Información sobre los límites territoriales de los municipios y su población 42

So far I have been concerned with laying some foundations in theories of subjectivity in Freud and Lacan and in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari so as to establish a working base for developing a Deleuze inspired differential desiring practice. Taking the schizoid weave further and expanding it into a schizoid constellation, I probed into the promises of a desiring practice inspired by Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari in exploring multiple aspects of the schizoanalytic machine. In this second part of the thesis I now turn to interrogating the process of enacting desiring practice, building on but moving beyond my explorations in the frame of the schizoid constellation in Deleuze-Guattari. Hence while in the previous chapters I focused on theories of subjectivity and questions of representation, I now draw on Deleuze‟s works which explore in particular processes of actualization and temporality relevant to becoming. This involves repositioning my project to the differential. In this process I shall develop some principles of desiring practice such as the enactment of the event¹ as originary instance of becoming. Central

1 Sasso (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 138-52) follows the evolution of the notion of event (and pure event) through Deleuze‟s oeuvre, in philosophical and literary terms which affords a decisively different perspective on my project in that it demonstrates the inter-relations between their philosophical and literary deployment and the particular literary aspects and modes of event (and pure event): from Deleuze‟s early work on Hume, Nietzsche, Proust and Bergson to Difference and repetition, The logic of sense, the later treatise on Proust and The fold as well as Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus and What is philosophy?. Sasso takes note of other literary sources of Deleuze‟s understanding of event (and pure event) such as Blanchot, L‟espace littéraire; Bousquet Traduit de silence and Les capitales; Péguy Clio, and another important philosophical source, Bréhier La théorie des incorporels dans l‟ancien stoicisme (p. 153). The notion of event (and pure event) connects to haecceity (momentary subjectivity), singularity (pointlike subject), meeting point and fulguration and thus draws multiple strands of Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s recasting of ontology together. Sasso summarizes the main features thus: „Not that what happens (in the sense of accident), but the eternal and ineffectual part of all what happens;

impassible entity always already happened as well as still to come, which subdivides itself incessantly into multiple singular events, and reunites them into one and only Event; to confront it in all that happens to us, and to be worthy of it, constitutes morality‟ [„Non pas ce qui arrive (l‟accident), mais la part éternelle et ineffectuable de tout ce qui arrive, entité impassible toujours déjà advenue, aussi bien qu‟encore à venir, se subdivisant sans cesse en de multiples événements singuliers, et les réunissant en un seul et meme Événement; l‟affronter dans tout ce qui nous arrive, et en être digne, constitue la morale‟]

(p. 138). Not all of the features of this central notion can here be followed, I focus on two points Sasso makes: (1) the event is „the paradoxical instance‟ [„l‟instance paradoxale‟] where „all events

communicate and are distributed, the Unique event of which all the others are fragments and pieces‟

[„tous les événements communiquent et se distribuent, l‟Unique événement dont tous les autres sont les fragments et les lambeaux‟], quoting from The logic of sense (1969, p. 72) (Sasso 2004, p. 142). (2) „The event […] is in that what happens as the pure expressed which gives us a sign and expects us‟

[„L‟événement […] est dans ce qui arrive le pur exprimé qui nous fait signe et nous attend‟], quoting from The logic of sense (1969, p. 175) (Sasso 2004, p. 145). In his critique Sasso proposes that the event as actualization of the virtual of Difference and repetition re-appears as fulguration ‒ under the name of dark precursor and the disparate ‒ in Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus which then leads to the notions of line of flight and fold in Deleuze‟s The fold (Sasso 2004, p. 148). Sasso discerns a double dimension of the event, an ontological dimension (in that the event captures incessant difference and

117 to my perspective will be the major shift in Deleuze‟s image of thought, from

subjectivity and individuation to haecceities and multiplicities as foreshadowed in the previous chapters, and how this impacts on the writing and reading strategies of literary practice.

The aims of the chapter

Exploring the process of the enactment of desiring practice reflects back on Deleuze-Guattari‟s initial notions of desiring practice in the schizoid weave and the schizoid constellation such as desiring-machines, an anoedipal unconscious and assemblages of desire. I now set these notions into the context of Deleuze‟s innovative image of thought of difference and repetition. One of the aims of this chapter is thus to examine the potential of differential aspects of desiring practice, how they maintain the schizoid modes, yet further affirm their positivity, productivity and creativity. This involves, as a further aim of the chapter, anchoring both the processes of enactment of desiring

practice and actualization of the event in Deleuze‟s shifted time concepts. These

concepts constitute the link to Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding of becoming. My third aim to be pursued in this chapter is, as a consequence of exploring the link between different/ciation, time and becoming, a re-appraisal of the process of becoming in its different instantiations: as Body without Organs and „spider‟s web‟ („toile d‟araignée‟) (Deleuze 2000, pp. 170-82; pp. 181-2)² of affectivity; as degrees of hallucinated

corporeal transformations (into animal-child-woman-molecule); and as always different instantiations of the literary machine (Kafka-machine, Proust-machine).

Differential aspects of desiring practice

The three inter-related Deleuzian notions of event („meeting point‟), haecceities (pointlike „subjects‟) and becoming (process and trajectory), as principles of enacting

becoming) and an ethical dimension (in that one has to measure up to the event to become a free (and genuine) subject through the counter-actualization of the event (p. 149). Cf. also Zourabichvili / Sauvagnargues / Marrati (2005). Zourabichvili presents Deleuze‟s throught as a philosophy of the event (an aspect which is further explored by Laporte (2005)); Sauvagnargues examines Deleuze‟s artistic principle(s) and Marrati focuses on Deleuze film philosophy.

2 The process of becoming in its different instantiations presents itself: (1) as Body without Organs (in various stages of imperfection); (2) as models of affectivity where becoming is the trajectory; (3) as degrees of hallucinated corporeal transformations (in form of simulacra); and in particular, (4) as literary machine(s) in always different forms.

118 desiring practice, can be put into perspective when drawing on Difference and repetition (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 164-213; pp. 174 seq. and p. 207)³ and The logic of sense (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 169-75; pp. 241-9; pp. 86-94).⁴ The notion of event allows access to the process of enactment conceived as event, while the notion of haecceities (for instance, Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 287-92)⁵ opens an understanding of transitory

subjectification in the stages of becoming; and the process of becoming can be doubly theorized as process and impermanent „goal‟ of desiring practice.⁶ For Deleuze and

3 Cf. Chapter III „The image of thought‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 164-213; esp. pp. 174 seq. and p. 207) which provides a summary of the eight postulates of the dogmatic image of thought.

4 Cf. in order of relevance for the question under consideration: „Twenty-first series of the event‟

(Deleuze 2004c, pp. 169-75); „Thirtieth series of the phantasm‟ (pp. 241-9); „Twelfth series of the paradox‟ (pp. 86-94).

5 I have pointed out in chapter one that the term haecceity takes a specific position in Plateau 10 in the sub-section titled „Memories of a haecceity,‟ „Plateau 10: 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 287-92) and refers to a specific type of

„individuation‟ inter-dependent with event and becoming. To return to Sauvagnargues‟ article (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2003, pp. 171-80), several points are noteworthy: (1) drawing on Dialogues (1977; 2nd edn 1996, p. 111) haecceity circumscribes an „individuation‟ which is not related to either subject or object, and drawing on The logic of sense (1969, pp. 124-5) serves to determine a transcendental impersonal and pre-individudal field (Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 172); (2) drawing again on Dialogues (1977; 2nd edn 1996, p. 111) haecceities instantiate as degrees of force [puissance] to which corresponds a power [pouvoir] to affect and to be affected, that is active or passive affects, or intensities (Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 173); (3) drawing on a range of sources (Deleuze‟s work on Spinoza, Difference and repetition, The logic of sense and Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus and What is philosophy?) the term now draws together (at least) three „folds‟, namely event and becoming, affectivity and intensity, and singularity and multiplicity (Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 174). Sauvagnargues views the term as theoretically completed in A thousand plateaus („Critique‟, pp. 175-80). In contrast and complementing Sauvagnargues‟ approach, Zourabichvili (2003) subsumes the notion of haecceity under several entries, among them event („Evénement‟, pp. 36-40) anchored in The logic of sense and A thousand plateaus, and becoming („Devenir‟, pp. 29-30) anchored in Anti-Oedipus, Kafka: Toward a minor literature and A thousand plateaus. The event

encompasses the double-mouvement of actualization and counter-actualization and creates the moment of instantiation (of „individuals‟ and of „things‟) (pp. 36-8). Zourabichvili draws a parallel to Heidegger‟s Ereignis (p. 39) in its double-articulation of event and appropriation. As I have pointed out earlier (chapter one), Zourabichvili aligns haecceity with assemblage(s) of desire and multiplicities as well as the virtual (aïon). He also proposes the idea of a „hierarchy of becoming(s)‟ in Kafka and A thousand

plateaus (p. 30-1). Cf. Deleuze‟s work on Spinoza (1988b/1970, 2005b/1968) is ever-present, for instance, as pointed out earlier, Deleuze-Guattari draw on Spinoza‟s Ethics (trans. Boyle, 1967; trans.

Shirley, 1991), „the great book of the Body without Organs‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 170), for their double-pronged theory of fabrication-production of the Body without Organs. Deleuze‟s early work on Spinoza and the later critical-clinical (as well as to Deleuze-Guattari‟s What is philosophy?) serve as foundation for the (multiple) readings of affect (and „passion(s)‟). See Garrett ((ed.) 1996) and Nadler „The geometric method‟ (2006, pp. 35-51) and „The passions‟ (2006, pp. 190-212) where affects are classified according to the changes in an individual‟s power (or conatus), active and passive affects (i.e. joy and sadness) are differentiated and desire (together with joy and sadness) are presented as the three primary affects in Spinoza‟s thought. (pp. 202-8). See also Deleuze (1988b/1970, pp. 48-51 on

„Affections‟ and „Affect‟); Deleuze (1988b/1970, pp. 97-104 on „Power‟ and „conatus‟); Deleuze (2005b/1968, pp. 217-34: „What can a body do?‟).

6 The process of becoming and the „goal‟ (or trajectory) are inseparable in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari as is desiring-production and affectivity (as „product‟). Early responses to this problematic of folding of process and product are: Ansell Pearson ((ed.) 1997); 1999) and Antonioli (1999). Early studies are directed at the impact of Nietzsche on Deleuze‟s work. Khalfa (ed.) n.d [2000] presents Simont (pp. 26-49) on intensity and encounter; Khalfa (pp. 64-82) on impersonal consciousness; Bryden (pp. 105-13) on Anglo-American literature, esp. Melville; Bogue (pp. 114-32) on Kafka („minority / territory / music‟);

119 Deleuze-Guattari, ontological questions around the notions of event, haecceity and becoming take on a different slant in that they are not oriented toward enquiry and discovery of ways of being but rather aim at processes without existant terminology, thus the need arises for creating new concepts (or reviving old concepts). Within Deleuze‟s frame of argument in Difference and repetition on the necessity of a new image of thought ‒ or even the absence of an image of thought ‒ he concludes (Deleuze, chapter III „The image of thought‟, 2004b, pp. 164-213) with the following provocative statement and final question:

Together they (the eight postulates) form the dogmatic image of thought. They crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommencement. The thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but / engendered in its genitality, is a thought without image. But what is such a thought, and how does it operate in the world? (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 207-8).

Notions such as virtuality / potentiality, actuality, becoming, folding, intensities, multiplicities and the all-encompassing plane of immanence,⁷ need to be understood as

and Imbert (pp. 133-48) on Deleuze between Carroll and Francis Bacon (from The logic of sense to The logic of sensation) with the aim to reconsider empiricism as unhinged. In early collection on Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari) no specific aesthetic orientation can be detected.

7 Since not all notions can here be followed in detail, I focus on the double-term of actual-virtual. The appendix to Deleuze and Parnet (2006) points to an earlier draft related to Deleuze‟s work on Cinema 2:

The movement-image. I follow here the evolution and critique of the double-term by Sauvagnargues (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 22-9). Sauvagnargues dates the term back to Deleuze‟s work on Bergson and his article on structuralism. „[T]hey [ontological categories] possess the same reality, but exclude each other. The actual designates the material and present state of things. The virtual the incorporeal, past and ideal event. Their exchange translates the dynamics of becoming as differenciation and creation‟ [„[E]lles [catégories ontologiques] possèdent la même réalité, mais sont exclusives l‟une de l‟autre. L‟actuel désigne l‟état de choses matérial et présent. Le virtuel, l„évenément incorporel, passé, idéel. Leur échange traduit la dynamique du devenir comme différenciation et création‟] (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 22). The virtual is the pure past as proposed by Deleuze in Différence et répétition (1968, pp.

134-5; p. 22) and „the subjective, or the duration, […] is the virtual in the sense that it actualizes itself, is in the process of actualizing, inseparable from the mouvement of its actualization‟ [„le subjectif, ou la durée, […] c‟est le virtuel en tant qu‟il s‟actualise, en train de s‟actualiser, inséparable du mouvement de son actualisation‟], quoting from Deleuze Le bergsonisme (1966, p. 36) (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 23).

Sauvagnargues also points out that Deleuze views the process of actual-virtual executed in Proust‟s Search (cf. Le bergsonisme (1966, p. 99); Différence et répétition (1968, p. 269)). Further, „[T]he virtual is “Idea”, “real without being actual, differentiated without being differenciated, complete without being whole”‟ [„Le virtuel est “Idée”, “réelle sans être actuelle, différentiée sans être différenciée, complète sans être entière”‟], quoting from Deleuze Différence et répétition (1968, p. 276) (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 24). These early statements evolve in The logic of sense („incorporeal‟, „pure event‟ ‒ „incorporel‟,

„évenément pur‟) and A thousand plateaus („multiplicity‟ ‒ „multiplicité‟) to What is philosophy ? (1991, p. 198) („pure event‟ or „the reality of the concept‟ ‒ „évenément pur‟ ou „la réalité du concept‟) (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 24). Sauvagnargues considers these transformations a secure path to study Deleuze‟s metaphysics (p. 24) and that the theorized relation between the virtual and the actual is the centre piece of Deleuze‟s ontology (p. 25). Cf. also an early explorative work by Alliez (2004). Laporte (2005) explores time and temporality in Deleuze in three stages which lead from an exposition of the

120 an effort to construct a thought that escapes the stranglehold of representation (of

identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 174 seq.)) and can thus be only of preliminary use. Deleuze is recasting the traditional ontological

framework; entailing major shifts in understanding language and its function in literary texts in that both language and texts are put into the service of expanding the limits of the unsaid and unsayable.⁸

Rather than assuming static being which can be explored, discovered and defined, and fixed identity which can be relied on, Deleuze‟s ontological strategies⁹ aim at the

modes of temporality („A presentation of time in Deleuze‟ [„Une présentation du temps chez Deleuze‟]; to an ontological questioning („Ontological liberation and experimentation‟ [„Affranchissement ontologique et expérimentation‟]; and then to a consideration of the crystal of time, predominantly in Deleuze‟s cinematic works („The question of falsification‟ – „The parodic paradox of eternal return‟ [„La question de la falsification‟ – „Le paradoxe parodique de l‟éternel retour‟]. Laporte proposes three temporal systems in Deleuze‟s thought on temporality, based on Bergson: (1) the three syntheses of time (as developed in Difference and repetition), (2) the two modes of time (or temporal modes) of aion and chronos (as developed in The logic of sense) and (3) the eventual modalities of the actual and the virtual, the one and the multiple (Laporte 2005, pp. 15-56). Laporte anchors the notion of the virtual in the Bergsonian three paradoxes: contemporaneity of all presents, their coexistence and pre-existence (Laporte 2005, pp. 22-3). He presents the temporal modes of aion and chronos as the two (simultaneous) aspects of the present (as two different orders of time) and thus not being equated with the (assumed) successive three dimensions of time (present, past, future) (Laporte 2005, pp. 29 seq.): „Chronos, embodied and successive, and Aion, mimed and impenetrable. The latter, “paradoxically empty time where nothing happens”, is then the time of the pure future where the present cannot pass without making appear its passage, returns and limits itself in the instantaneity of the event where finally the future and the past happen to coincide‟ [„Chronos, incarné et successif, et Aiôn, mimé et impénétrable. Ce dernier, “temps paradoxalement vide où il ne se passe rien”, est donc le temps de l‟avenir pur où le présent ne peut pas passer sans rendre compte de son passage, se retourne et se limite dans l‟instantanéité de l‟événement, où viennent finalement coïncider en lui le futur et le passé‟] (2005, p. 36). Laporte is quoting from Zourabichvili (1996/1994, p. 92) (Laporte 2005, p. 36).

8 The question is how can this be reconciled with established literary approaches? Cf. for instance, Buchanan and Marks ((eds) 2000) with the following essays approaching the „literary Deleuze‟ von various angles: Surin „“A question of an axiomatic of desires”: The Deleuzian imagination of

geoliterature‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 167-93); Murphy „Only intensities subsist: Samuel Beckett‟s Nohow On‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 229-50); EW Holland „Nizan‟s diagnosis of existentialism and the perversion of death‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 251-62); Conley „I and my Deleuze‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 263-82). See also for a contrasting view: Badiou (1995) Beckett: L‟increvable désir [The inexhaustible desire].

9 Here I am following Bergen (2008/2001) working across philosophy and literature (Deleuze, Badiou, Sartre; Genet, Bataille) who argues for naming Deleuze‟s creation of a new image of thought, an

„ontologie événementielle‟, an „ontology of the event‟ where time and difference function as the main pillars. In her concluding chapter, „L‟image de la pensée,‟ on „the image of thought‟, she draws parallels to Kant and Hegel which Deleuze might have discarded. Zourabichvili (2003) and Laporte (2005) come to comparable conclusions. Cf. also Bergen „The precariousness of being and thought in the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou‟ (Boundas (ed.), 2006, pp. 62-73); Bergen „Deleuze and the question of ontology‟ (trans. Boundas and Dyrkton, Boundas (ed.), 2009/2004, pp. 7-22). Deleuze-Guattari‟s provocative body of thought, in their collaborative work as well as their individual work, has (so far) been cast in often contradictory terms reaching from („unhinged‟, superior, transcendental) empiricism, metaphysics to ontology and geophilosophy, surely a sign of the complexity, the originality and the vast scope of their thought. J. Williams (2006) proposes transversal metaphysics (because of the many transversal connections to other philosophers); Colebrook (2005/2001) follows Deleuze‟s proposition with transcendental empiricism; Hallward (2006) evaluates Deleuze‟s thought as creationism; Zepke

121 fluidity and mobility of becoming, less a state to be determined than a movement to be followed and traced. To support such a strategy of an immediate encounter with being, Deleuze recasts all ontological observations in terms of difference. The newly created concepts such as virtuality / potentiality and actuality, becoming and folding, intensities and multiplicities are drawn into the force field of difference which sustains them.

These concepts are mutually supportive as belonging to a shared plane of immanence and being compatible within difference (understood as a process of continual becoming and unfolding). Since such a process and perpetual change cannot be halted, much less described and pinned down in meaning, other ways of detection in language and literary texts need to be sourced such as paying attention to speaking and revealing signs in symptomatic shadows, or developing methods of sensing and palpation. Such a recast ontology, founded in becoming and difference, does not direct itself at gathering

knowledge but at searching for the „Interesting, Remarkable or Important‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1996, p. 82), not in the mundane sense but in the sense of an „event‟ coming about. Thus observations of the processes in language and literary texts stretch beyond recognition and acknowledgement of familiar categories such as narrative structures of suspense or characters. Newly created concepts such as resonances (in the sense of affective responses), linkages, connections and assemblages (of desire) take precedence.

Adventurous methods such as the discursive diagram (adapted from Foucault)¹⁰ and the

(2005) speaks about ontological aesthetics with regard to the arts; Antonioli (2003) evaluates Deleuze-Guattari‟s approach as geophilosophy; Lambert (2002), being more sceptical, refers to non-philosophy;

Agamben (1999) circumvents the decision between transcendence and immanence with absolute

immanence; Lorraine (1999), comparing Deleuze and Irigaray, subsumes both under visceral philosophy;

Hayden (1998) refers to the multiple aspects with pluralist empiricism; Badiou (2000) ventures into defining Deleuze‟s thought as revival of metaphysics; Zourabichvili (1994) focuses on one dominating aspect with philosophy of the event; Alliez (2004) correspondingly heighlights yet another dominant aspect with virtual philosophy and Foucault (1972) evaluates Deleuze-Guattari‟s thought as an effort to establish a modern ethics (with specific reference to Anti-Oedipus). J Williams (2003) and Beistegui (2004), together with Laporte (2005), reframe Deleuze‟s understanding of time into an ontology. Cf. also the work of Faulkner (2006) and (2007) whose examination goes beyond the exploration of difference and repetition in establishing a link to Deleuze‟s work on Proust and time.

10 As pointed out before, Deleuze-Guattari deploy a range of notions from Foucault‟s work (regime of discourse, diagram) which attend to (always changing and contingent) power relations rather than to concepts fixing structural „sites‟ (cf. Foucault (1972 and 2009b). Deleuze also deploys the (abstract) notion of artistic graph (or diagram) in his work on Francis Bacon where the diagrammatic is seized by

10 As pointed out before, Deleuze-Guattari deploy a range of notions from Foucault‟s work (regime of discourse, diagram) which attend to (always changing and contingent) power relations rather than to concepts fixing structural „sites‟ (cf. Foucault (1972 and 2009b). Deleuze also deploys the (abstract) notion of artistic graph (or diagram) in his work on Francis Bacon where the diagrammatic is seized by