Efecto de la variación de la Relación de Alimentación Agua-

By contrast, ideational, social constructivist-basedexplanations of alliance ‘persistence’ do not commit to determinism, emphasising instead the notion that – rather than a common threat – member states remain allied because they perceive for themselves a common destinyor otherwise demonstrate ideological solidarity whereby member states will prefer to continue an alliance built on ‘common political values and objectives’.38 _{Giving more explanatory power to agency, these}

approaches assume that states also share a perception that they continue to hold the same or similar norms and values important, but they do not take for granted that alliances must be ‘stable’ in order that they ‘persist’. As Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh note, ‘conflict is central to the

economic structures of the states that participate within the order’ (Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh,

‘Understanding NATO’s Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory’, Global Governance, 17 [2011], pp. 81-94, p. 83).

34 _{Suh 2007, p. 110; by ‘renewal’, I mean the process by which an alliance is formally maintained through the} re-signing of the security treaty or pact by which it was originally formed between its member states. 35 _{Tim Dunne, ‘”When the shooting starts”: Atlanticism in British security strategy’, International Affairs, 80:5} (2004), pp. 893-909, p. 896.

36 _{Suh 2007, p. 186; Buzan 1991, pp. 213-217.} 37 _{McCalla 1996, pp. 455-456.}

nature and development of institutions’, and thus the role of agency in accounting for stability and

change is ‘crucial’.39

By this account, an alliance is not merely the aggregate sum of its member states’ material capabilities and assets, but also embodies their collective ideas and narratives used to ‘explain, deliberate or legitimize political action’.40 _{Koga argues that the US’s relationships with its allies are}

built partly on this basis, as ‘the United States aims not only to strengthen democratic bilateral security relations but also to expand its democratic networks between allies’.41 _{NATO’s contentious}

process of enlargement serves as a case in point. Through it, NATO sought to reinvent itself as a democratic security community that could serve as an important ‘symbolic marker [...] through which the threat of fragmentation and the return of the past might be countered’.42 _{This argument}

was advanced at every opportunity by NATO officials during enlargement, since they perceived the process as ‘related to the potential for spreading democracy’ and, in turn, democracy as essentially linked to the preservation of security between East and West and the unique organisational ‘culture’ within NATO.43

An alliance ‘identity’ built on the basis of these ideas and narratives may also play a part in its ‘persistence’. Cha, for example, raises the possibility that over time, this ‘identity’ based not only on ‘similarities in regime type, religion, or ethnicity’, but also on ‘a wide range of economic and social interactions, development of elite networks, and high levels of communication’, may

develop.44 _{Adding to this argument is Suh, who remarks on how a security alliance can even become}

‘a political practice central to state identity’:

39 _{Menon and Welsh 2011, p. 85.}

40 _{Vivien Lowndes, ‘The Institutional Approach’ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds, Theory and Methods in}

Political Science (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 60-79, p. 77. 41 _{Koga 2011, p. 13.}

42 _{Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the} Power of Identity’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 29:2 (2000), pp. 357-387, pp. 365-366. 43 _{Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, International Affairs, 80:4 (2004), pp. 687-703. P. 691.} 44 _{Victor D. Cha, ‘Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance’ in Michael H. Armacost and} Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The future of America's alliances in northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), pp. 121-139, p. 129.

45

When member states closely link their own identities to their participation in a particular institution like a security alliance, this thus makes them likelier to ‘work in favor of organizational effectiveness’ and support its continuation.46 _{This may also be evident in the internal socialisation undertaken by}

NATO in the Czech Republic and Romania, which included reaching out to academics through the Partnership for Peace Consortium, to parliamentarians through NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, and public education efforts.47

Nevertheless, these ideational arguments have also been taken to task. Walt, for example, argues that regardless of how strong the sense of community/identity might be between states, these bonds are ‘far weaker than the ties of nationalism’ and are subject to the whims of politicians who ‘still owe their careers to how well they satisfy their own electorates’.48 _{Relatedly, although}

member states might publicly state that their alliances are built upon shared values such as democracy and human rights, this may not be the case in practice. Tow and Acharya, citing New Zealand’s reluctance to participate in many USM and intelligence operations since the mid-1980s in spite of their shared cultural backgrounds, further note that ‘there is no guarantee that a period of socialisation through an alliance will necessarily lead to shared identity’.49 _{This point is buffeted by}

the accession of several Central and East European states to NATO whose own democracies were not yet consolidated, such as Albania and Romania, giving fuel to the argument that NATO’s primary objective ‘was never to maintain free-market democracies’.50

Suh also warns against the possibility that a certain identity might actually produce further

insecurity by its particular attributes (the ‘identity effect’), citing the US and ROK’s contentious

45 _{Suh 2004, pp. 151-152.} 46 _{Menon and Welsh 2011, p. 88.}

47 _{Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the “New Europe”’,}

International Organization, 59 (2005), pp. 973-1012, pp. 990-996. 48 _{Walt 1997, p. 169.}

49 _{Tow and Acharya 2007, p. 11.}

50 _{Zoltan D. Barany, ‘NATO’s Peaceful Advance’, Journal of Democracy, 15:1 (2004), pp. 63-76, p. 66.} [...] a significant portion of an alliance's activities consists of discursive practices that help constitute social reality. Allied officials and officers, for example, issue a number of statements, findings, directives, announcements, and so on, that “identify” threats and define security. The representations they produce then become a primary source for reporters, civilian analysts, scholars, and politicians, who proliferate these

representations in different forms [...] Because the institution of alliance is considered authoritative in security matters, the discourse it spawns is privileged over other discourses, becoming a preferred framework that policy makers and the public turn to in order to understand the world [...] As a result of discursive practices, the alliance discourse can achieve a hegemonic status, establishing the alliance as the natural order of things [emphasis added]. Within the hegemonic alliance discourse, the ally is seen as the natural, permanent partner [emphasis added], parting company with whom is unthinkable.

relationship with North Korea as evidence of a ‘security dilemma [...] which began as a codification in a [mutual security] treaty or a declaration, [which] [...] deepen[s] and widen[s] both amity and enmity as an intersubjective reality’.51 _{In securing themselves against a North Korean ‘threat’,}

therefore, the US and ROK governments are simultaneously defining the former as an adversary with whom there are limited means of interaction and conflict resolution, which can lead to the creation of ‘intricate webs of abiding violence and harm – webs that are sticky and resilient, ensnaring both people’s bodies and their political imagination’.52