Educación: reproducción de formas de violencia

To state that the UK is an established liberal democracy in no way suggests that it is perfect and should not or could not be improved. As detailed, the UK has a democracy suffering from low levels of participation in elections; where over half the electorate have little or no political interest; where the respect for politicians is at an all-time low and the majority of the electorate have significant reservations as to the efficacy of the current system of government. One other important flaw in the current system is that even with higher levels of turnout in elections, the result is often under-representation due to the arrangement used in those elections.

The first past the post electoral system has been discarded in favour of proportional representation systems in many elections within the UK. It is, though, still the electoral system for UK general elections and also for some English local elections. First past the post, whilst intuitively fair inevitably results in under-representation and potential exclusion of up to 49%

of voters on any one ballot box decision.

One potential solution to under-representation would be the further institution of proportional representation systems, which are already used in the devolved UK assemblies in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as local government elections in Scotland and Northern Ireland. One of the usual effects of proportional representation elections is that they tend to produce results where no one party has an outright majority. These elections usually result in coalition governments or minority governments which both require a level of cooperation and consensus which are anathema to first past the post. It should be noted, however, that this has not always been the outcome, demonstrated by the SNP having an outright majority in the parliament of 2011-2016 and only just falling short of another majority in the election of 2016.

The UK held a referendum in 2011 whereby the vote went against adopting the alternative vote or ‘AV’ system, meaning the first past the post system remains in place today. However, the recent movement away from the historic two-party order of Conservative and Labour dominated parliaments (in terms of votes cast), with a dramatic increase for minority parties such as the SNP and UKIP during the 2015 general election, has led to further calls to revisit

Chapter 2 – Democracy 34 the notion of proportional representation. The inequalities of the current system were laid bare in 2015 when a total UKIP vote of 3,881,099 (BBC 2015b) quite preposterously, returned the party only one seat in parliament. The fact that a referendum on the subject was held as recently as 2011 would, however, suggest that any re-visitation of the subject is highly unlikely (regardless of how appropriate) in the foreseeable future.

The absence of a foreseeable move to PR, particularly in the light of the requirement for the two main UK parties of Conservative and Labour to push for a system which would almost inevitably result in a significant loss of political power, is just one example of the manner in which our current political system fails to take into account the views of those who lose a ballot box decision. Deliberative democracy, which is intended to reach democratic decisions through strength of argument via a reciprocal process of rational exchanges, is for many a way to address this issue. Proponents of the deliberative model of democracy, such as John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, John Dryzek, Jurgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, are generally driven by the notion that deliberation is a better, reciprocal method of decision making than the ruthlessness of the ballot box alone. In this regard it stands contrary to liberal theory which sees politics as an aggregation of self-interest without any genuine presence of the common good (Dewey 1963), a position which is highlighted by the theory of the majority generally attributed to John Adams (1794).

The discourse theory of deliberation as proposed by Habermas and others, it is claimed, produces an increased legitimacy in political decision making through citizen participation and public reasoning. Joseph Bessette (1980) is credited with first using the term deliberative democracy, whilst Dryzek (2005) states that it is the dominant approach in democratic theory.

The main idea behind the initial deliberative model of democracy is that it has ‘a truth tracking potential’ (Habermas 2006 p.411). What Habermas, one of the most recognised proponents of the model, is suggesting, is that the process of deliberation can bring about consensus which in some manner implies that the correct decision or the truth will be the end product. In coming to a decision (based upon a binary question of yes or no) following a period of public consideration prior to a democratic vote, the resulting decision will therefore be legitimate.

Habermas states that there is empirical evidence from small scale studies where the process of deliberation has resulted in decisions being taken contrary to rational choice theory (Neblo 2005; Habermas 2005; Conover and Searing 2005; Steiner 2004). Rational choice theory works from the premise that individuals take decisions based upon their own personal preference, as opposed to a wider common good. In such instances then, the individual has changed their mind contrary to personal choice through consideration, following discourse with those of an opposing viewpoint.

Chapter 2 – Democracy 35 Computer mediated communications of the kind that are central to this project pose problems for deliberative theory in terms of:

The lack of face-to-face interaction between the participants in a shared practice of collective decision making and the lack of reciprocity between the roles of speakers and addressees in an egalitarian exchange of opinions (Habermas 2005 p.415).

Reciprocity is a vital component of deliberative theory (Elstub and McLaverty 2014) whereby arguing in terms that others can accept through giving of reasons, encompasses the process of exchange for mutual benefit of the parties involved. Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002) argue that voluntary cooperation is for many as natural as the propensity for self-interest in terms of human bargaining. Here, Habermas seems to be suggesting that the physical exclusion of online communication between participants prevents the social relationships which help to drive the will to reach equitable agreement on any given issue. Habermas also states that the role of the media in selecting and shaping messages is detrimental to the process of deliberation. The possibility of online deliberation has received much academic attention in recent times (Baek, Wojcieszak and Delli Carpini 2012; Wright 2012; Goldberg 2010; Dahlberg 2007; Wright and Street 2007; Tambini 1999). The possibility of deliberation and the broader subject of online communication and its role in decision making in the independence referendum is a central question of the project.

Second generation deliberative theory such as that of Bohman (1997) and Gutmann and Thompson (1998) developed the position of Rawls and Habermas whereby:

First generation deliberative democrats…debated the normative justifications of deliberative democracy, interpretations and necessary components of the theory, but failed to take account of the sheer complexity of contemporary societies (Elstub 2010 p.291).

Such complexity, as Elstub puts it, includes the impact of cultural pluralism in reinforcing particular values and the manner in which social inequality will in all likelihood preclude certain sections of society from the deliberative process. The challenges of such exclusion were to be taken into account and guarded against if deliberation was to be seen as effective and inclusive. The acceptance of such developments in deliberative theory from its first incarnations, bring it much closer to the agonistic pluralism of Chantal Mouffe (which is

Chapter 2 – Democracy 36 discussed later in this chapter) in the notion that consensus is idealistic and unrealistic in a consistent normative sense.

The third generation deliberative theorists (Parkinson 2006; O’Flynn 2006; Baber and Bartlett 2005 amongst others) were more concerned with the practical institutionalisation of deliberative democracy than its normative premise. The suggested mechanisms for deliberative democracy include citizen juries, consensus conferences, planning cells, deliberative polls and citizen’s assemblies. Held surmises that:

Whilst the concept of deliberative democracy now spans a wide range of positions, its main advocates use it to distinguish a political approach focused on improving the quality of democracy. At issue is enhancing the nature and form of political participation, not just increasing it for its own sake (Held 2006 p.232).

More recent developments in the theory, such as that of Jane Mansbridge (2010), explicitly accept the benefits of deliberation without the previously central, arguably unrealistic, requirement for consensus. Mansbridge accepts the role of liberal self-interest alongside the common good, and holds that deliberation is valid and worthy in enhancing the democratic process when the participants are, ‘constrained by the deliberative democratic ideals of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, the search of fairness, and the absence of coercive power’ (ibid. p.94). Mansbridge makes the important distinction, which separates deliberation from other discourse theories such as agonism, in requiring the setting for deliberation to specifically be well natured rather than coercive and antagonistic.

The arguments around the internet and more specifically social media participation in the modern day, are not as to whether the internet and social media have at least the potential to enhance the democratic process, notwithstanding narrower arguments on deliberation, but rather to what extent this potential is being fulfilled and at what costs (Sunstein 2009; Hindman 2008). The reality however, of establishing the necessary climate for deliberation, particularly online, is questionable. Dryzek (2005) suggests the difficulty lies in the different settings for deliberation and whether they are hot or cold, suggesting that cold settings such as deliberative opinion polls involving non-partisan participants, regularly achieve persuasion and do indeed see participants change position through deliberation.

As far as the Scottish independence referendum is concerned, we can apply Dryzek’s criteria for hot deliberation where he states, ‘deliberation tied to sovereign authority in divided societies is about as hot a setting as one can imagine’ (Dryzek 2005 p.229). We ought,

Chapter 2 – Democracy 37 however, to make the distinction that whilst the independence referendum was highly emotive and of great significance to the participants, it would be entirely inappropriate to categorise it with the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda on which Dryzek bases his arguments. Dryzek specifically points to identity-based arguments as being the most unlikely to easily change opinions (identity was suggested to be a key driver in position taking in the referendum and is discussed at length in later chapters). He goes on to clarify the need for a period of reflection, physically removed from the hot setting, if they are to save face by ‘not admitting it for the present’ (ibid. p.239). As far as online deliberation is concerned, it could be argued that the removal of face to face deliberation, whilst likely encouraging incivility and preventing Habermasian egalitarian social relationships, also allows for participants to reflect from a distance and take the opposing position, whilst saving face away from a physical deliberative forum.

The challenge it would seem, then, is to create an online environment whereby the type of passionate discourse that is ultimately strived for remains within the boundaries which allow for it to be deemed as a satisfactory element of, or even an improvement in, the democratic communication process.