ECONOMÍA INTELIGENTE

For Rogers authenticity is synonymous with congruence. In his 1959b paper he de®nes a number of terms, viewing them all as forming a cluster which grows out of the concept of congruence (p. 207):

Congruence is the term which de®nes the state. Openness to experience is the way an internally congruent individual meets new experience. Psychological adjustment is congruence as viewed from a social point of view. Extensional is the term which describes the speci®c types of behavior of a congruent individual. Maturity is a broader term describing the personality characteristics and behavior of a person who is, in general, congruent.

Rogers' point about openness to experience is interesting in the light of personality research (Cloninger, Svrakic & Pryzbeck, 1993; Benjamin et al., 1996) which suggests that some characteristics, including novelty-seeking and adaptability, are inherited; and that some of us are temperamentally

open to new experience and seek it out, while others are cautious and prefer things to stay the same. People who are autistic, for instance, can ®nd apparently minor differences in their environment dif®cult to accept and manage. The way they process information means generally that they prefer sameness.

The authentic person is, in effect, fully functioning, for further discussion of which see Chapters 5 and 8.

In a later paper, Rogers (1975/81) sees a deep concern for authenticity as a quality of the multifaceted, emerging person. He goes on to describe this person in polemical and political terms, citing examples of people who are prepared to reject a culture they see as hypocritical, to confront those in authority, to refuse orders, to work for civil rights, and to take full personal responsibility in situations (p. 158): `Such painful honesty, such willingness to confront, and the willingness to pay the price of such utterances are indications of the value this emerging person places on being authentic.' Schmid (2004, p. 38) says simply that: `To be a person can truly be called living the process of authenticity.'

This authenticity describes mankind in relationship and unity with itself and nature ± and, if not united, being prepared and willing to do something about it, to be, in Barrett-Lennard's (1998, p. 75) words describing the purposeful, open system that is the organism, `in particularly active inter- change with its environment' (see Chapter 2). Alienation is the opposite. Alienation, for Marx, the philosopher of alienation, is the distortion of such unities. Marx talks in terms of `distorted relations', Rogers (1951) of `distorted perceptions'. The difference is that a Marxist point of view argues that the distortion lies in oppressive forms of society, such as feudalism and capitalism, and not only in the individual's perception of distorted relations, as Rogers suggests in his theory of personality. Marx conceptualises alienation as four basic but closely related social relations within capitalism: man's (sic) relation to his product, his productive capacity, to other people, and to his species, a framework which Tudor (1997) draws on to describe examples of class-conscious therapeutic practice. Roy (1988) adds to this taxonomy a further set: that of man's alienated social relations with the earth, a perspective which informs contemporary concerns about the environment, and a developing interest in ecopsychology. Again, we ®nd in the work of Angyal and, speci®cally, in his holistic theory of Neurosis and Treatment (1965/73), more of a relational perspective on alienation. He uses the term `alienness' to describe (p. 92) `the central ®gure of the neurotic mythology . . . [which] results from the persisting state of isolation of the child whose attempts at relating himself to the world have largely failed, so that no communication and no real community has been established'.

A number of therapists from different traditions have taken up the concept of alienation. Here we refer to two, from gestalt psychology and from transactional analysis:

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Discussing alienation in the context of the malfunctioning process of projection, Perls, Hefferline and Goodman (1951/73, p. 259) describe this as a psychological process:

Alienated from his own impulses, yet unable to obliterate the feelings and acts to which they give rise, man makes `things' out of his own behaviour. Since he then does not experience it as himself- in-action, he can disclaim responsibility for it, try to forget it or hide it, or project it and suffer it as coming from the outside.

A person who is passive, who disowns her feelings and behaviour, who blames `them' or `the world' is, in these terms, inauthentic or alienated in some way. On the other hand, therapy which invites a client to `own' her impulses and behaviours, and to experience herself as herself-in- action in a social world, describes a process of dis-alienation, a process which, Bulhan (1980) argues, is impossible without a total restructuring of society.

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Based on a theory of alienation, and an analysis of oppression and power, derived from Marx and in¯uenced by Reich, Marcuse, Fanon and Laing, the tradition of radical psychiatry within transactional analysis offers particular co-operative ways of working with individuals and groups to reclaim autonomy (see Steiner et al., 1975). Steiner and his colleagues came up with a formula which de®nes Alienation as equal to (=) Oppression + Mysti®cation + Isolation. Echoing Marx's analysis, Steiner (2000) talks in terms of people being alienated from their hearts, or from love; being alienated from their minds, or from the capacity to think; being alienated from their bodies, or from their feelings; and being alienated from their hands, or from their work. Echoing the tradition of civil disobedience, Steiner (1981, p. 50) asserts: `The ®rst step in becoming powerful without using power to control others is to learn to be disobedient . . . Refusing to be controlled against your will and judgement frees your own powers for whatever you may decide is good for you.' This analysis of power and responses to `power plays' is echoed in the person-centred approach to personal power (Rogers, 1978) and collaborative power (Natiello, 1987, 1990).

We suggest (in Chapter 5) that Rogers frames his theory of personality in individualistic terms and that a structuralist conception of personality focuses more on the impact of the environment and social relations in the subject or client.

After some months of therapy a client said to her therapist: `You know, I don't like people.' She was, in effect, describing her alienation from her

species which in part she knew, and in part discovered, had its roots in her childhood and the ways in which her parents had stamped their structures on her (see Chapter 5). This affected all aspects of her life: from how she viewed herself and her capacity for enjoying life, through to how she organised her daily routine and even how she drove her car without much care for herself or others. She and the therapist spent the ®rst few months of her therapy exploring the ways in which she felt isolated and alienated from the world, and how she protected herself against feeling the implications of this. She acknowledged the ways in which she distorted certain perceptions of herself (`That's how I am'), others (`. . . are out to get me'), and the world (`. . . is against me'). She was also quite certain of the impossibility of change for herself, although she recognised this and even facilitated this in others. One day some birds ¯ew past the window of the consulting room. The client interrupted what the therapist was saying to point this out and, with great knowledge and animation, described the difference between the birds in some detail, and, in doing so, revealed her passion for nature. She then apologised for the interruption. The therapist acknowledged the affec- tive vitality of the client (Stern, 1985) and the signi®cance of the `inter- ruption'. As he saw it the temporary `rupture' in relationship had actually had the effect of helping him to refocus on her vitality and authenticity. Drawing on his understanding of the different forms of social relations and alienation, the therapist followed the client and discovered, as it were, a whole world of the client's authentic social relations with nature and the earth, in terms of her love of ¯ora and fauna, and of walking. This, and its origins in her childhood, became a signi®cant theme in therapy. Acknowl- edging this, client and therapist were able to return to other areas and reassess her relationship with both the `product' she produced and her pro- ductive capacity. By acknowledging and working with all of this, the client was able to talk more about her dif®culty in relating to others and the social world. Re¯ecting on this process sometime later, the client acknowledged that it was the therapist's non-judgemental, acceptant response which had been most helpful and reparative as, in her childhood, she had been con- sistently told off for interrupting.

This vignette highlights the value of thinking in terms of authenticity and alienation rather than health and illness. `In psychotherapy' says Phillips (1994, p. 49) `one always has to remember that anyone who is failing at one thing is always succeeding at another.' Schmid (2004) critiques terms such as `health', `normal', `in order', `in-®rmity' and `dis-ease' (p. 38): `authenticity has nothing to do with being ®rm or at ease. These common terms are not only misguiding, but completely wrong, because a severely ill person can very well live most authentically.' Whilst we agree with this in principle, we have two modi®cations, one strategic and the other a reframe.

Our strategic concern is that we think there is a missing stage in Schmid's argument. He refers to health and illness as if the two terms are used separately. In our experience this is not the case. There is such widespread con¯ation of these terms, especially in the ®eld of `mental health', i.e. mental illness, that we think there is a strategic need ®rst to argue that health is something different from illness (see Antonovsky, 1979) and then that mental health or well-being is something different from mental illness and `disorder' (see Tudor, 1996, 2004) ± two terms, incidentally, which themselves are also con¯ated and used synonymously, e.g. in current mental `health' legislation and policy in the UK and elsewhere.

The reframe we want to offer concerns the concepts of order and organisation. The correlative of `order' is `dis-order' and, in any context in which there is a tendency to polarise, these can be equated, respectively and somewhat simplistically, with health and illness. However, going back to Whitehead (1929/78) we discover a more inclusive and dynamic sense of order. He argues:

1 That both order and disorder are `given', that is, that the basis of the organism's experience is given. This represents a more even-handed view of both order and disorder, and a less pathologising approach to disorder.

2 That order is differentiated from `givenness' by virtue of the notion of adaptation, i.e. that an organism adapts in order to attain a particular end or goal (see the discussion of needs in Chapter 2).

3 That (p. 84): `There is not just one ideal ``order'' which all actual entities should attain and fail to attain.' This challenges the rei®cation of health over illness, and the kind of health fascism which promotes the notion of the perfect body and which leads to obsessive concerns about physical ability, ®tness and strength, body image and weight. 4 That, as Emmet (1932/66, p. 217) summarises: `order is always a

balance on the verge of chaos . . . the depth or intensity of order depends on the capacity to hold together diverse elements in experience as contrasts'. This acknowledges the inherent tension in organisms, and provides a link with chaos and complexity theory.

Thus, in its congruent, integrated state the human organism, as any other organism, is more or less organised and uni®ed from moment to moment (see Chapter 2). Lewin (1951/64, p. 101) makes a similar point with regard to his preference for the term `organisation':

Mathematically integration is the reverse of differentiation. However, it has been rightly emphasized that psychological `integration' does not mean dedifferentiation. It may be better to replace this term by the

term `organization.' This use of the term `organization' seems to be well in line with its use in embryology and also in sociology.

Before turning our attention to the speci®cs of process with regard to organism, self and person, we want to remind ourselves and the reader of the sheer complexity involved in order and organisation, organismic or otherwise. Whitehead (1929/78, p. 108) re¯ects that:

All the life in the body is the life of the individual cells. There are thus millions upon millions of centres of life in each animal body. So what needs to be explained is not dissociation of personality but unifying control, by reason of which we not only have uni®ed behaviour, which can be observed by others, but also consciousness of a uni®ed experience.

At times, and especially regarding the beginning of a human life, we may focus on the risk that a foetus may not be `perfect' and worry about the statistical chances of there being something `wrong' with it ± and, at this stage, it is often referred to as `it'! We may equally be amazed at the chances and actuality of relative genetic and chromosomal order and organisation. As Emmet (1932/66, p. 214) puts it: `the miracle of a living organism, is not dissociation, but uni®ed control'. Peake (1950) puts it more poetically: `To live at all is miracle enough.' In this sense the focus of the philosophy of the organism (Whitehead, 1929/78), the neurobiology of the organism (Goldstein, 1934/95), and the psychology of the organism (Angyal, 1941; Raimy, 1943; Perls, 1947/69; and Rogers, 1951, 1959b) promotes an appreciation of authenticity, order and organisation from which we may develop an understanding of pathology of the organism, self and person, grounded in an understanding of alienation.

Inauthenticity

In response to external threat, the human organism may become anxious. In his 1959 paper, Rogers, to a certain extent, paralleled his description of the cluster of terms around the concept of congruence (see p. 156), with some terms describing incongruence or, more broadly, inauthenticity. Browning (1966) views incongruence as estrangement and, from a Christian theological perspective, describes it as a bondage (to the self and its con- ditions of worth), and idolatrous (in absolutising relative values). Here, we summarise the relevant terms and complete this part of Rogers' framework.

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Incongruence ± de®nes or describes the state. It describes the dis- crepancy between the self as perceived and the actual experience of the organism.

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Closed to experience ± describes the way in which an internally incon- gruent individual meets new experience.

These represent two elements or continua in Rogers' (1958/67a) process conception of psychotherapy (see Appendix 3).

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Psychological maladjustment ± is incongruence as viewed from a social point of view. This exists (and here we combine Rogers' 1951 and 1959b de®nitions) when the organism denies to awareness or distorts in awareness signi®cant sensory and visceral experiences which, conse- quently, are not accurately symbolised and organised into the gestalt of the self-structure. Schmid (2004, p. 39) takes this concept further, de®ning it as `a de®cit of relational authenticity'. He sees two types of de®cit: autonomy de®cit, the incongruence between self and experience; and relationship de®cit, the incongruence between others as perceived and as they are. Drawing on Angyal's (1941) work, we recast this as: ± Autonomy de®cit ± which describes the incongruence between self

and experience.

± Homonomy de®cit ± which describes the incongruence between self and self-in-relationship.

± Heteronomy de®cit ± which describes the incongruence between self and differentiated `Other', representing actual others or, more generally, difference.

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Intensionality ± is the term which describes the speci®c types of behaviour of an incongruent individual and, as Rogers (1959b, p. 205) describes it, is characterised by a person who tends `to see experience in absolute and unconditional terms, to overgeneralize, to be dominated by concept or belief, to fail to anchor his reactions in space or time, to confuse fact and evaluation, to rely upon abstractions rather than reality-testing'.

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Immaturity ± describes the personality characteristics and behaviour of a person who is, in general, incongruent.

These terms describe rather than judge the inauthentic organism. Being intensional or closed to experience is not bad or wrong. We want to acknowledge the possibility and wisdom of being knowingly closed to some kinds of experience. In this sense the ideal is not to be continuously and gratuitously `open', but to be discriminating about those experiences to which we can be open. This view of authenticity and alienation is akin to a psychodynamic perspective which values balanced and mature defences.

Later in this chapter we elaborate this broad view of alienation and inauthenticity in terms of organism, and self and person. This is preceded by a discussion concerning process differentiation.

In document ATLÁNTICO. Centro de Excelencia en Sistemas de Innovación (página 82-99)