Ejecución de la prueba T-Student

Because the government resolved the root causes of grievances being exploited by insurgents, the Huk insurgency died a natural death. With the successive Philippine administrations, however, the insurgency rose up from its tomb because the roots of the problem intensified once again.578 _{Will the Bohol, Basilan, and Sulu models work when}

used as a strategy in the whole of Mindanao? Did these models address relative deprivation and revolutionary consciousness? How does an indirect strategy anchored on the Diamond Model play in Mindanao?

As has been proven effective in Bohol, Basilan, and Sulu, any future strategy should be people-centered and anchored on an indirect approach demonstrated by McCormick’s Diamond Model. Brigadier General Richard L. Clutterbuck in the book “Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam” says, “the first reaction to guerilla warfare must be to protect and control the population.” If the target is the population and not the enemy, then a sensitive government must be able to bring to the fore the active participation and support of civilian communities. Community-based programs that integrate the minds of the stakeholders could definitely bring legitimacy in any state.579 _{The value of legitimacy is even expressed in the principles of the Philippine}

National Unification Commission (NUC) that says:

A national peace program should present a peace vision and process that is community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to Filipinos. Thus, it shall not be defined by the government alone, nor by the contending armed groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.580

Applying the principles of the Diamond Model, the strategy should begin along leg 1 and leg 2 of the model to address the underlying causes of the populations support for the insurgencies. The strategy should reflect a culture of peace (COP) framework or roadmap for the future, crafted with the involvement of stakeholders. COP is defined as

578 Leonardo I. Peña, Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007), 56.

579 _{Julio Cesar L. Benitez, “Community Practices of the Culture of Peace,” Government of the} Philippines-United Nations, Multi-Donor Programme 3, Davao City, Philippines, 2004.

“a shared way of living that promotes peace.581 _{It includes key processes, such as peace}

building, healing and reconciliation, sustainable development, good governance, and empowerment.582 _{The components include policy advocacy that builds consensus,}

community participation, and media mobilization. Community participation in the promotion of COP should be undertaken through use of community radio, integration of peace education into community-based literacy and continuing education programs, training of women as peace advocates, forums for organized religious leaders, and special education for law enforcement agents, such as the military and police.583 _{This will help to}

promote the legitimacy of the plan and contribute to its durability. This strategy should be comprehensive in addressing issues beyond COIN and include a review and possible revision of GRP policies governing Mindanao. While the heart of this indirect strategy is a non-kinetic solution, this does not preclude the government from employing its coercive instruments to prosecute the violators of peace.

Generally, the operational environment provides the basis for any given strategy. Any environment is unique in terms of the dynamics of politics, information, economy, and security as they interplay with the culture and identity of the nation. The perception of legitimacy may also differ among people of different races and regions. The manner by which people recognize as well as resolve their problems, changes relative to context or environment. As such, while the models in the Philippines had a profound effect in addressing the threats, there is no guarantee that these will work in other areas. Given this, Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu cannot be “perfect templates” to any insurgency in the world. Any strategy to be adopted in any country shall be justified by the context or operational environment. There is no one-size-fits-all model for COIN. Successful models, however, provide important lessons that could enhance the prosecution of any COIN strategy. In the final analysis, the models may provide ideas that work in Mindanao, but the government must be careful to analyze the differences in context that may require some innovations or changes in strategy. In the case of the Bohol insurgency,

581 _{Benitez, 2004.} 582 _Ibid.

success could be largely attributed to the unity of Boholanos.584 _{The case of Mindanao is}

very different. Even among tribes, there are serious schisms that could hamper unity and harmony. These issues have not been resolved. Among the Muslim threat groups, there are also serious differences in ideology. Despite efforts to project a unified Bangsamoro front, the Muslim separatist movement is very much splintered.585 _{Of late, resources are}

starting to come into Mindanao, but the filtering of benefits of reforms, development, and poverty alleviation programs will take time.

On the other hand, the Sulu and Basilan Models worked in as far as addressing the problems on a shorter term. The building of infrastructures, provision of basic services, such as water supply, health and education, and attempts to address poverty are just the necessary components of a longer-term commitment to address the roots. As long as poverty, unemployment, injustice, and marginalization remain, the seeds that breed discontent could still sprout and provide the rationale to challenge the Philippine state’s legitimacy. In Basilan and Jolo, cases of kidnapping have occurred recently. This indicates that the underlying problems have not been totally uprooted. Arguilas says that “the Philippine government should not focus on COIN.” The problems that create a perception of relative deprivation and that give rise to revolutionary consciousness are not always COIN-related. Any strategy should be comprehensive. COIN will just be a part of it.586 _{Similar to Bohol, the overall template revolved on the fight against poverty}

and, thus, insurgency-related solutions are tied to it.