4. RESULTADOS Y DISCUSIÓN
4.4 Efectos observados a nivel celular
4.4.3 Efecto de la sobreexpresión de SSU72 y SKT5 en la morfología
The Players: Piotr V. Dubinin (1909-
83) was already a USSR Champion- ship finalist OTB in the 1930s. He became a FIDE international master in 1950 and an ICCF grandmaster in 1962. His best result was finishing runner-up to A.O’Kelly de Galway in the 3rd CC World Championship.
Aleksandr M. Konstantinopolsky (1910-90) won the first USSR CC Championship (1948-51) and he became an ICCF international master in 1966 and eventually a FIDE grandmaster (1983). He was one of the USSR’s leading chess trainers and a noted theoretician.
About this game: This game, the most
exciting in this elite event, featured in the 1985 Russian monograph on Konstantinopolsky’s career.
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 cxd5 4 c4 Èf6 5 Èc3
White plays the Panov-Botvinnik Attack, which can lead to a great variety of positions. Alternatives here are 5...g6 (which Konstantinopolsky played against Estrin in this event) and 5...Èc6 which can be met either by 6 Èf3, when Black usually plays 6...ƒg4, or by 6 ƒg5.
5...e6 6 Èf3 Èc6
Black chooses a hybrid system. Konstantinopolsky wrote: “I do not share the popular theoretical opinion that this move loses by force to 7 c5. The resources of the black position seem to me to be fully adequate.”
Nowadays the normal moves are 6...ƒb4 (transposing to a variation of the Nimzo-Indian) and 6...ƒe7, which Konstantinopolsky used to play earlier in his career.
The latter usually transposes to a Queen’s Gambit Semi-Tarrasch (7 cxd5 Èxd5), but his famous win against Keres from the 16th USSR
Championship (Moscow 1948), which had parallels to the present game, went 7 a3 0-0 8 c5 Èe4 9 †c2 f5 10 ƒe2 Èc6 11 ƒb5 ƒf6 12 ƒxc6 bxc6 13 0-0 g5 14 Èe5 ƒxe5 15 dxe5 Èxc3 16 †xc3 f4¢ (0-1, 50).
7 c5
Dubinin plays the recommended move and avoids isolated d-pawn positions that result from the normal 7 cxd5 Èxd5 8 ƒc4 or 8 ƒd3; instead he creates a 3-2 queenside pawn majority. The general plan is ƒf1- b5xc6 to take control of e5, followed by a queenside pawn advance. Black hopes to make use of his majority of
64 Great Chess Games 110
pawns on the kingside but first he has to solve the problem of developing his pieces in a cramped space.
7...ƒe7
Konstantinopolsky’s move order was probably influenced by a belief that he could improve upon 7...Èe4 8 ƒb5! Èxc3 9 bxc3 ƒd7 10 0–0 ƒe7 11 ƒf4 b6?! 12 †a4 …c8 13 c4‹ (1–0, 23) Dubinin-V.Bergraser, 4th CC
World Ch 1962. It is often a good idea to encourage opponents to repeat lines where they have had an easy success, because they may be uncritical.
8 ƒb5 0–0
‘ECO’ and ‘NCO’ instead rec- ommend an unconvincing line: 8... ƒd7 9 ƒxc6 (White usually prefers 9 0–0 0-0 10 …e1 and has had good results with it.) 9...ƒxc6 10 Èe5 (This is also not forced.) 10...Èd7! 11 Èxc6 bxc6 12 0–0 (Z.Franco- M.Voiska, Zaragoza 1993) 12...e5 13 ƒe3 0–0 14 b4 ƒf6= — Voiska.
9 ƒf4
Instead of this, theory now recommends 9 0–0 Èe4 when:
a) 10 ƒxc6 Èxc3 11 bxc3 bxc6 12 †a4‹ (Foltys-Opocensky, Munich 1941) is cited, for example, in the book on the Caro-Kann by Egon Varnusz. However, that example is very misleading and I think Black is OK here. After 12...†c7 13 Èe5?! ƒxc5! 14 dxc5 †xe5 15 †xc6 and here the immediate 15...†e2!? (and if 16 †xa8 ƒa6 or ...†xf1+) looks stronger than Opocensky’s 15...…b8 16 †d6 †e2?, which loses the exchange to 17 ƒh6! ƒa6 18 †g3.
b) 10 †c2 f5 11 ƒxc6 bxc6 was
played in Estrin-N.Kopylov, USSR Cht 1953, and many other games. According to the book ‘Caro-Kann’ by A.Veits and A.Konstantinopolsky (Moscow 1983) “Black can fight for the initiative”. Now S.Toldaev-L.Gusev, from the 10th
USSR CC Cht 1991, continued 12 Èe5 †c7 13 f3!? (a pawn sacrifice to get play on the dark squares and the c-file) 13...Èxc5 14 ƒf4 ƒd6 15 …ac1 …b8 16 †d2. While this is an interesting idea, it is not so clear and I expect that Black would have found something, e.g. 16...Èa6 now, instead of Gusev’s 16...ƒd7?.
9...Èe4 10 0–0
In an OTB game in Finland, double CC world champion Tõnu Õim played 10 ƒxc6 Èxc3 (10...bxc6!?) 11 bxc3 bxc6 12 †a4 †e8 13 0-0 f6 16 …fe1 g5 with a messy position, (1-0, 60) Õim-Mertanen, Savonlinna 1990. 10...g5! (D)
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9zpp+-vlp+p0
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9-+-zPnvL-+0
9+-sN-+N+-0
9PzP-+-zPPzP0
9tR-+Q+RmK-0
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Konstantinopolsky wrote that: “Black can thank the move c4-c5 for making this advance possible. Black’s centre is very secure and the flank attack is not merely permissible, but necessary.”Game 22: Dubinin-Konstantinopolsky 111
11 ƒxc6 bxc6 12 ƒg3 f6!
“This is more flexible than 12...f5, which would be met by 13 ƒe5. Black maintains control of the central square e5 and anyway the time has almost arrived to exchange the outpost È.”
13 …e1 Èxg3 14 hxg3 …b8 15 †d2 †c7 16 b4 …f7!
Not 16...…xb4? 17 Èxd5.
17 …ab1 ƒd7 18 a4 a6
Black wants to delay White’s b4- b5 advance while he completes his preparations on the other wing.
19 †e2 †b7 20 g4
To block Black’s kingside advance by Èc3-e2-g3-h5 or else Èf3-h2-f1– g3-h5, and maybe White did not wish to allow ...g5-g4. Black replies by doubling on the b-file to create threats there.
20...ƒf8 21 †d2 †c8 22 …b2 ƒe8 23 …eb1 …fb7 (D)
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9+R+-+-mK-0
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24 …b324 a5 was another plan, to block the b- file by Èa4-b6. Konstantinopolsky said he intended to counter that by 24...ƒg6 25 …e1 e5 but it seems to me that ...e5 needs more preparation, in view of 26 dxe5 ƒxc5 27 b5! axb5 28 exf6¢.
24...ƒg7
Black now plans to advance ...e6- e5 using the sacrifice of his a-pawn as a decoy, but the variations in his book don’t all check out with a computer. He rejected 24...ƒg6 25 …1b2 e5!? 26 dxe5 ƒxc5 because of 27 Èb5! but 27...ƒxf2+ looks like a good reply. Also Black stands well after 27 Èxd5 cxd5 28 exf6 d4, but 27 b5!? could be more awkward to meet.
25 †e2 e5! 26 †xa6
Black judges that the absence of the white † from the centre will enable him to get his own attack moving. 26 dxe5 would probably be met by 26...fxe5 27 Èxg5 ƒg6 28 …1b2 e4.
26...e4 27 Èe1 f5! 28 gxf5
If 28 Èc2 f4 29 †e2 (29 f3 exf3 30 gxf3 ƒg6) 29...f3 30 gxf3 exf3 31 †xf3 ƒg6 and Black is better after, e.g., 32 …1b2 ƒxc2 33 …xb2 …xb4.
28...ƒxd4 29 Èc2
This sets a trap or two: 29...ƒxc5? 30 Èxe4! dxe4 31 †c4+ ƒf7 32 †xc5 ƒxb3 33 …xb3 …f7 34 Èd4 and Black’s position is fragmented; or if 29...ƒe5 30 Èe3! £Èg4. Instead 29 Èxd5 fails to 29...cxd5 30 c6 †xf5 31 Èf3 exf3 32 cxb7 fxg2 33 †e2 ƒh5!.
29...ƒg7!
In exchange for the a-pawn, Black has gained space in the centre (especially control of d4) and now, to prevent ...†xf5, White must compromise his kingside. One point illustrated by the next stage of this game is that the player with a space advantage (here, Black) finds it easier to switch play between the wings.
30 g4
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30 Èe3!? is not mentioned in K’s notes: 30...ƒf7 (30...d4 31 Èxe4 dxe3 32 Èd6 exf2+ 33 ‡xf2 †d7å) 31 b5 and now 31...ƒxc3!? is trappy, because of 32 bxc6 …xb3 33 …xb3 †xa6? (better 33...ƒe5) 34 …xb8+ ‡g7 35 c7‹. Instead, 31...d4 is good for Black but very complicated. 31...…a8 is safer, leading to an advantage for Black without risk.
30...†c7 31 †e2
31 Èe2?? (intending the desirable Èg3) loses the † to 31...…a7.
31...†f4 32 b5 ƒe5 33 ‡f1 h5 34 Èb4
34 b6 is too slow (34...hxg4 35 a5 …h7) and if 34 gxh5 †h4 and ...ƒxh5. If 34 gxh5, the best reply is probably 34...…h7! (similar to the game).
34...hxg4 35 †e3 (D)
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9+RsN-wQ-+-0
9-+-+-zP-+0
9+R+-+K+-0
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The best defence, preparing to bring a È over to g3. The game is now at a critical moment because White’s queenside majority is potentially very dangerous, while Black has mobile pawns. It is hard to get to the bottom of the tactics here.35...g3?!
Previously this was always given a “!” but in view of the next note, Black should find another move here. With 35...†xf5!, Black avoids the † exchange and retains his threats, White’s counterplay apparently being insufficient. For example, 36 bxc6 (36 Èxc6? ƒxc6 37 bxc6 …xb3 or 36 Èe2 cxb5) 36...g3! and now:
a) 37 cxb7 d4 38 †e2 †h3+ 39 ‡e1 dxc3 (£ 40...†h1#) 40 †xe4 (40 †c4+ ƒf7 or 40 ‡d1 ƒh5) 40...gxf2+ 41 ‡xf2 †g3+ 42 ‡f1 ƒb5+! 43 axb5 …f8+ and mates.
b) 37 c7 d4! 38 cxb8† …xb8 and White is lost despite his extra …, viz. 39 †xe4? †xf2#, or 39 †e2 †h3+ 40 ‡e1 dxc3 etc.
c) 37 Ècxd5 …f7 38 c7 …c8 (£...†h3+) 39 ‡g2 gxf2.
d) 37 Èe2 d4! 38 Èxd4 (38 Èxg3? †h3+ and 39...dxe3) is the best defence but Black seems to win by 38...†h3+, viz. 39 ‡e2 (If 39 ‡g1? †h2+ 40 ‡f1 g2+ 41 ‡e2 ƒh5+ 42 ‡d2 ƒf4 or 39 ‡e1 gxf2+ 40 †xf2 …xb4 41 …xb4 …xb4 42 …xb4 ƒg3‰) 39...†h5+ 40 ‡d2 (40 ‡e1 g2) 40...…xb4 41 …xb4 …xb4 44 …xb4 ƒf4‰. 36 Èe2?
Konstantinopolsky wrote that “36 †xf4 (not 36 b6? g2+) 36...gxf4 37 fxg3 f3 (£...…h7) leads to defeat for White” but unfortunately he published no further analysis to justify that view. The exchange of †s was a better defence than the two players thought. The critical line goes 38 g4! (38 bxc6?! …h7! 39 Ècxd5 ƒd4! threatens mate, and if 40 ‡e1 …h1+ 41 ‡d2 …h2+ 42 ‡e1 f2+ 43 ‡f1 …h1+ 44 ‡e2 ƒh5+
Game 22: Dubinin-Konstantinopolsky 113 45 ‡d2 ƒd1‰) 38...…h7 39 ‡f2!
which, even if it fails, is much better than the game continuation, which loses by force.
Black only draws by ƒ checks (39... ƒd4+ 40 ‡g3 ƒe5+), but 39...…h2+! 40 ‡e3 f2 seems just good enough to win, e.g. 41 b6 ƒg7 42 Èa6!? d4+ 43 ‡xe4 …h3 and 44 Èxb8? fails to 44...…e3+ 45 ‡f4 …e1‰ (analysis with Junior7). There are many other possibilities for both sides, but the massed black forces are strong (especially with the white ‡ so exposed), whereas White’s queenside play seems a bit too slow.
36...g2+! 37 ‡xg2 †h2+ 38 ‡f1 …h7 (D) 38...†h1+? 39 Èg1 ƒh2 40 †h3!.
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9-+-+NzP-wq0
9+R+-+K+-0
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39 Èg1!“The inventive analyst P.Dubinin, in this difficult situation, found a remarkable counter-chance. The main point is to prepare the diversion sacrifice of the … at move 43. However, Black met the challenge and found on the board a hidden and paradoxical combinational resource leading to a mating finale.”
39...†h1 40 Èxc6 ƒf4 41 †d4
41 Èxb8 also fails: 41...ƒxe3 42 …xe3 …h2 (or 42...d4) and if 43 …g3 e3! 44 …b2 (44 …xe3? †g2+ or 44 fxe3 †e4 or 44 …xg5+ ‡f8) 44...exf2+ 45 …xf2 …xf2 46 ‡xf2 †h2+ 47 …g2 †xb8‰. 41...…h2! Threatening 42...†g2+ 43 ‡e2 ƒh5+. 42 Èe7+ ‡h7 43 …h3+
If 43 Èg6 to block the ƒ, then 43...†g2+ 44 ‡e2 †g4+ 45 ‡f1 ƒxg6 46 fxg6+ ‡xg6‰ £...e3.
43...…xh3 44 †xd5?!
This permits a quick finish but evidently Dubinin wished to set a final trap rather than “go quietly”. Objectively best was 44 Èxd5, but it’s obviously hopeless after 44... ƒc6!, clearing the back rank for the b8-… to prevent †h8+, so that the ‡ can escape up the h-file and Black can consolidate his extra ….
44...ƒh5!
Black parries the mate threat on g8.
45 †d7
Apparently threatening a dangerous discovered check, but...
45...†xg1+! 0–1
In fact, two moves force mate. a) After 45...†xg1+ 46 ‡xg1 ƒf3 there are several variations, but the black ‡ always escapes the checks, e.g. 47 Èc8+ ‡h6! 48 †e6+ ‡h5 49 †e8+ ‡g4 or 47 Èg8+ ‡h8! 48 †d4+ ‡xg8 49 †d5+ ‡f8 or 47 Èd5+ ‡h8! or 47 Èg6+ ‡h6!.
b) Unfortunately there is a “cook” as 45...ƒf3 also wins, and after the checks finish Black can choose between ...†xg1+, ...…h1# and ...†g2+, ...†xg1#.