Efectes secundaris de la radioteràpia:

The Agreement and the Constitution, which was produced by the Agreement, are fundamentals upon which power, which is the key ingredient of conflict, was addressed. The Agreement also provided a solution to the problem of power in security sector, whereby it was decided that security institutions be shared equally between Hutus and Tutsis. Although, the Agreement is fundamentally good, a key to resolving the conflict but the problem lies in its implementation: representation of Hutus and Tutsis in the National Assembly is problematic- are Tutsis representing Tutsis supposed to come from Tutsi parties or not? Tutsis lost somewhere; what they had won in Arusha was lost in the Pretoria Agreement during negotiations. South African experience was not favourable to the Tutsis; 40 per cent representing Tutsis

were to be drawn from any party regardless of whether the party was a Hutu party or not. The concern is that most of the 40% representing Tutsis in the present government were drawn from the ruling party which is a Hutu party, CDD-FDD. Moreover, Tutsi parties claim that those Tutsis from Hutu parties “are not wholly Tutsis because they have a Hutu ideology”. Thus, the ethnic power sharing quota system is not a solution in the long-run because the problem in Burundi is not ethnic but political. Ethnicity was simply used as a tool to obtain political power. In addition, one respondent argued that the power sharing quota system could perpetuate the Hutu/Tutsi sentiment among the Burundians. For instance, why doesn’t 40 per cent for Tutsis and 60 per cent for Hutus march population representation of the ethnic groups? Although, the power sharing formula, which will only apply in the first Legislative Assembly is not sustainable, it was the only tenable solution at the time as a means to end fighting.

It is fundamentally, important to address grievances of the Tutsi parties concerning genuine representation of the Tutsis in both cabinet and legislative assembly in order to avoid future confrontation of Hutus and Tutsis. This is based on the fact that, sharing a similar ethnic background does not necessarily imply that you share similar convictions or ideologies, thus, justifying concerns of the Tutsi parties. This further affirms the argument that conflict in Burundi is not ethnic but political. However, this does not imply that ethnicity has not influenced the conflict to some considerable degree. Thus, this requires political mechanisms that are strongly influenced by the ethnic configuration of the Burundian society in order to address the conflict. Suggesting that in order to ensure successful implementation of the Arusha Agreement and, therefore, route Burundi on a firm road to enduring peace, fair representation of both Hutu-Tutsi parties, which should go beyond the first legislative assembly is inevitable.

“Arusha is like a bible for Burundi”, said a respondent. It addressed all issues and concerns that faced Burundian parties. It provided a foundation upon which the ceasefire negotiations were carried out between rebels (who had not participated in the Arusha negotiations) and the government of Burundi. Although, some smaller parties had refused to sign the agreement with the influence of Mandela and President Kagame of Rwanda they signed it with reservation, it was nonetheless, a strong

commitment of the Burundian parties to end the civil conflict. However, the agreement failed to address the problem of impunity, in that, those who killed massively are the ones now occupying government. By having signed the agreement with reservation implies that unless there are further discussions to address concerns underlying such reservation, implementation of the agreement will encounter difficulty, a situation that may slide the country back into violent conflict. The question of impunity must be dealt with decisively as a measure to discourage the promotion of a culture of impunity, and to promote reconciliation. This will also prevent revenge killings like was the case in 1993 after the death of the first democratically elected Hutu president.

The agreement was the basis on which all subsequent accords like the ceasefire were made. It provided the framework for reforms in the Judiciary, Army and Police. However, the agreement was only negotiated by party representatives without consulting or, the participation of, the Burundian public. Only politicians participated without the rebel movements and that is why even after signing the Agreement armed confrontation went on, though, this was later addressed by the ceasefire agreement that was signed between the government of Burundi and the CNDD- FDD. The ceasefire agreement acted as “a seal” for the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi since it was, unlike the latter, signed by the belligerent forces consequently leading to peace in most parts of the country. In addition, the agreement provided for a Constitution, which was accepted by Burundians through a referendum, and now the focus to bring about desired change. Although, CNDD-FDD did not participate in the Arusha peace agreement, thy recognized it because it addressed the fundamental problems of Burundi. The failure of the FNL to join the peace process challenges the Hutu cause of fighting as the Hutu concerns have been addressed (for example, through political and military power sharing). The fighting will not have a big impact since they are politically bankrupt. At some point government agreed to meet their demands but they kept adding on the list of demands, thereby frustrating the peace process.

In order to allow for successful implementation of the Arusha Agreement there was need for the participation of all Burundians. Thus, there is need to unpack and rediscuss key parts of the agreement, e.g., the question of justice/impunity, by

involving all Burundians. This will ensure that all Burundians own the peace process and, therefore, help smooth implementation of the agreement. On the question of the FNL, with cooperation of neighbouring countries and support from the international community, the government of Burundi should engage with the rebel group in an attempt to address their concerns, or else, the country will not achieve comprehensive peace.

The Arusha agreement enabled the return of refugees and holding of elections, however, there is need for extensive discussions among Burundians as a society, if at all, enduring peace is to be possible. Although, the Arusha agreement permitted various parties to discuss issues confronting Burundians, it is not sufficient enough to resolve the conflict among Burundian groups without addressing the problem of poverty.

Indeed, there is need for extensive discussions among Burundians concerning the Arusha agreement in order to ensure long-lasting stability in Burundi. For instance, the distorted history of Burundi’s ethnic groups that was coined by colonialists, needs to be discussed at length as a measure to address the deep-seated enmity between Hutus and Tutsis, a factor that has been seen by some to be the source of Burundi’s civil conflict.

Further, the agreement was both beneficial and a limitation; it helped to cultivate a democratic culture and, therefore, address the change of governments through coups. This has encouraged accountability in the current leaders as opposed to the past leaders who only pursued their interests and, on the other hand, the agreement imposed a flawed Constitution, which promotes ethnic power sharing in favour of Hutus while all communities are equal. This is a basis for future conflicts.

It is early to conclude that the Arusha agreement has created a democratic culture through which peaceful change of governments is a reality; without effectively addressing the issue of political power in which all parties will not have a feeling of alienation (like it is the case now), peaceful change of governments in Burundi may not happen in the foreseeable future. Although, the current Constitution was passed through a referendum, it was not generally accepted by Tutsis. Given that Burundians

did not participate in Constitution-making undermines the legitimacy of the Constitution and, therefore, fails to provide a solid ground for peace-building in Burundi.