sales, the remaining grain were not even enough for us to save some for ourselves, let alone to feed the livestock”, “We also never got the chance to obtain any basic commodities”, “We were only given ten yuan after each harvest. How could we cultivate the farmlands with only ten yuan?

It is barely enough to buy five packs of cigarettes.”¹³⁸ Even though all such complaints had been expressed countless times before the meeting, peasants did not fail to voice out their concerns. Whether this time, their voices had been heard or not, these messages and grumbles really were all that the peasants could say to the authorities. In return, the villagers received no more than the usual standardized answers. “I knew that the peasants were all exhausted,” stated Huang,

“But what was I supposed to do? Nobody could break the rules and disobey the policies.”¹³⁹

On the other hand, since the peasants rarely resorted to violence to resist to the policies implemented by the government, they began considering alternative ways to circumvent the law. One of the most used solutions was to hide the grain needed to survive in advance and hope not to be found out by the procurement officers. Trying to save themselves, desperate peasants thus resorted to burying stacks of grain in the yards, hiding handfuls under the pillows, firewood piles, and in

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

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some cases, in outhouses, or even under animal manure and graveyards.¹⁴⁰ The development of such practices became so common that they transformed each procurement visit to the villages into a cat and mouse game. But just as the villagers grew more and more desperate to save themselves, so were the procurement authorities who were tasked to collect the required amount of grain.

Special teams composed of procurement supervision members (du li ban) and search members (sou he ban) were hence assembled by local officials and police departments to assist in the collection of grain. Equipped with shovels and wooden sticks, the procurement teams would go from house to house, poking around and searching for any suspicious corners and rummaging through any potential hiding spots until late in the evenings. In the case of an unsuccessful search, a beating would be given to whoever remained in the household and had failed to flee from the sights of the search teams, for having “wasted their time”, or for having hidden the grain too well.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, if anything was found, peasants would automatically receive a severe beating as well, mainly as a punishment for disobeying the procurement policies, and also to “reward” the inspectors for defeating the peasants at their own game.¹⁴²

In some other instances, local officials would simply refuse to play the game at all. Rather than dedicating manpower only to the hunt for grain, procurement teams had decided instead that peasants who fell short of their quotas were to be

140 Huabei liangshi pingheng cangku, Man, Huabei Shiliang Souhe Jigou ji Souhe Duice Bijiao Yanjiu (A Comparative Study of Grain Searching Agencies, Methods and Countermeasures in Manchuria and North China) (n.p. huabei liangshi pingheng cangku, 1943), p. 139.

141 “Ha’erbin xianbing duizhang guanyu binjiang sheng nongchanwu chu he yinqi nongmin fanxiang de baogao (Harbin gendarmerie captain’s report on the peasants reaction towards grain procurement in Binjiang province),” in Dongbei Jingji Lueduo (The Exploitation of the Northeast Economy), eds., Zhongyang dang’an guan, Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’an guan, Jilin sheng shehui kexue yuan, 559.

142 “Huang Fujun kougong (Confession of Huang Fujun),” in ibid., p. 548.

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taken away by the authorities as “hostages”, with the only condition for release, to have their “ransoms” paid in full. Villager Li Fu, who lived with his family near Huachuan County in 1941, was once the unfortunate victim of such dreadful experiences. Growing up in a poor family, Li became a swineherd for the local landlord Wei Guofeng in the neighbouring village of Wengang after his father, a farm labourer, lost his job due to his illness and inability to work effectively in the fields. Even though Li’s family had no land registered under their names nor were they the proprietaries of any crops, procurement officers still made their way to Li’s household doorsteps, giving them an ultimatum. Either they handed in the specified amount of grain within the next two days, or their son would be taken away as “mortgage”. Fearing for their son’s safety, Li’s parents instructed him to go away and hide for a few days, until the heat died down. However, three days later, when the officials returned and discovered that Li was not home, they took the family’s youngest son instead, without any explanation. “I do not have any solution for you,” one of the officials said to the parents as they were about to leave, “the orders came from above, I will give you five more days to collect the necessary grain to trade for your son, otherwise we will send him away for labour duties.”

After the authorities left, Li’s parents cried and wailed desperately as they knew it would be impossible for them to get the required grain in time. Not bearing to lose their youngest son, Li’s mother proposed to his father to sell her and use the money to redeem her son back. “If you do not sell me, our entire family will starve to death anyway”, cried his mother as his father ultimately agreed to her suggestion. The following day, Li’s father found a buyer through a trustee in the county. With the intention of purchasing a wife for his mute brother to marry back in Shandong province, the buyer, who was the owner of an oil mill, agreed to pay a sum of 350 yuan and took the woman away. After receiving the money, Li’s father quickly headed back to town and purchased the required amount of grain, and managed to get his son back before it was all too late.¹⁴³ Surely, to the Li household, such

143 Fu Min, “riben qiangdao lueduo qiong ku nongmin zao yang – ji lifu yi jia zai riwei tongzhi xia de zao yu (Bandit-like plundering of the Japanese and the sufferings of the poor peasants – The experiences of the family of Li Fu under Japanese rule),” in Jiamusi Wenshi Ziliao (Jiamusi Cultural and Historical Data), ed., Zhongguo renmin

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extreme measures taken by the local officials were barely distinguishable from the acts of banditry that plundered the countryside in the early years of Manchukuo. In a way, both exploited the peasants to great lengths, and both had a “justifiable”

reason for doing so. The main difference between the two tormenters was that the Manchukuo authorities systematically “pillaged” the villages, seized everything they could, and demanded more every time. In contrast, bandits were more likely to limit their pillaging and demands to the things they needed for their survival.

If from a distance, such appalling stories about grain procurement in the rural regions seem like unfortunate and isolated incidents, the cruel realities of the countryside suggested otherwise. In the villages surrounding Wangkui County, more than 30 cases of suicide were recorded within five days, right after the imposition of grain procurement. In 1943, it was noted in Fengtian province that a large proportion of the peasants living in the jurisdiction of Fushun County had already starved to death, while the situation in many villages adjacent to the northwest of Shenyang County was no better.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the dreadful situation was so alarming that even the Japanese gendarmerie commanders garrisoned across the regime began to worry about the potential damage such demands forced onto the peasants would cause to the long-term stability of the state. In May 1942, it was reported in Harbin that “The peasants [were] having doubts and also expressed their hatred towards the [Compulsory Grain Sale] policies. Some [had] already given up on themselves and chose beggary instead. The most essential element in the agricultural sector is the peasants. But now they have all lost motivation towards agricultural production.”¹⁴⁵ Two days after, a similar concern was evoked by the zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Jiamusi shi weiyuanhui wenshiziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Harbin: Heilongjiang chuban zong she, 1990), p. 170.

144 Yao Yunpeng and Li Fengxia, “Riwei Tongzhi xia de Fushun Jingji (The Economy of

144 Yao Yunpeng and Li Fengxia, “Riwei Tongzhi xia de Fushun Jingji (The Economy of