The interview is one of the most important sources in the collection of data for case studies (Yin 2003), and can provide useful insights when analysing the belief systems of individuals within the policy process and their relationship with other players (Goddard 1993). Interviews with ‘elite’ players provide important information
since such people have a very singular view that can arise from their expertise, position or insights (Guba and Lincoln 1981).
Since each interviewee will have had a unique experience of, and position within the case, every interview will be different and of a unique nature, more like a conversation and characterized by a certain fluidity resulting from following leads and probes that arise during the interview (Guba and Lincoln 1981; Stake 1995; Yin 2003). While this inherent flexibility and adaptability is a great advantage, it also presents one of the grave dangers, namely a potential failure to ask the right questions during the limited period of time for which the interview lasts. It is therefore useful for the researcher to have a strong plan of advance (Stake 1995). Bearing this in mind it was decided that a semi-structured approach to interviewing would be the most beneficial one in this study. The main areas that were discussed during the interviews focused on the topics addressed by the research questions as well as additional insights or knowledge a player might have as a result of occupying a certain position within the debate.
In order to identify the key players, two strategies were pursued. First of all, where people were mentioned directly in any of the public documents, attempts were made to track them down. In a lot of instances this proved to be difficult. Since the year 2000 a number of those people had moved on from the positions they held at the time, had retired or fallen gravely ill. Consequently, contact details were not always readily available. However, by following up the last available lead and contacting other people within the organisations at which those people had had a position, attempts were made to overcome this problem. While most of the contacted organizations did not give out any individual’s contact details, usually quoting the Data Protection Act, they were happy, where known, to forward information on the study and the researcher’s contact details to the person in question, or to provide directions as to other avenues that might be worth pursuing.
In those cases where organizations or generic positions at an organization, rather than individuals, were identified, the organization was contacted directly in order to find out who would have been involved within the organization at the time. These leads were then followed up.
In a few cases, contact details were readily available from the outset. Where possible, the initial contact regarding the interview was made by post, followed by an email or telephone call ten days later. In those instances where only email-addresses or telephone numbers were obtainable, these routes of contact were taken, the emails again being followed up by telephone or further emails.
Secondly, the study sought to identify other key players and organisations using a ‘snowball system’. Those people that had been identified and contacted were asked to name anyone else they thought of as playing an important role at the time, and who they thought should be contacted for this study. The people identified in this way were then contacted following the above approach. This way of getting in touch with people proved to be the most useful one in so far as the reference through other individuals appeared to have a positive effect on the target contact. In addition, individuals also proved less reluctant than organisations to share contact details. The main problem, however, that could not be overcome as part of this research, was the identification of key civil servants involved within the Home Office. Despite continuous efforts and a number of contacts obtained through the ‘snowball system’, only one civil servant working within the Home Office and involved at the time could be contacted.
Overall twenty-one people were contacted who initially seemed to have played an important role at the time of the Sarah Payne case. Of these, fifteen emerged as having been directly involved and occupying key positions. Of those fifteen people, seven individuals were happy to be interviewed; three individuals, mainly from a governmental background, refused to participate; four people, two of whom also had a governmental background, failed to respond despite several follow-ups; and one person could not be interviewed due to serious illness. However, it was possible to obtain some information through the latter person’s colleagues.
In face-to-face interviews it is easier to establish rapport with the interviewee, pick up any non-verbal cues which can clarify the meaning of verbal responses and take notes. Furthermore, they allow for a more relaxed overall conversational style which in turn allows the provision of fuller opinions and disclosure of information (Robson 1993;
Bowling 1997). Consequently, the aim was to conduct face-to-face interviews with the key people identified. This was deemed of special importance due to the controversial and emotional nature of the events as well as the high public profile of the policy area. However, it emerged that due to the position and resulting hectic schedules of one of the key stakeholders, a telephone interview rather than a face-to- face one was required. While this meant that potentially important non-verbal nuances for probing might have been lost and that the interview style was more towards the structured than the guided conversational end, with answers being potentially more focused and less rich, it was pragmatically decided that the benefits of conducting an interview with this person over the phone would outweigh the downsides of having no interview at all. While all other interviews were tape recorded in order to simplify the analysis, due to technical obstacles this was not possible in the case of the telephone interview.
The duration of the interviews varied between 50 minutes and three hours and the analysis of the interview material mirrored the manual approach taken in the analysis of the documents. Initially, the interviews were transcribed. The transcriptions were then used as a basis for highlighting the themes that emerged from repeat listening to the interview tapes and as a way to categorize the various points mentioned by the interviewees.
Although interviews have become a widely-used approach not only for studying the beliefs of elites but for gathering information of any kind, so much so that it is possible to speak of ‘The Interview Society' (Fontana and Frey 2000, p 646), their use is not without problems. Along with the everyday use of interviews has come the danger of routine and uncritical acceptance of an interview’s content. It is therefore often assumed that the answers provided paint a true and accurate picture of the respondents’ selves and lives (Fontana and Frey 2000).
However, while this is a dangerous assumption in general, it is especially so in the case of ‘elite’ interviews. Not only are there general problems associated with the reliance on memory for providing answers, but there is the inherent difficulty that it is possible for people to re-define situations retrospectively and for their answers to be influenced by the researcher, both of which can happen unknowingly (Goddard 1993).
All information provided in an interview will have been ‘filtered’ through the interviewee’s point of view. Given that people are not similarly articulate and perceptive this will influence the kind of answers they give (Creswell 2003). Additionally, within policy-making it is likely that people will try to increase their own role, their responsibilities and the importance of these aspects in the overall process (Rose 1973, p 88). The interviewee might have his or her own hidden agenda and try to influence the interviewer iii one way or another. Consequently, it is generally advisable not to base research solely on interviews since such aspects can
‘cripple' or ‘sabotage' it (Guba and Lincoln 1981, p 155). The one method that lends itself to counteract these problems is documentary analysis. Since documents are mainly ‘non-reactive' sources they provide an ideal complementary source to interviews and counteract any interviewer-bias (Young and Mills 1980, p 17).
As a result the combination of documentary analysis and elite interviews used within this research proved to be a very useful form of triangulation.