Eficacia de las políticas públicas tendientes a determinar el cumplimiento de los

Prior research that finds that some auditors are more sceptical than others (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Grenier, 2014), provides evidence to support the notion of varying

levels of scepticism. The term insufficient professional scepticism also attracts the attention of regulators (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Backof, 2014; Hurtt et al, 2013; Trompeter et al, 2013; PCAOB 2012a; CAQ 2010). Westermann et al (2014) refer to degrees of professional scepticism; and others explicitly refer to such as levels

(Harding & Trotman, 2015; Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Hurtt, 2013).

Glover & Prawitt (2014) take the notion of levels further, placing characteristics of scepticism on a continuum, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, below. Glover & Prawitt (2014) intend that the continuum will be of ex ante help (O’Donnell et al, 2015) to auditors in applying scepticism matched to assessed risks, rather than as means of assessing auditors or measuring scepticism exhibited, and to enable consistent application of scepticism by auditors and quality reviewers alike. However, the authors acknowledge that guidance material should be developed to aid application of the continuum concept in practice. The authors’ reference to a ‘Neutral’ perspective reflects regulatory intention that the auditor does not assume anything (Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Westermann et al, 2013; Hurtt, 2010); instead taking a position absent of bias (Quadackers et al, 2014; Nelson, 2009) and a purely objective approach to the evidence. As this explanation of professional scepticism is consistent with the requirements of the Auditing Standards and relatively unambiguous, Neutrality is the descriptor adopted for the purposes of this research.

Figure 2.1 A Continuum of Scepticism

SOURCE: Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.P3

Glover & Prawitt (2014) also describe a continuum of evidence assessment, indicated by the line in Figure 2.1 which links the Neutral and Presumptive Doubt areas. In Gover & Prawitt’s (2014) evidence continuum, less evidence is collected and evaluated at the Trust end of the continuum, constituting less effort, compared with more evidence at the other (Westermann et al, 2014), constituting greater effort (Peytcheva, 2014). The authors attribute a relationship between these continua to reflect perceptions of audit risk, wherein less evidence is required in low-risk scenarios that engender trust, and more evidence in high-risk scenarios that provoke distrust due to complexities, identified anomalies or inconsistent/contrary evidence (Glover & Prawitt, 2014). Failure to gather sufficient appropriate evidence aligns with insufficient professional scepticism (Beasley et al, 2001) and excessive trust (Glover & Prawitt, 2014). Accordingly, highly sceptical auditors efficiently alter their audit procedures in response to risk indicators (Carpenter and Reimers, 2013; Peytcheva, 2014), however Peytcheva (2014) highlights that it is important to recognise that increased evidence does not necessarily equate to increased evaluation

of evidence (Peytcheva 2014).

Further, Kang et al (2015) note that sceptical action requires more than sceptical judgment. That is, an appropriate response (action) to audit risk is a consequence of

utilising professional scepticism for the purpose of gathering and evaluating sufficient appropriate evidence, appropriate to the risk. Sceptical disposition, or sceptical judgment, are not, of themselves, enough to reduce audit risk. The action, or outcome, which completes the scepticism process, would involve design of appropriate audit procedures, as well as documentation of those procedures and subsequent audit judgments.

Despite Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) association of Neutrality with attitudes free of assumption (and therefore the greatest professional scepticism), they identify the entire continuum as a range of scepticism, with the professional range encompassing the entire Neutral and Presumptive Doubt areas, excluding only Complete Trust and Complete Doubt. The reasoning for the breadth of this professional range is not clear, however it is relevant that Neutrality and Presumptive Doubt are strongly represented because they are the two dominant perspectives of professional scepticism emerging from regulation and recent academic research, with no consensus as to which of the two is the most appropriate (Quadackers et al, 2014).

Whilst Glover & Prawitt’s (2014, p. P4) continuum represents “gradations” of incrementally different scepticism levels, it does not distinguish a professional range from a range of scepticism that may be exhibited by a layperson who has neither the diligence of a professional nor the complete (dis)trust of a non-sceptic. Therefore it is not possible at this time to translate differences across the continuum to measure a professional level of scepticism.

Glover & Prawitt (2014) argue that auditors should (and therefore are able to) choose the level of scepticism they exhibit, and that it is important they choose different levels across the continuum which match the circumstances of their audit tasks. For example, in situations of heightened risk, sceptical auditors would adopt a

presumptive doubt perspective (Westermann et al, 2014; Quadackers et al, 2014). This capacity for change reflects the notion of ‘state scepticism’ (Nelson, 2009; Hurtt, 2010), and Glover & Prawitt (2014, p. P4) state that auditors must maintain their “questioning mind” at all points of the continuum so that they can respond appropriately in light of ongoing risk assessments. It is not clear whether the authors are referring to questioning of the evidence required/obtained (trait scepticism) or of the thinking processes utilised to evaluate it. Further, Glover & Prawitt (2014) do not identify how an auditor’s scepticism is placed on that continuum by anyone other than the individual applying it, or by means other than that individual’s judgment: Each individual’s choice of scepticism to apply depends entirely on the individual’s assessment of risk they perceive in the circumstances (Glover & Prawitt, 2014), and such assessments may be deficient (Beasley et al, 2001), influenced by unconscious trait biases.

Further complicating the challenge of defining a cohesive professional level of scepticism, prior research (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013) observes no correlation between trait and state scepticism (Hurtt, 2013; Khan & Harding, 2013; Harding & Trotman, 2015). The authors suggest that these observations may reflect order effects in measurement, which could be addressed in further research (Harding & Trotman, 2015), but in any case the notion of some degree of independence between the factors is noted.

Consequently, a coherent measure of professional scepticism arguably must consist of a combination of both trait scepticism and its situational factor (Hurtt et al, 2013). Given the reasonably static nature of trait scepticism (Hurtt, 2010), and the more fluid, situational (Hurtt 2010; Westermann et al, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 2014) nature of scepticism skill, the level of overall scepticism may be subject to change over time and/or under differing conditions (Glover & Prawitt, 2014).