What then of the current Coin debate? As the foregoing history has shown, it is possible to mount a thoroughgoing intellectual critique of classical Coin as a theory. its case- study basis draws on an extremely limited, and perhaps unrepresentative, sample of conflicts, from a very specific and peculiar set of historical circumstances, and thus may not be applicable in differing circumstances today. its social- scientific component is based on post- war thinking about devel- opment, governance, information and the nature of colonial or post- colonial societies in what was then called the ‘third World’ – thinking that is almost certainly out of date due to the effects of globalization, modern mass media, transnational proliferation, virtual sanctuaries, and so on. thus both classical Coin and its neo- classical revival have some serious intellectual limi- tations as a basis for contemporary campaigns.
one might argue that this lack of intellectual applicability does not particularly matter in any case, since neither classical nor neo- classical Coin bears much resemblance to the methods that are actually being used today in Afghanistan, or were applied in iraq. not only do these methods diverge from classical Coin, they are barely considered in the neo- classical Coin literature such as FM 3–24. thus, while one could criticize Coin as an inappropriate paradigm for today’s wars, this matters less because it is not actually being applied as such.
interestingly, however, these are not the comments one commonly hears from critics of Coin. rather, as discussed at the start of this chapter, those criticisms fall into four key areas: effectiveness, appropriateness, ethics and policy. in each debate, some key critics of Coin often seem to be criticizing strawmen of their own creation, to be radically misinformed about the nature of current operations, or to be arguing from a position of institutional self- interest rather than intellectual openness. some examples follow, but the obvious implication is that this debate misses the point about what is problematic about Coin as a theory, while equally missing the point that this Coin theory is being applied in only an extremely limited way in today’s cam- paigns. A debate that focuses narrowly on the Coin concepts of the late 1950s is therefore both distracting, and potentially very unproductive.
Key critics of Coin in the current debate include Colonel Gian Gentile, a professor at the us Military Academy at West Point, whose argument seems to be that Coin is not appropriate for modern conflicts, has had little to do with any success that was achieved in iraq, and runs the risk of undermining future us military capability for conventional war against peer adversaries.
Gentile, who served in Baghdad in 2006 during a period when AQi extended its reach and the environment was spiraling out of control, is not an impartial critic (though neither, of course, are the Coin advocates he criticizes) and he has sometimes been regarded unsympathetically, due to the extremely sharp personal animosity that he shows in many of his writings.27 However, to the extent that a consistent position can be identified, he seems to be offering a critique based on effectiveness (Coin techniques do not work), appropriateness (the us military as currently constituted and trained is incapable of executing Coin techniques, and therefore these are not appropriate for American forces), and policy (the danger that re- orienting the Army, in particu- lar, towards Coin for today’s conflicts will undermine its effectiveness in theoretical future conflicts against as- yet-unidentified adversaries).
the academic anthropology community, with some exceptions,28 has generally been extremely negative towards Coin in its neo- classical form, regarding it as a soft form of impe- rialism, as a means to the oppression of occupied peoples, as a perversion of social science research on the characteristics, incentives and culture of populations in affected areas, and (perhaps most saliently) as compromising the work of academic anthropologists, who may be mistaken for intelligence or Human terrain team operators and thus be put at risk or lose research access to communities.29 Much of this critique has been dismissed by some commenta- tors as simply anti- American or Left politics, as opposition to the invasion of iraq by the Bush administration and therefore a desire to see the occupation fail, or (perhaps more accurately) as based on misinformation about the humanitarian benefits of Coin as opposed to counter- terrorism or conventional warfare. one might also argue that the academic community is expressing a perfectly legitimate professional concern about the impact of Coin on research programmes, but that this must be balanced against bigger issues at stake in today’s conflicts. some may also see it as rather disingenuous to express such criticisms as moral or ethical con- cerns with Coin, when in fact they have more to do with academic or professional self- interest, and when the application of Coin in iraq and, to some extent, in Afghanistan has coincided with a drop in civilian casualties, so that it arguably has been a moral positive in these campaigns.
some humanitarian nGos have mounted a similar critique of the use of development meth- odologies, humanitarian spending and community stabilization initiatives in today’s conflicts, arguing that these programmes – even when undertaken by civilian government aid agencies, but even more so when done by the military – erode the humanitarian space within which nGos operate, compromise their impartiality, cause them to be identified associated with occupying forces, and put them at risk.30 these concerns are justified to some extent as a com- mentary on actual practice in the field today, but are not strictly a critique of Coin theory per se, since similar concerns exist in any stability operation or peacekeeping deployment, as well of course as in conventional war, whether or not Coin is the dominant approach used. thus this is more properly considered as an issue in nGo–military relations in general, rather than for Coin in particular. one might also argue that nGos (especially Western- led nGos focusing on social or gender issues in conflicts like Afghanistan or sudan) are in fact not impartial in any meaningful sense, and that therefore concepts such as humanitarian space have limited applica- bility in these types of conflict.
A critique by development nGos, as well as some academics and aid agencies, has argued that high rates of development assistance in Coin campaigns (including programmes like the us Army’s Commander’s emergency response Program, CerP, as well as larger- scale stabili- zation programming by aid agencies) contribute to instability, corruption and abuse (Wilder 2009). By creating streams of poorly- supervised cash income, monetizing elements of the rural subsistence economy that are not traditionally cash- based, creating incentives for exploitation
and corruption, and advantaging aid recipients over neighbouring populations who may then be driven to violence through a sense of relative deprivation, development assistance can indeed destabilize Coin environments. such assistance can also create inflationary pressure, under- mine local markets and producers, and exacerbate local dependency on outside actors. Again, however, although these criticisms are entirely valid, they are not really criticisms of Coin theory as such – similar debates and criticisms attach to the whole construct of Western develop- ment assistance generally, whether or not this happens in a Coin environment. And, in fact, the idea that development spending creates stability is actually not a generally accepted concept in classical Coin – theorists like nathan Leites and Charles Wolf were arguing a similarly scep- tical position on this issue in the early 1960s (Wolf 1965; Leites and Wolf 1970).
other critics, including the historian edward Luttwak, have mounted passionate attacks on Coin, based on the notion that it is somehow ‘malpractice’ or intellectually dishonest (Luttwak 2007). Luttwak argues that there is, in fact, a universally effective method in countering insur- gency, and this is to out- terrorize the insurgent, to so terrify and cow the population through salutary acts of violence that the insurgents can no longer gain support. to support this argu- ment he adduces the roman empire and nazi Germany as examples of successful counterinsur- gency using this method. this critique seems to be simply ill- founded in fact: roman counterinsurgency technique included very significant non- lethal, political, governance and economic development components and applied violence in ways that were in step with con- temporary norms in the ancient world, and to apply nazi approaches on the eastern Front would be to copy an army that failed dramatically, despite an initially welcoming population, to control the area under its occupation. Luttwak’s argument (advanced early in the surge period in iraq in 2007, and arguing that since the united states could never be as violent as the insur- gents, the iraq effort was doomed) turned out to be a radical misreading of the situation, which was beginning to turn significantly in the coalition’s favour even as Luttwak’s article came out, and this criticism of Coin seems to have now been thoroughly discredited by events on the ground.
ralph Peters, a retired army officer who served as a military intelligence analyst during the Cold War, has mounted a similar personal attack on some advocates of Coin, arguing in essence that Coin is not a ‘manly’ approach to warfare, that its advocates are soft, gentle, or even defeatist or treacherous in their attitude, and that Coin not only cannot work (the effec- tiveness critique) but that developing Coin capabilities undermines the military’s warlike ethos (appropriateness) in ways that will be extremely dangerous in a future all- out war against an unspecified possible future enemy (policy) (Peters 2006, 2007). Peters has argued that it would have been better to invade Afghanistan, destroy the taliban in a conventional military cam- paign, then simply leave – rather than assuming the expense and trouble of post- conflict recon- struction or counterinsurgency. He has argued that it would be cheaper and more effective to simply re- invade if the taliban or AQ were to re- establish a safe haven, rather than to occupy territory on a permanent basis. this argument makes a great deal of sense, but is perhaps imprac- tical in that it is, in fact, not proven that periodic re- invasion (on the model of colonial punitive expeditions) would in fact be cheaper or more effective than long- term stabilization, and since such a policy would in fact be in breach of international law which imposes certain obligations on an invader to administer conquered territory and protect populations within it. Moreover, given the downside risk that failure to prevent the re- emergence of a safe haven would only be noticed in retrospect following another major international terrorist attack, such a strategy would be quite risky. And, in any case, this was not the strategy adopted – so, like it or not, we are now engaged in a long- term struggle against an insurgency in Afghanistan and must seek an appropriate way out. in this sense, Peters’ critique is as useful as that of the proverbial farmer
who gives directions that begin ‘well, if i were going there, i wouldn’t start from here . . .’. And again, whatever the merits of Coin as a theory, current practice in iraq and Afghanistan does not in fact bear a particularly close resemblance to that theory, and thus such criticisms, while highly relevant to the Afghan campaign, are less relevant as critiques of Coin.
some policy critics of counterinsurgency sometimes take another view, suggesting that the acquisition of counterinsurgency capabilities by the military will make it more likely that poli- tical leaders will commit the us military to a series of far- flung, unsustainable interventions with little chance of success – in other words, that having the capability for Coin will make Coin more likely. Would that this were so – as Dr Janine Davidson has pointed out, in practice, lack of an effective doctrine for Coin and lack of key capabilities has not typically stopped mis- guided political leaders from committing to such conflicts, iraq being only the most recent case in point (Davidson 2010).
Conclusion
in summary, this chapter has examined the state of the controversial art of counterinsurgency from the standpoint of intellectual history. As this history shows, counterinsurgency in its generic format is one of the oldest and most diverse forms of conflict, having existed at least as long as the state. the specific concepts, techniques and tools used to counter insurrection have varied dramatically over time, usually reflecting the nature of the state or government involved, and in particular its relationship with the population groups residing in its territory. this means that, while there is a very large body of historical data on counter- insurrection, there is little com- monality between examples and it is difficult to pinpoint a specific set of core concepts or mainstream techniques.
By contrast, ‘big- C’ Counterinsurgency, the specific set of concepts developed by the us government- sponsored think- tank community, in the late 1950s, does embody a very definite set of ideas about how to counter insurgencies. As we have seen, however, this theory emerged through a process of reasoning by analogy from a very small number of case studies, all of which had very similar features associated with the immediate post- 1945 wars of national liberation and the decolonization of european and us empires in Asia and Africa. thus, to the extent that similar conditions obtain in any particular conflict today, these ideas (which i describe as ‘clas- sical Coin’) may be quite relevant. unfortunately, as explained earlier, modern conditions in fact vary quite significantly from the standard assumed conditions that underlie classical Coin, and thus these techniques may not be particularly applicable.
i have criticized what i call ‘neo- classical Coin’ for attempting to apply classical Coin without due attention to these differences, but in practice this is something of a hollow criti- cism, since in current campaigns in Afghanistan and iraq, the methods actually being applied (reconciliation, local irregular forces, high- intensity targeting of irreconcilables and so on) bear little resemblance to either classical Coin theory or to its neo- classical revival.
thus, it is possible to mount a reasoned critique of Coin as theory – based on limited sample size and extrapolation of general principles from too few case studies – or as practice, since it has so rarely been applied in full in the real world that there are few genuine opportunities to validate the theory. interestingly, however, this critique is rarely heard in the current debate over Coin, which is generally dominated by ill- informed commentary, or institutional interest, rather than open inquiry. For this reason, as i have argued, Coin (in its classical, 1960s sense or in its neo- classical version) is not only not the dominant paradigm for contemporary conflict, it arguably should not be: and a debate that focuses too narrowly on the applicability of a set of Cold War concepts from the late 1950s has the potential to be both distracting and destructive.
Notes
1 stephen t. Hosmer, rAnD Corporation, personal communication to the author by email, Washing- ton, DC, september 2006.
2 transcribed by the author from a plaque at the us Army John F. Kennedy special Warfare Center and school, Fort Bragg, north Carolina, during a visit in March 2010.
3 Misidentified in the symposium report (p. xi) as a member of the French Marine Corps, Galula was in fact an officer of the Colonial infantry, a branch of the French Army whose badge was, somewhat confusingly for some non- French observers, a naval anchor. in point of fact, he had actually retired from the French Army by this time, and was working as a research associate at Harvard university’s Center for international Affairs.
4 General raoul salan, last French commander in indochina and a former Commander- in-Chief in Algeria, was one of four organizers of the Algiers putsch of 1961 and went on to found the reactionary terrorist group, organization de l’Armee secrete (oAs).
5 the Algerian campaign is in fact mentioned only eight times in the book.
6 As noted earlier, although Galula was misidentified as a Marine officer he was an Army officer of the colonial infantry.
7 the following section draws partly on an updated version of portions of (Kilcullen 2006–7).
8 For examples of this pattern in resistance warfare see (Asprey 1975; Beckett 1988; Laqueur 1977; orlov 1963).
9 Discussion with Mahsud informant, northwest Frontier Province, June 2006. the informant noted that each Mahsud family has contributed one fighter to the anti- government insurgency in order ‘to protect their traditional ways’, while Waziri tribesmen have joined in a less organized but more fanati- cal manner. these patterns of behaviour are closely consistent with tribal characteristics.
10 For a discussion of these effects in relation to indonesia, see Kilcullen (2006).
11 see ‘Al Qaeda takes Media Jihad online’ at www.middle- east-online.com/english/?id=14500. 12 see us Joint Publication 1–02 which defines insurgency within a single- state, single- insurgent para-
digm, as ‘an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict’.
13 For example, see the transfer of letters between Ayman al- Zawahiri and Abu Musab al- Zarqawi (noted below), and other correspondence between AQ leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and insurgents in iraq and southeast Asia.
14 interview with Pakistan government official, north- West Frontier Province, Pakistan, June 2006. 15 For example, in July 2006 shiite militias in iraq conducted operations in sympathy with Hizballah
fighters engaged in conflict with israel, while in 2005 AQ in iraq conducted a hotel bombing in Amman, possibly in an attempt to disrupt support for coalition forces in Jordan.
16 see materials captured in the possession of Jema’ah islamiyah (Ji) operative Dr Azahari in november 2005, and the so- called ‘Camp Hudaibiya manual’ used by Ji and AsG insurgents in the Philippines, which drew on AQ source materials produced in south Asia.
17 CiA analyst, unclassified personal communication, July 2006.
18 Personal observation, taji, January 2006 and discussions with us military intelligence officers, Baghdad and Kuwait, January–February 2006.
19 i am indebted to Dr Gordon McCormick of the naval Postgraduate school, Monterey and to Colonel Derek Harvey for insights into the ‘small world, scale- free’ aspects of insurgent social networks and the enduring influence of the pre- war iraqi oligarchy on the current iraqi insurgency.
20 see McCormick et al. (2006) for comments on this discourse. 21 For a good example of this perspective, see Fall (1965).
22 Cordesman (2006) and interview with Multinational Force iraq intelligence officer, January 2006. 23 Personal observation, Baghdad, taji and Basra, February 2006.
24 interview with Pakistan Government civilian official, Khyber Agency, June 2006.
25 interview with senior iraqi government national security official, Green Zone, Baghdad, January 2006.
26 the following account is based primarily on the author’s participant observation as a member of the iraq Joint strategic Assessment team, and then as senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to Multinational Force iraq, based in Baghdad, during 2007.
27 see smallwarsjournal.com for an extensive selection of commentary by CoL Gentile. 28 For example, thomas Barfield, Montgomery McFate and Carl Philip salzmann.
29 see, for example, the report of the American Anthropology Association’s Commission on the engage-