1965: Diplomatic manoeuvres for gaining time and securing tactical advantage
It was unanimously believed abroad that in order for the bilateral Greco-Turkish dialogue to have any viable outcome, a period of calm had to ensue, and most importantly to last. Thus, the UN, along with the British and Americans, believed that the only way forward was to find ways to convince the two communities of the necessity of direct contacts at any level possible.
The Cyprus Government publicly appeared willing to accept inter-communal talks, but Makarios reiterated that such talks should only be conducted on the basis of the Mediator’s report.518 As soon as Makarios came back from Athens therefore, he requested Plaza’s return in order to prepare the two communities for talks about guarantees for the Turkish-Cypriot minority rights.519 Makarios was well aware, however, that it was impossible for the UN Secretary-General to initiate such a process when one of the contesting parties vehemently opposed it. Therefore, by
518 Clerides, Vol.II, op. cit., p.173
519 Ibid.
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insisting on a dialogue on these terms, Makarios skilfully insulated himself from the blame for the internal stalemate.
In spite of this, Makarios recognized that it was time to offer an olive branch to Turkish-Cypriots, a move that would have further enhanced his Government’s position diplomatically. The first signs of this approach surfaced quickly, on 31 March, with a speech by the President of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides. As already commented in the first chapter, the latter firstly admitted, in the presence of President Makarios, that “enosis is not round the corner” and secondly he underscored the good intentions and determination of his Government to guarantee Turkish-Cypriot rights through a Charter of minority rights in religious, language and cultural affairs.520 Although all these measures were unacceptable to Turkish-Cypriots, it was perceived that Makarios himself wished to encourage Clerides as the Greek-Cypriot politician capable of negotiating directly with the Turkish-Cypriots, when the moment came, with some chance of success.521 It should be noted that throughout the decade 1964-1974 the British had observed that Clerides was usually assigned to express any moderate views by the Cyprus Government, views that neither Makarios nor his Ministers could afford to express.522 Clerides had been accused of being pro-Western precisely because of such moderate observations. In retrospect, we can discern that he was one of the few, perhaps the only, leading contemporary politician with a practical grasp on how to find a path towards a viable settlement, especially in the period before the 1974 invasion. This was something that the bulk of opinion could not readily grasp, and
520Phileleftheros, 1 April 1965
521Intelligence Report No.15/65, 6-13 April 1965, Makarios’ Initial Reaction to Plaza Report: CAB 191/10, TNA
522 Timothy Daunt (Nicosia) to Tyler 13 June 1967: FCO 27/83, TNA
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such views expressed by any politician without the prestige of Clerides’ family name could easily mean political suicide. Throughout his political career Clerides was characterized by many Greek-Cypriots as a ‘dove’ who made unacceptable concessions, as was to be keenly illustrated in the view of many at a much later point, when he came to support the UN Annan Plan in 2004. Nevertheless, he was undoubtedly a pragmatic politician in his understanding of the costs of any agreement, and the fact that international considerations and regional balances of power could not be excluded. In Greek-Cypriot political culture in the immediate wake of independence, such predilections did not come easily to the great majority.
As a second, more substantial good-will gesture, on 21 April 1965 Makarios announced that all roadblocks and fortifications were to be removed from all main towns, except Nicosia and the well-fortified and armed Kokkina enclave.523 Moreover, he complied with the Turkish request for the extension of the list of supplies imported through the Turkish Red Crescent to Cyprus without paying extra duty.524 In the prevailing logic, these measures were not well received by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which perceived them as mere propaganda since they provided no real relief. Instead, they claimed that the previous fixed check points were now replaced with mobile and erratic patrols further eroding their freedom and security of movement.525
It is interesting in this context to note The Observer correspondent’s assessment of Makarios’ ‘peace offensive’. He stressed that the latter was now adopting techniques
523 Phileleftheros, 22 April 1965
524 Hunt, Dispatch: Reactions to the Report of the UN Mediator, 7 May 1965: DO 220/110, TNA;
Eleftheria, 18 April 1965
525 Hunt to CRO, General, 1 May 1965: DO 220/49, TNA;
Eleftheria, 30 April 1965
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similar to those used by Field Marshal Harding against EOKA in the mid-1950s.526 Specifically, Makarios was switching between an attrition policy and a more moderate approach towards the Turkish-Cypriot community and then back again.
The correspondent commented that those measures aimed at breaking the Turkish-Cypriot front, but to no avail. Although this proved accurate enough, at least it did help in practice to alleviate some tensions, a very important prerequisite for the initiation of the Athens-Ankara dialogue a few weeks later.
Although the Turkish-Cypriots in general rejected Plaza’s recommendation for inter-communal talks, only a few days after the submission of the report moderate Turkish-Cypriot leaders showed genuine interest in the initiation of joint meetings with moderate Greek-Cypriot leaders under the supervision of UNFICYP during the Political Liaison Committee’s meetings.527 The latter Committee had been established on the island in the aftermath of the December 1963 crisis and it was the only forum then available in which officials from both communities could jointly discuss – in 1963 under the chairmanship of a British official - daily problems arising from the de facto separation.528 Because of the ineffectiveness of the Committee, however, when UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus it decided to meet separately with the liaison officers of each community.529 Nonetheless, by 1965 it was evident that this procedure was equally ineffective and time-consuming. Since certain moderate voices within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership floated the option of the resumption of joint meetings, and since any type of high-level direct contacts between the communities was not forthcoming, both the UN and the Anglo-Americans believed
526 From the correspondent of ‘The Observer’ in Cyprus, cited in Eleftheria, 27 April 1965
527 Hunt to CRO, Long Term Solution, 8 May 1965: DO 220/49, TNA
528 Soulioti, Fettered Independence, op. cit., p.373
529 Stegenga, op. cit., p.127
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that the former should be further pursued. Any approach to normalization, however, would certainly have stabilized conditions for the Turkish-Cypriot community and reduced the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Needless to say, it would also have enhanced Kuchuk’s waning political standing within his community.530
Although in theory not opposed to the joint meetings of the Liaison Committee, the Cyprus Government was unenthusiastic at best.531 The Government was privately dissatisfied by the Committee’s work because it was constantly reacting to Turkish-Cypriot requests.532 The Committee’s primary aim, after all, was to promote normalization which ipso facto benefited the Turkish-Cypriots in the enclaves, and this undermined the Government’s aim to force the Turkish-Cypriots to capitulate.
Against any radical relaxation of the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriots, the Cypriot President gave strict orders that his representatives should not attend any meeting of the Liaison Committee at which a Turkish-Cypriot representative was present.533 Carlos Bernardes, the Political Advisor of UNFICYP who unofficially undertook to fill the vacuum after Plaza’s withdrawal in April 1965, tried to convince both communities to have direct contacts through this Committee without any pre-conditions; that was inevitably an uphill task.
While on the local front Bernardes tried continuously to bring the two communities together, from May until December 1965 the Cyprus Government’s attention to the national question was directed elsewhere. First of all, as soon as the Athens-Ankara dialogue had been initiated, Cyprus Government was at pains to stress that only
530 Secretariat British Forces Cyprus, Memorandum, Annex A, 21 April 1965: CAB 191/7, TNA
531 FO to Washington, 25 February 1966: DO 220/214, TNA
532 District Officer Nicosia/Kyrenia to all Ministries, 8 December 1966: FA1/1898, Cyprus State Archive
533 District Officer Nicosia/Kyrenia to President of the Republic, 29 July 1966: FA1/1900, Cyprus State Archive
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Nicosia was the centre for determining the right course to the Cyprus Problem and that no final solutions would be implemented over its head. Nonetheless, the Government’s policies and actions at times contradicted its own principles and were perceived as acutely in variance with the Greco-Turkish discussions. Secondly, a UN General Assembly meeting on Cyprus was in the offing, with the Mediator’s report on the agenda and thus further lobbying missions had to be initiated.
One of the first diplomatic moves of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to approach both Britain and the United States, to try to convince them of the futility of the Greco-Turkish dialogue and to induce them towards active involvement in finding a settlement along the lines favoured by the Cyprus Government. In London, Greek-Cypriot officials requested Britain’s help to convince Turkey to accept the negotiations on the basis of minority rights.534 At the same time, Cyprus’ diplomats in Washington tried to test the waters for different approaches. Initially, Kyprianou suggested to the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that since the current negotiations on enosis had little chance of success, an informal US-Cyprus dialogue for enosis held possibilities.535 Believing, however, in the importance of the Greco-Turkish contacts, Rusk avoided encouraging Kyprianou’s ideas. It should be noted that the latter was one of the closest advisors of Makarios and one of the hawks his Cabinet. In contrast to the moderate influence that Clerides tried to exert on the Cypriot President, Kyprianou, according to Hunt, was convinced that enosis was inevitable and for that reason he sought to achieve “enosis at the earliest moment possible”, based on the principles laid down by Makarios.536 Through this policy,
534 Adair, 24 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
535Memorandum of Conversation, (DoS) 10 June 1965: DoS, Office of the Historian, Doc.193
536 Note for the Record, 18 February 1966: FO 371/185629, TNA
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however, Hunt believed that Kyprianou pursued his own political ambition, which was to carve out a role for himself in Greek-Cypriot politics.
Meanwhile, other Greek-Cypriot diplomats were sending mixed messages concerning the next moves and perceptions of their own Government. Despite previous disagreement over having any direct contacts with the Turkish Government, it was reported that certain Greek-Cypriot diplomats were putting out feelers, especially towards the United States, for the possibility of direct talks between Nicosia and Ankara probably on the basis of independence.537 Nonetheless, this was perceived as another tactical move by the Cyprus Government for disrupting chances for any substantial progress through the Athens-Ankara talks.538 However, rumours of a Nicosia-Ankara dialogue intensified after the collapse of the bilateral dialogue in July 1965 and the appointment of Ozdemir Benler, the new moderate Chargé d’Affaires in the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia in September 1965. Unlike his predecessor, Benler was willing to have contacts with moderate Greek-Cypriot leaders.539
According to several reports coming from the Foreign Office and the British Ambassadors in Ankara and Athens, the option of a Nicosia-Ankara dialogue might not be totally opposed by the Turkish Government, as it had been previously reported. Nonetheless, this process might be further explored only if Makarios were to initially make a gesture towards acknowledging the validity of the 1960 Constitution, such as recognizing Kuhcuk as the Vice-President of the Republic, and
537 Dean (Washington) to FO, 29 May 1965: PREM 13/792, TNA;
Intelligence Report No.23/65, 1-9 June 1965, General: WO 386/3, TNA
538 Dean to FO, 29 May 1965: PREM 13/792, TNA
539 Note for the Record, Nicosia 16 October 1965: FO 371/179973, TNA;
FO to Ankara, 8 December 1965: DO 220/50, TNA
Note: Turkey terminated its diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, not in 1963.
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provided that these talks would discuss some form of federation.540 That option, however, still faced one great challenge. Turan Tuluy, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, was convinced that the key barrier to such a procedure was the Greeks who
“were much more heavily pledged to enosis than the Cypriots”.541 Thus, a solution on independence would probably not be a lasting one, unless Greece agreed in advance. From another perspective, the Canadian High Commissioner in Cyprus assessed that a Makarios-Ankara dialogue, perhaps without pre-conditions, would have been much more effective than any other alternative, especially that of talks between the two communities.542 He explained that although Ankara did not recognize the Cyprus Government, it accepted that Makarios had de facto authority on the island. Secondly, contrary to the imbalance between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, the two Governments were evenly matched due to the fact that firstly they both had a fearsome instrument of war - the air superiority of for Turkey and ground superiority of the Greek-Cypriots - that could be used anytime they decided, and secondly, they both possessed the political power to implement their decisions on their people.543
All these, however, proved to be mere diplomatic ‘brainstorming’, firstly for undermining the Athens-Ankara negotiations and secondly for gaining time until the next UN General Assembly debate. After September 1965 the Cyprus Government sought to secure a diplomatic victory in the forthcoming UN debate. The timing was indeed propitious. As already discussed, by August 1965, the Cyprus Government had secured an anodyne Security Council Resolution concerning its new electoral
540 Allen to FO, 1 December 1965: DO 220/50;
Murray to Dodson, 15 November 1965: DO 220/50, TNA
541 Ibid.
542 Wainmann-Wood (Nicosia) to Ottawa, 13 December 1965: DO 220/50, TNA
543 Ibid.
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law that had previously brought significant political tension. Meanwhile, the Greco-Turkish dialogue had been interrupted after the fall of Papandreou’s government in July, and there were not at the moment any realistic prospects for its quick resumption. By the beginning of September there was still no stable government in Greece while Turkey was concentrating on its general elections in October. With no other process on-going, Nicosia calculated that it would be easier for the Turkish-Cypriots to accept the dialogue that Makarios was offering without setting any pre-conditions. Still, the best time to initiate such a dialogue would certainly have been after a favourable outcome for the Greek-Cypriot position in the General Assembly, thus further enhancing the Government’s position vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots. It is noteworthy that moderate voices within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership also opined that the period after the UN debate would likely be propitious for preliminary discussions with the Cyprus Government for a genuine relaxation of tension on the island, providing that the General Assembly resolution was not an outright victory of the Greek-Cypriot position.544
In order to achieve this victory, therefore, Nicosia needed once again to appear more flexible towards the Turkish-Cypriots. The first move of the Cyprus Government was to present a ‘Declaration of Intention and a Memorandum’ with measures for the safeguarding of minority rights, and secondly to establish a Committee responsible for the rehabilitation of the displaced Turkish-Cypriots.545 According to Makarios:
the Government, following the recommendations of the Mediator of the UN, is prepared to accept the presence in Cyprus of a UN Commissioner with an adequate staff of observers and advisers who will observe on such terms as Your Excellency may direct, the
544 Peters to Lewis, 21 September 1965: DO 220/149, TNA
545 PIO Press Release, Central Rehabilitation Committee, 9 October 1965
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adherence to all rights referred to in the Declaration and Memorandum….546
Trying, however, to prevent the ghosts of the past, such as his ‘Thirteen Points’
proposal and all the constitutional amendments since 1964, from haunting his new initiative, Makarios presented this Memorandum not as a fait accompli but in the form of a declaration of intention to be discussed with the Turkish-Cypriots.547 Meanwhile, the wording had to reflect the benevolent intentions of the Government: because not only was this to be its main lobbying ‘tool’ before the General Assembly debate, but it was also to be officially presented during the proceedings of the debate.548
Naturally, both the Memorandum and the proposal for the Committee for the Displaced Persons Rehabilitation were rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as nothing but more Greek-Cypriot propaganda. With regard to the formalities of the Memorandum itself, Kuchuk repeated their long-standing argument; the Zurich-London Agreements recognized that their community did not consist of a mere minority and that the Greek-Cypriots were trying to deprive them of their legal and political rights as granted by the 1960 Constitution.549 Since there was no Cypriot nation, Kuchuk continued, the two communities were equal.550 His counter-proposal was based on the long-standing Turkish-Cypriot argument that the two communities cannot live peacefully together and a voluntary population exchange must thus transpire under the supervision of UN.551 Privately, however, several Turkish-Cypriot leaders appeared more conciliatory. They explained that it would not have been so difficult to accept Makarios’ proposals if only they could be assured that the
546 PIO, Press Release, Declaration on Minority Rights, 12 October 1965
547 Hunt to CRO, 12 October 1965: DO 220/149, TNA
548 Peters to Lewis, 21 September 1965: DO 220/149, TNA
549 Special News Bulletin, 26 September 1965: DO 220/65, TNA
550 Ibid.
551 Special News Bulletin, 17 October 1965: DO 220/65, TNA
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Cypriots could keep their word. For the Turkish-Cypriot MP Umit Suleiman, it was a question of confidence and the Turkish-Cypriots did not trust Makarios whatsoever.552 Having in mind that Makarios’ proposal came in the aftermath of the electoral law saga exacerbated their mistrust. Therefore, the fundamental reason for rejecting this proposal was that neither the judicial proceedings proposed in the Memorandum nor the system of the UN observer were for them adequate guarantees for their personal security in case of any attack on their position.553
Nonetheless, the preparations for the General Assembly debate brought a short period of calmness in Cyprus. Indicative of this was the fact that the for the first time since 1963, on 29 October 1965, three Greek-Cypriot Ministers met with Kuchuk and other Turkish-Cypriot leaders during a reception organized by the Turkish Embassy inside the Nicosia enclave for the celebrations of Turkish National Day.554 This invitation was also one of the first promising moves of the Turkish Government of Suleiman Demirel. Nonetheless, this peaceful atmosphere proved to be the calm before the storm that followed - because of the Famagusta crisis of November and the General Assembly resolution of December. On 2 November heavy firing broke out between the National Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters in Famagusta due to the former’s decision to extend coastal fortifications, contrary to the previous recommendations of the UNFICYP to avoid such actions. The UN force managed to bring about an agreement a month later.555 The Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot sides were greatly frustrated by this recent crisis; thus, when the General Assembly
552 Note for the Record (Nicosia), 13 October 1965: FO 371/179973, TNA
552 Note for the Record (Nicosia), 13 October 1965: FO 371/179973, TNA