LABAYEN
FACTS
Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (TRO and/or PMI for brevity) against Petitioner for the implementation of its new rates because it was imposed without public hearing in violation of due process. At first, the complaint was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Later, Respondent City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or PMI praying that the case be set for hearing. The Court granted the TRO. The judge issued a final injunction allegedly confirming the previous preliminary injunction which is in truth, the judge referring to is the TRO earlier issued. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising that it issued a final injunction without the petitioner being heard which was denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review at the Court of Appeals but was likewise, denied on the ground that the TRO earlier issued has been elevated to the same level as the preliminary injunction in the procedure, grounds and requirements by Section 4, Rule 58 because the Judge has deliberately omitted to call it as TRO in the latter orders.
:
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a writ of preliminary injunction issued. :
HELD
NONE. It was clear that a TRO was clearly stated in the order. It was only when Petitioner expressed its vehement objection on the latter Order when Respondents just wanted to construe the TRO as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the final injunction. A restraining order, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically vacated and expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20) day period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. The court held that it is because of this rule on non-extendibility that Respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. Now, they cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.
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DAVID
v.
NAVARRO
FACTS
Petitioner was the mother of the businessman Andrew David who was shot by unidentified men. One of the suspects in this case was her wife. Petitioner filed a settlement of estate of her son and she likewise prayed to be the special administratix of such. Meanwhile, the wife sold to Respondents the lot to which the Petitioner opposed on the ground that she has another prospective buyer. The wife proceeded with the sale and did not give any share to Petitioner. Thereafter, Respondents occupied the property. Petitioner filed for annulment of sale to which the Municipal Trial Court (MTC for brevity) rendered a favorable judgment. MTC granted execution pending the appeal of Resondents in the Regiol Trial Court (RTC for brevity) because of failure of the latter to file supersedeas bond. RTC did not issue any TRO or injunction then until the writ was implemented. Undaunted, Respondents went to the CA for injunction to which the latter granted. Later, RTC reversed the decision of the MTC granting the annulment of the deed of the conditional sale.
:
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA imprudently issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. :
HELD
YES. Writ of Preliminary Injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enjoined is a fait accompli. The Writ of Execution had already been enforced and Respondents were evicted from the property, as they were placed in possession of the property. It was also clear that MTC is mandated to issue the writ of execution under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court for failure of respondents to file supersedeas bond. Respondent also committed a procedural lapse when instead of refilling their petition with injunction to the RTC, they sought recourse to CA. However, court dismissed the petition on the ground that RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Court ruled that the writ of execution issued by the MTC had, thus, become functus officio.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 59
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ARRANZA
v.
B.F. HOMES INC.
FACTS
Respondent filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) a Petition for Rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of payments because of the closure of Banco Filipino in which Respondent has a huge investment. The SEC placed Atty. Orendain as a Receiver (Receiver for brevity) who unified all the homeowner’s association which was later called Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), as representative of all homeowners. Later the Receiver was replaced by the new Board. They revoked the authority given to the Receiver and instead recognized BF Parañaque Homeowners' Association, Inc., as the representative of all homeowners; deferred purchase of new pumps; deployed its own security guards in the subdivision; and took management of clubhouse. Petitioners filed a class suit and later a cease-and-desist/status quo order raising issues on the following basic needs of the homeowners such as water, security and right of way. HLURB granted but Respondent filed a prohibition to the Court of Appeals. Respondent asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction over because the SEC being the appointing authority, should be the one to take cognizance of controversies arising from the performance of the receiver's duties based on the contracts entered into by the former receiver. Court of Appeals finds for the respondents.
:
ISSUE
Whether or not HLURB will still retain jurisdiction over claims by subdivision owners once it has been placed under receivership.
:
YES. The court held being under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. In this case, where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon Respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation and receivership, Respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence, continues or should continue to perform its contractual and statutory responsibilities to Petitioners as homeowners. Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights. It cannot be used as an instrument for the destruction of those rights. A receiver is a person appointed by the court or quasi-judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possible destruction or dissipation. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets of the receivership estate and in the management and disposition of the property committed to his possession. He acts in a fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards all interested persons. Claims of the Petitioners are basically not pecuniary in nature and for the ideal community living that respondents portrayed they would have when they bought real estate from it which is under the purposes why HLURB was created although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations.
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