5.3.2 Potencia del motor cuando utiliza gas pobre
5.3.2.3 Eficiencia del motor
(Appendix C), instruction sheet on how to complete the set of surveys (Appendix D), and a set of surveys (i.e., one survey identical to the one subordinates completed, and one survey for each of their subordinates). Supervisors completed a survey for each of their subordinates (Appendix E). This survey included items assessing trust in each subordinate, LMX assessed from the supervisor’s perspective (SLMX), the job performance of each subordinate, OCB of each subordinate, and ORB of each subordinate. Supervisors also provided demographic information (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, job tenure, tenure with this subordinate).
169 Table 37
Summary of Survey Plan for Study Two (Field Study)
Construct Subordinate Supervisor
Dispositional Trust X X Person-Specific Trust X X LMX- 8 X X Procedural Justice X Distributive Justice X Job Performance X X
Overall Job Satisfaction X
Intention to Quit X
Organizational Commitment X
OCB X X
ORB X X
170 Chapter Nine
Results Study Two Participants
One-hundred and thirteen out of 143 (79.0%) employees in one work unit of a high tech organization completed a survey on work time. Of the total of 113, 19 were supervisors. Of those reporting on the demographic variables, 78.4% (n=87) were men, 96.3% (n=107) had earned at least a bachelor’s degree, and 58.7% (n=61) were Caucasian and 35.6% (n=37) were Asian. The average age of the participants was 36.83 years. Participants had worked for the organization an average of 8.57 years and worked with their current supervisor an average of 1.48 years. Participants worked an average of 46.88 hours per week. Due to missing data, there were a total of 103 dyads with matched surveys (i.e., both the subordinate and their supervisor completed surveys). A power analysis revealed (Table 38) that this sample size provided a power level of .80, assuming medium effect sizes to test hypotheses one through four
(Cohen, 1988). While there are no accepted methods of determining power for
complex models (i.e., testing the entire hypothesized model) using structural equation modeling, the sample size is less than the ideal of 1 0 observations per variable in the model.
Scale Scores
As in Study One, factor analyses were conducted to verify the dimensionality of the measures. These analyses resulted in the expected unidimensionality of all the scales except for the ORB scale. Based on the factor analytic results, no distinct
171 factors were found. Therefore all items in the ORB scale were collapsed into one scale. This is similar to the strategy used by Lee and Allen (2002) for the Bennet and Robinson (2000) ORB scale. Scale scores were computed for each variable by
calculating the mean of the set of items used for each scale. Therefore, all scales have a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. The exception to this procedure was the organizational retaliatory behavior scale. For this scale, the responses to each of the 19 items were summed. This results in a scale range of 19 to 133 for subordinates’ self-reports. Since supervisors’ reports of ORB could include a “Do Not Know” response, these responses were treated as missing data. Therefore, it is possible for a supervisor report of member ORB to be one (i.e., 18 “Do Not Know” responses and 1 “Never” response). The high score remained 133 for supervisor reports of member ORB.
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables examined in Study Two are contained in Table 39 for measures from the subordinates’ perspective and Table 40 for measures from the managers’ perspective. Table 41 contains correlations for matched subordinate-supervisor dyads.
The Role of Dispositional Trust
Two scales measuring dispositional trust were included in Study Two.
Estimates of internal consistency indicated that the Rotter (1967) trust in social agents factor had a reliability of .63 and the MacDonald et al. (1972) trust factor had a reliability of .78. Since internal consistency for the MacDonald scale was better, this scale was used for all analyses concerning dispositional tmst.
172 Based on the lack of a statistically significant correlation between subordinate’s
dispositional trust and subordinate’s trust in their supervisor (r = .12, p > .05) (Table 39) and between supervisor’s dispositional trust and supervisor’s trust in the
subordinate (r = .07, p > .05) (Table 40), Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Trust in a Specific Other and LMX
The correlation between trust in a specific other and LMX, from both the subordinate’s (r = .73, p < .01) and supervisor’s (r = .67, p < .01) perspectives, was very strong. Additionally, after controlling for several background variables (e.g., age, gender, length of relationship, span of control of supervisor), trust in a specific other was strongly related to LMX for subordinates (AR2 = .47, F = 99.01, p < .01) (Table 42) and supervisors (AR2 = .43, F = 79.67, p < .01) (Table 43). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported.
Distributive Justice and the Outcome Variables Using Self-Report Data
Hypothesis 3 was tested with correlation coefficients (Table 39). Subordinate reports of distributive justice were positively related to job satisfaction (r = .36, p < .01) and negatively related to intentions to quit (r = -.29, p < .01). Distributive justice was unrelated to organizational commitment, in-role performance, OCBI, OCBO, or ORB. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.
Distributive Justice and the Behavioral Outcome Variables Using Supervisory Reports Similar to the self-report data, distributive justice as reported by subordinates was not related to supervisor reports of in-role performance, OCBI, OCBO, or ORB (Table 41).
Procedural Justice and the Outcome Variables Using Self-Report Data
173
Hypothesis 4 was also tested with correlation coefficients (Table 39). Subordinates’ perceptions of procedural justice were related to organizational
commitment (r = .50, p < .01), job satisfaction (r = .40, g < .01), intention to quit (r = - .31, g < .01), and OCBO (r = .26, g < .01). Procedural justice was unrelated to in-role performance, OCBI, and ORB. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. Procedural Justice and the Behavioral Outcome Variables Using Supervisory Reports
Procedural justice as reported by subordinates was not related to supervisor reports of in-role performance, OCBI, OCBO, or ORB (Table 41).
The Interaction of Procedural and Distributive Justice and Outcomes
To test Hypothesis 5, the interaction of procedural and distributive justice on the outcome variables, hierarchical regression was used. In step one of the regression equation, a set of control variables was entered in the regression model (e.g., age, gender, tenure with the organization). In step two, procedural and distributive justice were entered into the equation predicting each outcome variable in turn. In the third step, the interaction term (i.e., procedural justice x distributive justice) was entered. If this third step was statistically significant, then two regression lines would be
developed in order to examine the specific nature of the interaction. Utilizing the self- report data from the 113 direct reports, the interaction term was not significant for any of the outcome variables in Study Two. Additionally, the interaction term was not significant when using supervisor reports of in-role performance, OCBI, OCBO, or ORB as the dependent variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
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