Ejemplo

6.1.

Introduction

Having reviewed evidence on the impact of fiscal decentralization on irrigation development in northern China, this chapter evaluates the hypotheses put forth in Chapters 4 and 5 and summarizes findings to answer the two research questions posed within those chapters. To recall, this dissertation sought to answer the larger question, how has China‘s decentralization policy impacted irrigation development? The dissertation ten explored two aspects of decentralization by focusing on village-level irrigation investment and asked: How do targeting and demand side factors drive different sources to invest in village-level irrigation development? How does the degree of local fiscal authority over irrigation funding impact village-level irrigation system performance?

Indeed, the overwhelming evidence presented in this dissertation confirms that fiscal structure impacts irrigation development – via diverse investment portfolios and localized authority over irrigation decision making – but not in the anticipated ways. Village-collective management lacked the capacity or resources to effectively manage irrigation systems and such a decentralized system left China‘s small scale irrigation

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works in shambles. To address this widespread structural decay of China‘s irrigation systems, descriptive and multivariate results show a clear re-centralizing of

investment and irrigation management by upper-level irrigation agencies. The levers of control are shifting away from village collective control over irrigation

management, and such shifts have large consequences for how village level irrigation works in northern China.

This chapter first revisits the study findings regarding the drivers of irrigation investment from three different funding sources. The next section reviews study findings on how local investment authority impacts village-level irrigation system performance, also referred to throughout the paper as irrigation development outcomes. Following this, possible strategies are proposed for policy makers to maximize the effectiveness of public and private investment into irrigation development, while also achieving the aims of increased crop yields, water

conservation and increasing farmer incomes. Finally, the key theoretical findings of this study are discussed in terms of how this empirical work contributes to the fiscal decentralization and irrigation development literatures

6.2.

Summary of findings

6.2.1. Study Overview

This dissertation set out to explain how the fiscal processes around irrigation infrastructure decision making result in a variety of village-level irrigation investment

portfolios, and how decentralized fiscal structure impacts irrigation development outcomes of agricultural productivity, water conservation, and poverty alleviation.

Using fiscal decentralization and irrigation development theory, the preceding chapters reveal the how both upper-level government targeting strategies and local level demand side drivers determine public and private investment in village –level irrigation infrastructure. The study also investigates how local revenue and water planning authority impacts irrigation development performance by examining a number of different measures of village level authority, ranging from control over discretionary funds, to decision making over key financial aspects such as fee setting and contract signing, among others. Results from the empirical analysis show that securing a future water supply, by building infrastructure to access and store water, drives farmers to invest and that decentralized control over revenue and spending decision making matters significantly for water use and farmer incomes, but not in the ways hypothesized.

6.2.1.1. Drivers of diverse village level irrigation investment

Upper-level government is not following a progressive irrigation investment strategy.

A progressive irrigation investment strategy would follow the pattern of

higher upper –level investment into villages with low-levels of irrigation development, and lower levels of funding to villages with highly developed irrigation systems. According to study results, the government is targeting investment funds toward

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increasing the quality of irrigated land in northern China but not expanding the quantity of surface water irrigated area. That is, upper-level government investment selection criteria are designed to target villages with higher levels of ability to irrigate land in their villages designated as ‗effective irrigated area‘. This targeting strategy departs from earlier strategies by the Chinese government to invest in irrigation development with the main aim to expand irrigated area (Cai 2010), but is supported by previous cost effectiveness studies that report that focusing on improving quality is a more effective irrigating development strategy than expanding irrigated area

(Hayami and Kikuchi 1978). If the public investment strategy reflects the policy aim of increasing irrigated area in order to spur agricultural productivity and increase standards of living in rural areas (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006), either the government struggles to reach under-served areas, or alternatively, focuses investment on villages with demonstrated capacity to maintain irrigated land. The targeting strategy appears to focus on increasing quality of irrigated land, rather than expanding the quantity of irrigated area.

Upper-level agencies allocate more to villages with unreliable water supply than the village collectives themselves.

As one looks to see what factors determine a village‘s irrigation investment portfolio, results indicate that unreliable water supply spurs investment from two groups, upper-level government and farmers, but not from the village collective. When considering the village-level and upper-level government policy priorities, this trend makes sense. Upper-level government not only makes investments to ensure