Efectos del reconocimiento y transferencia de créditos

At this point in the chapter it is necessary to refer more explicitly than has previously been done to what might be considered the two major approaches in discourse analysis relevant to social psychology. Both approaches, whilst having a certain amount in common, come from different academic traditions and

consequently adopt distinctive epistemological positions. There are many tensions and dilemmas that come under the broad label of social constructionism. Whilst Burr (2003) argues that the division between different approaches to discourse should not be painted too sharply, it is also useful to make the differences sufficiently clear for comparison to take place. So with the caveat that not all discourse analysts fit neatly into one of these two camps, the key distinctions and debates will be discussed. Towards the end of this section the merits of a more integrated approach will be considered.

Burr (1995) provides a particularly useful means of dividing research into that which operates either at the micro or at the macro level of discourse analysis.

This basically translates as whether the focus is upon language and rhetorical devices manipulated by individuals in a specific setting (e.g., a particular conversation) or whether the emphasis is upon discourse in a much broader societal sense, related to the post-structuralist works of Foucault. So there are differences over the very topic of discourse: at the micro level discursive texts are typically transcripts of speech or written sources. In contrast, Foucauldians, to varying extents, regard discourses as external to the individual and consequently take a broad view of what might be considered textual. The implication is that anything which has meaning may be subjected to Foucauldian analysis.

At the micro level, Discursive Psychology (e.g., Potter and Wetherell, 1987, Edwards and Potter, 1992) does not merely challenge claims of naturalness and truth but is also radical in the way that it regards 6real-world’ objects. Potter and Wetherell point out that in the English language rivers and streams are distinguished on the basis of size, whereas in French the distinction is between a river that flows into the sea (fleuve) and one that does not (riviere). Their example

shows that the partitioning of river and stream, fleuve and riviere, is a discursive move - water does not come pre-labelled. They argue that cross-cultural studies can be useful because they serve as a constant reminder that things could be constructed differently.

When Discursive Psychologists speak of a constructed world, they refer to far more than just constructed political, ideological or social categories. In

Discursive Psychology, materiality has no pre-given meaning until it is

constructed (or to put it another way, all meaning comes abbut through discourse).

There are many alternative ways in which to conceptualise the water that forms the basis of Potter and Wetherell’s example. The water is treated as a

homogeneous whole, rather than chemically or sub-atomically. So there are no aspects of talk that are off-limits to the Discursive Psychologist suggesting that this form of analysis could be a powerful analytical approach. This strong anti- essentialism is a dominant feature of social constructionism and allows all truths, even ‘real-world’ claims, to be deconstructed. The relativism of discursive psychology strongly rejects that anything has an essential nature - language does not reflect, it constructs. Although critical of taken-for-granted knowledge, Foucauldian Discourse Analysts are typically less extreme in their relativism and to varying degrees accept certain elements as ‘real’ (for example the material conditions required to (re)produce discourses). This epistemological tension is one of the major differentiating factors between discourse analytic approaches. To illustrate better how these concerns might inform discourse analytic research, it is perhaps useful to consider some examples firstly from Discursive Psychology before turning to the Foucauldian approach. In each case there are particular analytical concerns and objects of deconstruction that help to suggest where some of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach might lie.

Disavowal of ‘reality’ is an extremely anti-cognitivist manoeuvre (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) yet it is not just a matter for epistemological debate.

Edwards and Potter (1992) demonstrate that discursive psychologists are able to conduct analysis and make comment where cognitivism would be unable to advance. To illustrate this assertion, Edwards and Potter refer to Neisser’s (1981) study of John Dean’s Watergate testimony. The study is seen as part of a shift in cognitivist research from lab-based experimental work towards a more

‘ecologically valid’ style (i.e. this is a naturally-occurring event that Neisser has

not manipulated). Both Dean’s testimony and the transcripts of the original conversations between Dean and Nixon were available. Neisser’s design used the transcript as a kind of experimental control against which Dean’s testimony can be checked. Edwards and Potter argue that this design requires ‘truth’ in the form of the transcript: without this Neisser could not have proceeded.

One of the major concerns of Discursive Psychology is the function(s) that certain utterances perform. Individuals are seen as highly active in the way that they use language to certain effects. Neisser (1981) does not attend to the functions of the text (i.e., Dean could be implicated in the scandal). Cognitivists certainly recognise that people might lie through self-interest but not only do they not study it, cognitivist experiments are typically designed to exclude it (Edwards and Potter, 1992). Dean’s construction of himself as honest, having a good memory and being awestruck by Nixon suggests that his testimony was not a window on his cognitive processes but instead part of an activity sequence.

Therefore, Edwards and Potter propose, efforts to remember become indistinguishable from modes of accounting.

In another political scandal, Edwards and Potter (1992) describe Nigel Lawson’s (Chancellor of the Exchequer between June 1983 and October 1989) attempts to deny having briefed journalists off the record about a controversial new policy. Unlike Watergate, there are no tape recordings, only the journalists’

shorthand notes. These take on a variable status that is alternatively talked up and down as a source of ‘truth’. The press construct the consensus of journalists as strengthening their version of events. However, this account was undermined by Lawson who argued that the journalists colluded to produce a fictitious story (proved by their unanimity). The Chancellor manages his version of events in terms of the journalists’ stake (i.e., their need to file a good story), which lends credibility to his story. Edwards and Potter see this as a version of ‘they would say that, wouldn’t they?’ (attributed to Mandy Rice-Davies by Edwards and Potter,

1992, p. 117) which challenges a competing account on the grounds of its interests rather than its factuality.

Discursive psychology is very much grounded in the texts (either written or spoken) of individuals. The micro level analysis of the rhetorical moves and strategies employed seeks to understand how one individual tries to bring off their account of reality over competing accounts. Edwards and Potter (1992) in

particular offer an extensive range of rhetorical devices that may be identified in texts. This carries with it the concept of speakers who are very actively engaged in producing their texts or utterances. Yet, at the same time, Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Edwards and Potter (1992) stress that discursive psychologists do not attribute intentionality to speakers. In other words they do not try to theorise whether the use of language is consciously strategic (or even whether its effects are anticipated) but just that it does have effects, intended or otherwise. In some respects, this does seem to shield analysts from speaker complaints (‘That wasn’t what I meant! ’) and avoids a seemingly irresolvable argument over who has access to what was ‘really’ meant. Yet, at the same time, it is difficult to read the re-analysis of Watergate without some implication of intentionality on the part of the John Dean. Madill and Doherty (1994) similarly feel that the view of speakers strategically using language does not sit easily with a blanket refusal to theorise intent.

The strongly post-structuralist Foucauldian Discourse Analytic approach operates well beyond the boundaries of individuals or specific conversations and instances. Not only is less emphasis placed upon the individual, but the individual versus society dichotomy (so central to social psychology and Western thought) is not itself above criticism. So rather than language use being strategic, for the advancement of individuals, Parker (1992) suggests language is structured to mirror existing power relations. In common with Discursive Psychology, discourses are not seen as merely descriptive, but as categorising the world and bringing into sight objects (even if they are not ‘real’). Indeed once something enters discourse it becomes difficult to refer to as anything but real, and herein is the problem of essentialism. An implication of this is that it becomes difficult to imagine or articulate alternative ways of being.

The apparent paradox is that discourse analytic research occurs ‘as you take your first step away from language’ (Parker, 1992, p. xi). It is difficult to imagine academic papers (and indeed normal life) without language, but what Parker suggests is that language be treated critically: just because we operate within it does not mean we cannot subject it to scrutiny. So Foucauldian

approaches share with Discursive Psychology a similar scepticism of truth claims.

Parker (1992), following Foucault, regards discourses as having history. Certain discourses fall into disuse and other new discourses emerge. Thus it is possible to

trace these histories in a genealogical fashion. Although there are no means of predicting what discourses might surface in the future, some analysts in the Foucauldian tradition suggest ways in which discourses might become less oppressive (e.g. Willig 1998).

Foucauldian discourse analysis has been controversial partly because it can be seen as suggesting an inescapable system of power. If discourse controls the way objects are thought and spoken about, and our very subjectivity is the result of discourses, then there appears to be no exit from the ‘seamless web’

(Burman, 1983, p. 34). Parker (1992) argues that such an accusation is heavily loaded against discourse analysis and suggests a number of ways in which

discourse analytic research can be useful and liberating. He suggests that a critical distance from discourse may be sufficient to set aside certain assumptions. From this point, any description of the discourse or attempt to educate or suggest alternative discourses is action research. Thus discourse analysis should not be seen as merely a post-modern intellectual pursuit, but as political research with the potential for ‘real world’ effects.

The Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis particularly avoids assuming individual culpability for social practices. Notions of intentionality and what might constitute an accidental slip or mistake are problematic for many discourse analysts (such terms imply an inner reality that is somehow more authentic than the speech act). However those subscribing to a macro view of discourses see individuals as sometimes producing utterances with connotations of which they were unaware. The person is not seen as exercising full control over the discourses they speak (or, to put it in more Foucauldian terms, the discourses that speak them) and thus has not necessarily failed to be a good person when they employ oppressive discourses. They may not even like the discourses they have employed (or, when they are spoken by discourses they may be positioned in ways they might often resist). This is useful in the sense that discourse analysis need not be heavily and oppressively judgemental. It also acknowledges that more desirable and liberating discourses are not always available. However, although discourses may have effects independent of a speaker’s intentions this does not mean that when theorising subjectivity intentionality must necessarily be ignored.

Parker (1992) is clear that replacing what goes on in the head of a discourse user

with a void or ‘black box’ is not particularly helpful and may invite cognitivism back into discourse analysis.

Burr (1995) argues that the positioning of ourselves and other people within any given conversation may be seen as having effects beyond that specific interaction. Power relations are played out within even the most trivial seeming conversations. As Burr points out, the belief that language does matter is also found in feminist research where (sexist) language is implicated in women’s oppression. This has a particular significance for any research into sexual or gender identities, not just in terms of using appropriate language for conducting research, but ,also in accounting for how satisfactory identities are constructed.

Walkerdine (1981) provides a useful example of macro level discourses at work where, due to their age, the speakers are probably not fully aware of the discourses they are drawing upon. This of course does conflate naivety and innocence with childhood. Although there is always the potential for this to be problematic, Walkerdine’s example is helpful in providing an account of the power of macro discourses without assuming the speakers to be skilled manipulators (consciously or otherwise).

A nursery teacher is admonishing two four-year-old boys when they start swearing. In the exchange, the boys briefly seize control of the situation by locating themselves and their teacher in a discourse of sexuality where she is rendered as a sex object. Walkerdine suggests that the teacher’s lack of resistance and ineffective response is the result of a pedagogical discourse in which, as teacher, free expression is something she must encourage. Neither the two boys nor the teacher are authors of the discourses in which they are positioned; rather their speech is a ‘tissue of quotations’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 146).

Burr (1995) argues that these discourses construct the two boys’ and the teacher’s subjectivity and how they experience themselves. As with discursive psychology there is an avoidance of cognitivist understandings of personality and fixed notions of traits and roles are rejected. Although they see the person as the basic unit of society, Harré and Van Langenhove (1991) argue that the concept of roles is too static and that positioning offers a more dynamic alternative. Their approach is broadly in line with post-structuralist theory as it seeks to avoid essentialising the self. Harré and Van Langenhove see positioning as largely taking place within what they regard as the most basic element of the social realm,

the conversation. As such, it is not just the epistemology that makes positioning theory attractive to discourse analysts but also its topic. Furthermore, it is possible to regard positioning in both micro and macro terms.

Davies and Harré (1990) argue that positioning is a discursive practice that generates subjectivity, so rather than merely being a rhetorical move it also forms part of the psychology of the self. They suggest an interrelationship between positioning and illocutionary force, where the social meaning of an utterance depends upon the speaker’s position (which in itself is a product of social forces).

Davies and Harré agree with the post-structuralist assertion that discourse is constitutive, but see this in terms of the provision of subject positions rather than being an entirely deterministic or what Danziger (1997) sees as ‘dark’ social constructionism. Whilst we might wish to avoid loaded terms like ‘dark’ and Tight’, and the assumption that individual agency equals desirable social change, Davies and Harré reject any heavily deterministic model and see agency in terms of the uptake of positions.

Although the individual is seen as neither passive nor fixed, once constituted they come to see the world from a particular position (with all the associated images, metaphors and stories). Positions are made available in the person’s own (and other speaker’s) discourse, and so an individual’s position may shift around during conversation. Harré and Van Langenhove see positioning as the ‘discursive construction of personal stories that make another person’s actions intelligible’ (p. 395) and so positioning at any given time has implications for how an utterance may be heard.

There is much to recommend both the Discursive and Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis since they offer an anti-essentialist critique of cognitivist social psychology. Whereas cognitivists conceptualise language as a more or less transparent means of accessing underlying cognitions, discourse analysts see language as where the actual business of sense making and attribution take place (Edwards and Potter, 1992). So it is important to see discourse analysis as not just a turn to language (cognitivists can and do study language) but rather a radical refocusing of topic onto the functions of language and power systems embedded in it.