Efecto del proceso de torrefacción sobre el poder calórico y la eficiencia energética

As a technology for conducting warfare, insurgency is designed expressly as means for challenging a militarily superior sovereign force. And as was made clear in reviewing the highlights of both the People’s War and Focoist doctrines, winning the support of the initially non-aligned civilian population is embraced by insurgents as their paramount objective. Historically, by contrast, incumbent governments have pursued a wide variety of tactical approaches aimed at arresting the growth of insurgent challengers, only one of which (Winning Hearts & Minds) represents a direct response by governments to compete against insurgents in persuading the masses to lend them their allegiance. Insurgency is after all a strategy designed to redress a relative material disadvantage, and by extension the state possesses the material basis for pursuing a much broader array of tactics. A representative summary of the historical repertoire, adopted by COIN forces, is summarized below in figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2: A Taxonomy of Ideal Type COIN Tactics

Geographic Centric Population Centric Opposition Centric

Search & Destroy Clear & Hold Topographic Dominance

Winning Hearts & Minds Population Control/Repression

Expulsion/Extermination

Negotiated Settlement Undermining Morale Fragmentation/Cooptation

Geographic centric approaches primarily focus on addressing aspects of the physical space upon which the conflict takes place, with an emphasis on the size of the state, salient topographical features, and challenges in securing long porous borders. One of the simplest COIN tactics is search and destroy. The first goal of such an approach is to maintain a constant

and visible presence of government forces in contested areas, display the incumbent regime’s resolve to maintain control, and deny opposition fighters the luxury of operating unmolested. And the second objective is to initiate contact with insurgents by drawing fire and then

counterattacking. Since the location and identity of opposition forces is often unknown, patrols can act as a bait to lure insurgents out into open engagements.

The clear and hold, or oil spot method, is often lauded as a more effective alternative (Farley 2007; Krepinevich Jr 2005). A clear and hold strategy aims to constrict the opposition force’s ability to maneuver by progressively establishing larger government held safe havens (Petraeus and Amos 2007, 5–18). As the size of these zones is expanded insurgents will become funneled into increasingly smaller areas of operation. Eventually the government controlled zones will expand to include the entirety of the state and the insurgents will therefore be compelled to either take up and defend a fixed position, surrender, or abandon their cause. In their study of Russia’s North Caucuses, Duffy-Toft and Zhukov (2012) argue that a strategy of denial, using large scale cordon operations to isolate the conflict zone, was the most effective means of limiting the insurgency’s expansion.

Topographic dominance refers to tactics which recognize that certain terrain features are thought to provide an advantage for insurgent fighters. These include mountains,

forests/jungles, caves/tunnels, and large border areas, all of which provide more easily defensible safe havens. The goal for COIN forces accordingly is to secure the areas of land that are conducive to hiding opposition forces or which provide them with a tactical advantage. Such tactics include the burning (van Etten et al. 2008) and clearing (Arreguín-Toft 2006, 48–71) of forests, smoking out caves (Callwell 1903), closing borders (Record 2007), and laying siege to rural mountain strongholds (Kilcullen 2006). During the Algerian War of Independence for

example, the French “constructed a two hundred-mile barrier of double row electrified fencing, minefields, and blockhouses along the border of Tunisia” (Miller 2000, 65).

Population centric strategies instead adopt the perspective of the civilian populace itself as the center of gravity. As was discussed in the beginning of the chapter, insurgents cannot survive without a complicit or at least neutral noncombatant population to conceal their identities from the government’s security apparatus and to provide them with direct material support. The strategy of winning hearts and minds aims to break this linkage by convincing the noncombatant population to voluntarily support the efforts of the incumbent regime’s forces (Petraeus and Amos 2007, A-5), principally by providing actionable local intelligence on insurgent activities (Condra and Shapiro 2012). The state aspires to prevail in the competition over popular support by providing human security to civilians and addressing political, economic, and social concerns through robust civil affairs and infrastructure reconstruction programs.

Population control measures alternatively seek to deprive the insurgent forces of their support base, but attempt to do so not through persuasion but rather by means of physical isolation. Tactics include forcible relocation to secure camps [strategic hamlet program]

(Sheehan et al. 1971), the searching of homes and personal property, and curfews (Petraeus and Amos 2007, 5–21). State repression is employed with the intention of instilling fear of the government throughout the population so that they acquiesce to the ruling regime and denounce the insurgency (Davenport 2007). Historical tactics to this end have included systematic rape, murder, torture, and the wanton destruction of private property.

Finally, states have also attempted to eliminate portions of their own polities that were considered to be either sympathetic to or actively involved in supporting insurgents by expelling

civilian populations are often employed by government military forces as a calculated strategy owing to the difficulty involved in directly targeting guerilla fighters (2004).

Opposition centric strategies concentrate their focus on the adversary organization itself. Negotiated settlements attempt to separate the opposition’s ideology from its political demands. Insurgencies are often manifested symptoms of some underlying political, economic, or social grievance, and if their demands are both limited and tangible then they can be

bargained with (Metz 2007; Valeriano and Bohannan 2006, 299). Undermining opposition morale refers to a concerted propaganda effort by government forces to dissuade members of an insurgent organization from continuing the pursuit of their cause (Valeriano and Bohannan 2006). If a sufficient mass of its membership can be persuaded to capitulate the organization will be left without a foundation and will shortly collapse under its own weight. Tactics include propaganda aimed at exposing contradictions and inconsistencies between espoused opposition organization doctrine and actual behavior (especially of the movement’s leaders), amnesty and resettlement programs for opposition fighters, and publicized government initiated correction of alleged grievances. Finally, incumbents may also attempt to fragment their opposition and

coopt moderates into the extant political system by driving a wedge between the supporters and active members of an insurgency whom hold positions that are reconcilable within the status quo political system, from those whose views are not (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009; K. G. Cunningham 2011; Driscoll 2012).14

14 _{Although fragmentation of an opposition force may inadvertently produce greater numbers of veto}

players, and by extension adversely impede the reaching of acceptable settlement terms (D. E. Cunningham 2006).