Introduction
As discussed in the last chapter, the three groupings of suffering in the First Noble Truth correspond to the three stages of the Buddha’s life.
The first grouping, with its examples, conveys how suffering is usually conceived: pain, sickness, aging, etc. Thus, the way to avoid suffering is to not be in pain, not get sick, old and die, and ideally these should not be brought into mind either. This is what Gautama’s palatial life tried to bestow (by keeping all signs of sickness, old age, and death outside the walls). The second grouping shows an understanding of suffering that corresponds to the Buddha’s ascetic life. The second grouping observes that the root cause of suffering is desire, and specifically unsatis-fied desire. Thus, pain need not be suffered as long as one is disciplined enough to not be bothered by the pain. In his ascetic life, the Buddha underwent severe conditioning and impoverishment in order to lessen his desires and to overcome the temptations of his desires. The third grouping corresponds to the Buddha’s enlightened life as he realized that it was not just any desire that instigated suffering, but desires that involve
an attachment to self (specifically, to the sense of being an enduring self that is independent of the ever-in-flux aggregates). This specific kind of desire is called ‘craving’ (trishna, which translates literally as thirst). The Second Noble Truth asserts that cravings are the cause of suffering. This chapter will analyse the notion of craving and its connection to suffer-ing, and the distinction between cravings and other desires that are not cravings.
Craving is a kind of desire that involves attachment to self. To illus-trate, hunger is a natural response to an empty stomach. It is an evolved reaction to a need for sustenance and nutrition, and cannot be elimi-nated entirely (and as hunger also manifests as a kind of pain, the pains of hunger cannot be eliminated entirely either). For the adept ascetic who is habituated to living off very little food, it is nevertheless unavoidable to feel some hunger – to desire some food – when the stomach is empty (particularly so when it has been without food for a long time). The ascetic may be disciplined enough to deal easily with this hunger, but the desire itself is biologically rooted and will still arise. But in the Buddhist conception, the desire for food need not be suffered, even when it is unsatisfied. Suffering in the Buddhist conception arises when we have a craving for food; when the desire involves trying to satisfy a self who yearns for food. This craving for food – this trying to satisfy a self over and above trying to meet a biological requirement – is held to be elim-inable. Without an invested sense of self in the hunger, the hunger may remain but it will not be a craving. Likewise, one may be in pain, or grief, but these need not be suffered according to the Buddha. Suffering arises when we crave, in order to assuage a sense of self, to not be in pain or grief. According to the Buddha, cravings can – with training and dis-cipline – be uprooted. They involve attachment to an entity that is held to not exist. This is the sense of suffering to be overcome and, unlike the pang of an empty stomach and the biologically rooted response of desiring food, it is the only suffering that can potentially be overcome.
Once we divorce pain, sorrow, etc., from attachment to self, then an important dimension of these experiences is removed. Again, there will still be pain (for instance, there will still be specific neuronal responses
resulting from exterior tissue damage due to a cut or lesion). But there will not be the associated anxiety and trepidation that comes with think-ing of a “me” that is in pain. Without this dimension, states such as grief and sorrow may remain, but presumably would be very different, and perhaps diminished, without a sense of a me that is in grief, or of my sor-row. Investing a sense of self in one’s hunger or pain can cause suffering that is over and above the feelings of hunger and pain. The experiences are exacerbated when it is thought that there is a self who will suffer from the hunger and pain, and who will benefit from their alleviation. It is this dimension that is held to be eliminable by the Buddha.
An attachment to self may add to the need for expediency in resolving a feeling such as hunger. It may lead to the thought or fear or anxiety that one’s well-being, and perhaps one’s very self, is at stake with the unsatisfied hunger, and this may add impetus to finding food to satisfy the hunger.1 But in the Buddhist view, while it may add urgency to our desires, and press us to bring about their satisfaction, attachment to self is also held to be suffered.
Craving and Permanence
According to Buddhist doctrine, impermanence is an aspect of our world that is closely linked to suffering. It might seem that a desire for permanence must cause suffering, for, in an impermanent world, it must end in frustration. The desire for immortality is an example. However, this thinking is too quick: suffering in the Buddhist conception is not simply a matter of a desire for permanence in an impermanent world; it must be a craving to be suffered.
Consider that some desires for permanent states of affairs – such as a desire for a lasting world peace – need not cause suffering in the Buddhist sense. An unsatisfied desire for a lasting world peace may be upsetting.
But there are many unsatisfied desires that can be upsetting and painful 1 See the closing section of the previous chapter for further discussion of this.
(such as continuing thirst, hunger, etc.). As already explained, unsatisfied desires need not be suffered under the Buddhist conception of suffering (for if they were, suffering could not be eliminated for not all desires can either be entirely satisfied or eliminated). Therefore, while a desire for permanence (such as for permanent world peace) may remain unsatis-fied, this does not by itself imply that it must be a suffered desire. The mere inclusion of permanence in an unsatisfied desire does not alone make the difference between suffering and not suffering. Only if the desire for permanence is a craving – only if it involves a concern for an enduring or permanent self – does the desire for permanence involve suffering in the Buddhist conception.
A craving is a special kind of desire; one that entails the existence of the desirer’s continuing self. To illustrate this, consider a desire for the fleeting experience of sexual gratification. The lack of this gratifica-tion might indeed be distressing, but this is not by itself suffering in the Buddhist sense. But suppose that what’s desired is that I be a person who experiences sexual gratification – that is, that a continuing “I” be the subject of this experience – that this continuing subject be in one state rather than another (even though that state may be fleeting). This is the kind of desire that is being called a craving, and this is what Buddhism aims to free one from. Not, in this case, by providing sexual gratifica-tion, but rather by removing the desirer’s concern about his continuing self. Having at least some unsatisfied desires is an inevitability in life and the Buddha’s unsuccessful experience with asceticism is supposed to show this. We can’t expect the world to conform to all our desires, and we can’t make all our desires conform to the world. What we can do though, according to the Buddha, is eliminate cravings.
As discussed, the Buddha, in the third grouping of the First Noble Truth, links suffering to the five aggregates (which are referred to as the ‘aggregates of attachment’). These aggregates are the constituents we associate with our sense of self. These are called ‘aggregates of attach-ment’ because we readily attach a sense of self to these aggregates (as when we think along the lines of my body, my desires, my sensations, my feelings, etc.). While the aggregates are ever-changing, the sense of self
we attach to the aggregates is thought to remain the same through these changes. It is the subject or experiencer of the changing aggregates that, in some essential capacity, is presumed to remain the same or permanent over time. It is held that we attach a sense of permanent selfhood to the ever-changing aggregates and in this way suffering is connected to per-manence. Our concept of self does seem to presume permanence, that is, a continuing existence as the same entity over time. This is evident in the way we speak for we use the same word, ‘I’, to refer to ourselves at different times in our lives despite the many changes we have undergone and continue to undergo. This attachment to permanence may involve the presumption of being an undying and unchanging soul, or it may just be the sense of being the same self through the changes experienced through one’s lifetime. But again, it is attachment to a sense of perma-nence – of being the same self in some essential respect over time – that is involved with cravings and is the source of suffering in the Buddhist conception (the notion of remaining the same self over time will be discussed again in Chapters Nine and Eleven).
Craving and Wanting – A Difference in Kind
In order to clarify terminology, we will stipulate a difference between cravings and wants as different kinds of desires: cravings are desires vested with a sense of self and pursued in the interest of satisfying this self, and wants are desires that are not vested with a sense of self, and are not pursued in the interests of satisfying a sense of self.1 The former lead to suffering in the Buddhist conception while the latter do not. And thus the end of suffering – Nirvana or Enlightenment – involves the elimination of cravings but not of wants. Wanting, after all, cannot be entirely eliminated anyway; many of the activities we do, from getting up, to brushing our teeth, to making turns while driving a car, to doing our daily chores and tasks, may not get done without there being wants
1 See also Williams (2000), p. 44.
leading the way. When I get up to brush my teeth I need not explicitly tell myself that I want to do so, but there may still be a want leading the way (without which I may skip brushing). Furthermore, there is no contradiction in saying that enlightenment involves the elimination of cravings and also saying that it is an objective that can be wanted (and thus desired) for these are different in kind. Cravings for enlightenment must end if enlightenment is to be achieved, but wanting enlightenment – which is equivalent to wanting to end cravings – is not only possible but necessary for leading to practices for reaching enlightenment.1
When we crave we do not just want with more emphasis, or with greater intensity. Again, craving involves attachment to self; it involves the feeling or sense that something is at stake for oneself in one’s desires (we might say that it involves the sense of being a stakeholder in one’s desires). Cravings are pursued in the interest of satisfying one’s sense of self and unsatisfied cravings are felt as suffered by this sense of self. The difference between cravings and wants is one of kind, and not just of degree, and this underlies why cravings cause Buddhist suffering while wants do not.
In order to see this more clearly, let us suppose the converse is true, namely, that cravings and wants do not differ in kind but only in degree (i.e., suppose that cravings are strong or burning desires and wants are weak desires with no other relevant difference). There are a number of difficulties with this view. For one, a strong desire, without attachment to self, need not be problematic in the Buddhist view. An example is a strong, but selfless, desire for world peace. If a strong desire is unsatisfied,
1 Williams elaborates upon this distinction: “… it does not follow from want-ing somethwant-ing that one has a cravwant-ing for it. The Buddha’s alms-round was not the result of craving … Thus it was not considered faulty, and certainly not contradictory (as people sometimes tell me) for a Buddhist to want enlightenment. A Buddhist wants enlightenment in the sense that wanting something is a condition of freely and intentionally engaging in practices to bring it about. It is indeed faulty to have craving for enlightenment and, since the Buddhist path is precisely designed to bring craving to an end, to want enlightenment is to want practices which will eliminate among other things craving after enlightenment itself. There is no contradiction in any of this.” Williams (2000), p. 44.
frustration may ensue (and presumably more frustration than for a weakly felt desire). But merely being an unsatisfied desire is not sufficient for constituting suffering in the Buddhist conception. As explained in the previous chapter, unsatisfied desires are unavoidable in life while suffering in the Buddhist sense is held to be eliminable. Some desires – weak and strong – are just unavoidable consequences of being embodied creatures (e.g., the desire for sleep is unavoidable given a length of time without sleep, and fittingly, a strong desire for sleep is unavoidable given a very long time without sleep). The eliminability of suffering means that cravings cannot simply be strong desires.
In addition, we can observe that many desires become stronger the longer they remain unsatisfied (as is the case with the above-mentioned desire for sleep). If the difference between wanting and craving is solely one of degree, then at some point the want for sleep becomes a craving merely in virtue of becoming sleepier. A difficulty with this is that it is not clear at what point this turn is made (for again, we are supposing, for the sake of consideration, that there is no difference of kind that could mark the turn). Moreover, saying that only strong desires cause suffering under the Buddhist conception suggests that we should aim to satisfy desires while they are still weak and before they become strong. Thus, to avoid incurring suffering, we should give in to desires for food, sex, ill will, vengeance, wrath, etc., while they are weak, and before they have a chance to grow strong. This, however, promotes a licentiousness that is at odds with the Buddhist emphasis on discipline and compassion on the path to enlightenment. Strength of desire may usually or often be part of craving; cravings, for instance, may often be felt as burning desires, and this for reason of being wound up with trying to satisfy a sense of self. But merely being a strong desire is not sufficient for being a craving.
Simply characterizing the difference between craving and wanting in terms of a difference in degree – a difference in strength of desire – does not bring out the character of craving. There is a difference in kind that must be accounted for, and the following two sections will elaborate this.
The Character of Craving – Qualitative Observations
The Buddha, upon enlightenment, is held to have overcome attachment to self, and with this a whole set, but not all, of his desires were extin-guished. These desires have been called ‘cravings’. Clearly, we associate pain, sorrow, sickness, and many unsatisfied desires with suffering; this is true now just as it was in the Buddha’s time. That these need not involve suffering under the Buddhist conception tells us that there is something special about this conception of suffering; something that, once overcome, does not stop pain, sickness and unsatisfied desires from being experienced, but does stop them from being suffered in some way (or from being unsatisfactory in some way, to use another connotation of duhkha). And hence there is something special about the nature of craving, and something special about the investment of a sense of self in a craving, that makes it suffered. There is a difference between feeling pain or sickness, and feeling pain or sickness with attachment to self;
there is, in other words, a difference in kind between mere wanting and craving. This section will elaborate upon this difference in kind, and the special characteristics of craving.
To begin, it is important to note that attachment to self may usu-ally, but need not always, involve selfishness. It is the attachment to being a self in the sense of something permanent and independent of the ever-changing aggregates that is problematic in the Buddhist view, and this can be present in even unselfish people. As noted, a presumption of the Buddhist conception of suffering is that suffering is pervasive. If attachment to self simply meant selfishness, then suffering would not be pervasive – for many of us are not predominantly selfish, and a few of us are rarely selfish. Again, it is the attachment to the sense of being a per-manent self, separate from the ever-changing aggregates, that explains the pervasiveness of suffering in Buddhism (and unselfish persons can still believe and feel themselves to be a self in this sense, and be attached to this self, while still being generally unselfish). Unselfishness, or self-lessness, certainly plays an important role in overcoming attachment to self, but it is not sufficient. The Noble Eightfold Path, to be discussed in
Chapter Seven, delineates steps that involve unselfish action and thought, but also steps that require other disciplining measures as well.
The attachment to self in a craving is not to an actual self, for this is held to be nonexistent. Instead, it is to what we feel or sense to be a self.
This is a more visceral attachment than the mere belief in a self. The attachment is emotive and affective. For instance, we pursue the satisfac-tion of many desires in the interest of satisfying not simply the desire, but a self or subject that feels the pangs of the desire; we feel unsatisfied desires not merely as feelings of being unsatisfied or hungry or frustrated, but as a self that is unsatisfied, hungry and frustrated. Attachment to self adds a dimension to the pursuit of desire, and to the experience of unsatisfied desires. This is an affective addition that makes a difference to the expe-rience of the desire. And it is an introspectively observable difference.
The involvement of attachment to self makes craving feel qualitatively different than mere wanting (to use a contemporary philosophical term, we can say that there is a difference in qualia with craving). For instance, there is an inwardly observable difference between just feeling hungry, and feeling myself to be hungry (the latter, for instance, may involve a
The involvement of attachment to self makes craving feel qualitatively different than mere wanting (to use a contemporary philosophical term, we can say that there is a difference in qualia with craving). For instance, there is an inwardly observable difference between just feeling hungry, and feeling myself to be hungry (the latter, for instance, may involve a