Eficiencia del rotor

Heidegger thus concludes that 'We are uncertain about philosophizing'.57 _{This uncertainty} must be taken as belonging to philosophy itself. Heidegger expands on this thought as follows:

Philosophy has a meaning only as a human activity. Its truth is essentially that of human Dasein. The truth of philosophising is in part rooted in the fate of Dasein. This Dasein, however, occurs in freedom. Possibility, change, and predicament are obscure. Dasein stands before possibilities it does not foresee. It is subject to a change it does not know. It constantly moves in a predicament it does not have power over. Everything that belongs to the existence of Dasein belongs just as essentially to the truth of philosophy.58

Determined to follow the implications of this re-location of the ideal of truth for philosophy, Heidegger is keen to move the investigation beyond its current operation 57 _{FCM, §6. b), α)}

at the level of 'apodictic propositions'. As such, the above statement is forwarded as being merely probable, rather than certain. However, “probability” only has meaning within an understanding of the mathematical ideal of truth as absolute certainty, i.e., as its “conceptual counterpart”.59 _{Accordingly, the uniqueness of philosophy's (and} man's) vacillation between certainty and uncertainty is only mitigated, and never expressed, in reference to probability. The ideal of truth for philosophy, then, cannot be thought to lie within the schema of certainty-probability-uncertainty. Referring to this schema as the 'illusion of apodictic propositions', which elides the ambiguous movement of philosophy by securing it as knowable according to these easily understandable (everyday) concepts, Heidegger forwards the following description of how it stands with philosophy's if we are to no longer be deluded:

Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance. It is turbulence, the turbulence into which man is spun, so as in this way alone to comprehend Dasein without delusion. Precisely because the truth of this comprehension is something ultimate and extreme, it constantly remains in the perilous neighbourhood of supreme uncertainty. No knower stands so close to the verge of error at every moment as the one who philosophizes. Whoever has not yet grasped this has never yet had any intimation of what philosophizing means.60

Without this readiness and recognition of the 'intrinsic perilousness of philosophy', Heidegger claims that no 'confrontation that is a philosophizing' can occur. The original German reads as follows.

Solange diese elementare Bereitschaft für die innere Gefährlichkeit der Philosophie fehlt, so lange wird nie eine philosophierende Auseinandersetzung geschehen.61

59 _Ibid. 60 _Ibid.

Heidegger is, here, consistent with his later reading of Auseinandersetzung, and indeed the notion of philosophy that he will espouse in the later sections of FCM, where he will claim that philosophy is only ever preparatory. In this sense what philosophy prepares for is the very possibility of a philosophical Auseinandersetzung: philosophy is a matter of readiness. But readiness for what? It is clear that in FCM philosophy is a readiness for a face to face confrontation with metaphysics. In Chapter 1, I claimed that

Auseinandersetzung, as a terminus technicus, names the movement of thinking itself. This movement was shown to take in the whole of metaphysics, as it involves a confrontation with the very “beginnings” of all thinking. This confrontation was not a matter of repudiation, but of overcoming from within. As confrontational, philosophical Auseinandersetzung is a mode of relation that does not stand fully within those beginnings, but is also not freed from them. It remains intrinsically bound to it, but also operates in the name of another beginning. In this sense, Auseinandersetzung

was taken to name the very movement of the self-becoming of thought. This is precisely the case with FCM.

On my reading, FCM is entirely engaged in a critical process of overcoming the everyday, historically pervasive “prejudices” that bind philosophy to the mathematical ideal of certainty. Heidegger himself continually indicates that this movement is aimed at generating a genuinely philosophical Auseinandersetzung. As my reading progresses through the FCM I aim to show that throughout, Heidegger unfolds a presentation of philosophy as an essentially historically rooted activity, which at the same time realises an essential freedom.62 _{Expounding upon this notion in order to show the intimate}

62 _{In this regard my interpretation of these opening sections requires a certain familiarity with the} remainder of the lecture course. The full weight and importance of these sections is perhaps only

connections between this text and the Nietzsche Lectures will bring to light the deep- rooted centrality of Auseinandersetzung with regard to Heidegger's notion of philosophy, showing that being cut to fit Nietzsche does not undermine its scope: it remains the philosophically responsible response to the contemporary situation for philosophising.

Philosophy can now be understood as a readiness for an Auseinandersetzung: a confrontation whereby the Dasein of man is thrown back into its originary state of terror and agitation in the face of its finitude. This is to say that the task of FCM as a whole is initially set out as aiming towards a confrontation with man's finitude that must, according to an essential necessity, avoid all the 'comfort and assurance' afforded by the mathematical ideal of truth as certainty. Any effort at sanitising the daunting task of philosophy will miss out on something that is essential to philosophising. Heidegger puts it as follows:

Thus man in the ground of his essence is someone in the grip of an attack, attacked by the fact 'that he is what he is', and already caught up in all comprehending questioning. Yet being comprehensively included in this way is not some blissful awe, but the struggle against the insurmountable ambiguity of all questioning and being.63

How this task is to be achieved, and indeed that it even can be achieved is yet to be determined within FCM. What remains equally as ambiguous is the relationship of this particular notion of Auseinandersetzung to the historical Auseinandersetzung that has Nietzsche at its core. It is to these questions that I now turn, via a continued graspable once their development throughout the whole of the text has been witnessed. As such my claims here will be continually developed, justified and elucidated throughout the remainder of this chapter and the following two chapters devoted to a reading of FCM.

engagement with the 'Preliminary Appraisal'.