Taking into consideration that there is variability in how rules are enacted between rule- makers and rule-takers over time, the different types of rule changes developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) become helpful. In the next section, the four different institutional modes of change clarifying how the assumptions built into these will be applied to analyse regime stability and change.
The four modes of institutional change
The following discusses drift, layering, conversion and displacement, developed by the original authors Streeck and Thelen (2005), Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Hacker et al. (2015).
Drift occurs when regimes hold onto existing rules, by resisting or refusing to adapt to changing circumstances. This may result in the system ceasing to function the same as it had previously (thus the term drift) (Hacker et al., 2015). This may seem counter-
intuitive for drift actors not to respond when its rules are becoming irrelevant, thereby yielding a risk towards insignificance and decline. However, actors that seek drift are trying to avoid public debate so that they can try to persuade governing actors to maintain existing rules, without having to deal with contesting views. Hacker et al. (2015) note that, with drift, change is not achieved with an ‘electoral spectacle’ nor with ‘big legislative battles’; instead, contestation is fought with less scrutiny, away from public sight and through quieter, less prominent channels. This is because clashes in highly visible spaces have the potential to spark initiatives that could lead to mobilisation of competing interests.
Moreover, Hacker et al. (2015) indicated that the abilities of actors that seek change through drift are very much different from those who are outside the incumbents’ inner domain. Here, drift actors tend to possess insider knowledge, insights and views across numerous arenas for a much more extended period (Hacker et al., 2015). The point of drift is that by delaying and shifting the contestation into hidden channels, the opposition actors are unable to gain sufficient knowledge to mobilise efforts against the incumbents, such as forming coalitions, articulating contesting narratives or provoking public protests.
For this example, Hacker et al. (2015) noted that the US minimum wage, which is not indexed to inflation, could decline in value over time unless new federal legislation is enacted. Drift here would mean blocking the updating of existing rules despite the need to do so. This means that refusing or deliberately neglecting to update an existing rule to reflect the environment can cause the system to drift.
Layering is one of the concepts most developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and is defined as the addition of new rules alongside an existing one. Here, an example would be the introduction of the private pension system in the US within an existing welfare public system. Furthermore, the private pension was implemented as a voluntary alternative and, importantly, did not attack or directly undermine the existing system. Eventually, the private pension system grew to such an extent that the old system started to lose support from key constituencies, and ultimately, this led to its stagnation (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).
The assumption in layering is that adding a new rule means that it causes ‘path altering dynamics’, whereby the new rule eventually crowds out the old, which could end up declining over time (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 23).
Conversion defines institutions as ‘multipurpose tools’, which means they can be used for differing ends, depending on who is powerful enough to utilise them in their favour (Hacker et al. (2015). Conversion occurs through actor discontinuity ‘because actors that were not involved in creating the original rules now seek ways to repurpose them for their own interests’ (Hacker et al., 2015, p. 184). The mechanisms here are the redirection of the institutional resources over political or other forms of mediation and contestation over what functions and purposes an existing institution should serve. In other words, existing institutions are redirected into new goals or purposes according to those who are powerful enough to do so.
An example is the British Labour Party which came to power in 1945 and which inherited several policy instruments because of wartime emergency measures (Hacker et al., 2015). Here, the policy instruments were not dissolved but instead redirected to serve new goals, which were to serve peace. The instruments were used to strengthen the role of the state through the power of redistributing wealth. Hacker et al. (2015) go on to mention that conversion, in this case, was a strategy used to emphasise continuity to enlist the support of those who were already vested in existing institutions, as well as to neutralise those who were opposed to sudden changes, resulting in political feasibility or expediency.
Displacement is the removal of an old institution, through radical or gradual replacement over time (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This is the least developed concept, and Thelen mentioned that displacement is ‘rare in the politics of reform in contemporary advanced capitalist economies’ (Thelen 2009, p.488). Moreover, in large technical systems, wholesale displacement from old to new has also been claimed as exceptional, given the long duration of path-dependent systems (Sovacool et al., 2018). I, therefore, suggest possible means of displacement, drawing on increasingly important literature, such as phase-out policies (Rogge and Johnstone, 2017), creative destruction (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016) and ‘discontinuation governance’ (Stegmaier et al., 2014).
These four different types of rule changes are summarised in Table 3.3, which outlines their definitions, mechanisms of change and their implications.
Concluding this section
To conclude this section, Papers 2 and 3 cover three of the institutional theory modes (drift, layering and conversion), and each paper will be discussed in more detail in turn. The fourth mode is not covered by any of the papers but is included in the discussion and conclusion chapter, where that discussion builds on the findings from Papers 2 and 3.
Paper 2 draws on institutional modes of drift and layering to illuminate the types of institutional changes which are evident when a relatively stable regime (with a strong structure that enables actors to maintain their current practices) is subjected to pressures from a niche.
Paper 3 contributes to the discussion on regime stability and change by analysing the kind of institutional changes which take place when a regime that has limited stability (disagreement in core rules amongst regime actors, leading to moderate structure) faces further pressure when a gas programme is introduced into the electricity system. 3.5 Summary of the chapter
In sum, this chapter has explained how the main concepts used for this thesis are mobilised in order to address the research task. In doing so, a conceptual meta- framework was developed, which problematises regime stability into three forms: high, limited and low (Table 3.2). In delineating these three different forms, structure and agency were used as a way to maintain the notion of the duality of the regime. Having differentiated regime stability, I am then able to test these concepts by means of the empirical cases, using institutional theory as a lens through which to observe endogenous regime change. The next three chapters form the empirical case studies in this thesis, and their purpose is to establish how the coal-fired electricity regime was established (Chapter 4) and to provide an analysis of regime responses to the introduction of renewables (Chapter 5) and gas (Chapter 6).
Table 3.2: Summarises regime stability and change as differentiated levels of structure and agency
Structure Agency Stability of the
regime
Rules Resources Type of structure Organisational field conditions
Actor network composition and strength of coalitions
Type of agency
Coherent Resources are intact and amenable to actors
Strong Certain Homogenous
Coalition is strong
Maintenance High
Disagreement Reduced flow of resources
Moderate Uncertain patterns and trends are identifiable; risk can be evaluated
Heterogenous
Coalition is disentangling
Reform Limited
Disagreement More reduced flow of resources
More uncertainty Heterogenous
Coalition is disentangling
Reinterpretation
Incoherent Substantial loss in resources
Weak Substantial level of uncertainty; it becomes challenging to anticipate or predict the risks
Complex set of actor configurations, competing interests, perceptions and motivations
Coalition is weak
Table 3.3: The four different types of gradual transformation of drift, layering, conversion and displacement, adapted from Streeck and Thelen (2005)
Drift Layering Conversion Displacement
Definition Rules are deliberately held constant in the face of significant contextual shifts.
New rules are added alongside existing ones;
New rules do not attack existing institutions.
Redeployment of old institutions to new purposes.
Removal of existing rules and replacing them with new ones.
Mechanisms of enactment
Deliberate neglect or delay in reforms.
Involves amendments, revision or addition.
Gaps between rules and enactment due to subversion; existing rules are reinterpreted.
The existing rules are abandoned, as they are not tenable.
Institutional outcome
Continuity is attempted through hidden channels to prevent the mobilisation of opposing interests.
The new rule sets path altering dynamics, which can result in more significant impact of new
institutions at the expense of the old.
Existing institutions are
repurposed, redirected into new goals.
A displacement of the old institution with the new.
Paper 1: Historical review of the relationship
between energy, mining and the South African
economy
This has been published as TING, M. B. 2015. Historical Review of the Relationship between Energy, Mining and the South African economy. In: MYTELKA, L., MSIMANG, V. & PERROT, R. (eds.) Earth, Wind and Fire: unpacking the political, economic and security implications of discourse on the Green Economy. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers.