Efecto del tamaño de grano

The findings for this dissertation are useful to provide insights into how the federally funded Choice Neighborhood and Promise Neighborhood initiatives, which seek to target both community and academic development, could be carried out in a better fashion. The implications for policy and practice are as follows.

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HUD must acknowledge and address the barriers related to creating mixed income communities

Creating mixed income communities is a difficult undertaking. HOPE VI, in many communities, suffered from several key consequences. The first was that attractive mixed-income residential communities steadily raised real estate values (Brazley & Gilderbloom, 2007; Popkin et al, 2004) leading to gentrification. Second, in many other cases, homes priced at market value were undersold and remained vacant. Another key element to consider for mixed income developments is that neighborhoods with a low tax base (such as areas with housing projects), also offer low levels of amenities. When individuals or families consider spending upwards of $500,000 (which is the price of housing in some mixed-income developments), the city’s delivery of services must also include: safety, convenient transportation, quality schools (public and private), access to consumption (luxury goods) and leisure (entertainment, theatre). Finally, while reports indicate that desegregation in the last three decades has declined, it resulted from blacks steadily integrating into communities which were once off limits. Essentially, whites are less likely to move to communities where the residents are predominately black. These issues pose a serious hardship for the development and success of the HOPE VI projects.

HUD must establish a definition for mixed-income communities.

Eleven years following the implementation of HOPE VI, HUD (2003, p. 3) announced that “in practice, there is no single formula, or standard definition of mixed- income housing.” To date, there is no regulated percentage of housing that must be reserved for low income occupants. In each HOPE VI location across the country it is left

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to public housing officials, developers and planners to determine a healthy and sustainable mix. Without parameters for a reasonable and sustainable mix, no method of accountability is possible nor does not it protect or ensure that low-income families would receive a suitable number of housing units.

Public housing revitalization must plan for housing shortages

As National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), President Sheila Crowley pointed out, “HOPE VI doesn't solve the critical housing problems of the very poor and exacerbates them by making fewer units accessible” (cited in Pitkoff, 1999). With fewer units available coupled with higher real estate prices, the lowest income families were forced to transition to new neighborhoods. It is important to note that in some cases families became homeless during this transition.

To attract families to revitalized neighborhoods, school performance must be considered The premise of this research is based on the fact that public school enrollment is typically organized by neighborhood boundaries (also known as ‘neighborhood schools’). These boundaries inextricably link public schools and neighborhoods. In order to create true and balanced mixed income developments, the sites must provide access to quality schools. Families with children buy homes with an eye to school quality. The social fabric of a community is as important as the physical environment.

Public school officials must embrace marketing and rebranding to promote the positive qualities while combating the negative perception of urban public schools.

Urban public schools are often perceived to be undesirable by middle income and high income families. Public confidence in public schools has dropped considerably in

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the last 30 years (Carr, 2007). Well performing urban public schools (e.g., those with high test scores, where safety is not an issue and students go on to attend college) do not catch the public attention. In some cases, public schools outperform their neighboring charter schools. Yet, charter schools have fully embraced the need to market and brand their specialized mission and objectives. Every charter school has an academic focus and is required to incorporate a high level of community engagement. While public schools offer a plethora of academic options, there is little to no concerted effort to advertise the many benefits of a public school education. Consequently, middle income parents not only avoid urban public schools, but make personal sacrifices so that their children can fully exercise school choice. Public school officials must address both the perception and reality in order to attract middle income families.

Formal and direct partnerships between public housing and public schools are essential. Philadelphia appeared to benefit from overlapping, indirect partnerships between the public school and several community groups. The various interviews representing a number of organizations were aware and could define the mission of partnering groups. Meanwhile, DC’s level of neighborhood partnerships was extremely low. Residents, board members, housing authority representatives and school officials all reported that few official community partnerships exist. The lack of both indirect and direct partnerships with the public housing authority or the identified community groups profoundly alienated the school. The literature on HOPE VI also supports that direct partnerships between public housing and public school are extremely low.

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Community service providers are effective when developed as grassroots or “insider” organizations.

Services should duplicate and continue the aims of HOPE VI (outreach and communication, career development, business development, homeownership counseling and various supportive services), while garnering buy-in from residents. Community trust is an essential element. Philadelphia service provider of Universal Companies demonstrated expertise in community development while also having a grassroots approach. In addition, specialized social services developed collective family growth.

Community and Stakeholders must have buy-in. Social integration and community development should be continuous and ongoing.

The level of community engagement was high in both Philadelphia and the District of Columbia. Community meetings with all stakeholders were constant and continuous. Yet, Philadelphia offered an example where residents were hired as members and leaders of the outreach initiative. In this case, Universal Companies served as a conduit of partnership between the housing authority and the residents. It is important to note that DC encountered a lapse in community meetings between when HOPE VI funds ended and residents actually moved in. In addition, the homeowners association was not authorized until 90% of homes were sold. This created a disjointed process.

Members on the Community Board should represent key stakeholders. Official partnerships between government agencies are essential.

Community initiatives more closely tied to HOPE VI appeared to positively influence school performance. Both HOPE VI sites neglected to create official

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partnerships between the housing authority and the local public school. Nonetheless, Philadelphia was successful in creating overlapping partnerships that sought to serve the residents of MLK while intertwining the needs of the school. Several partner organizations were highly clustered to meet the needs of families and their children, which also created support for Jackson Elementary School. In DC, the strongest evidence of partnership was the board configuration of the Capitol Gateway Resident Association. The board consists of a DCHA representative, the site management & developer representative and residents. A collective mission and vision was expressed by each member.